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## **Module 5. Southeastern Europe**

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# Module 5. Southeastern Europe

## Topography Shaped Geopolitical Reality

### Southeastern Europe

This module on Southeastern Europe focuses on the work of the OSCE missions in:

- Croatia
- Macedonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
- Bosnia-Herzegovina
- Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo
- Albania



- ★ Capital City
- Other City



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## **Mountains and Rivers**

Southeastern Europe is marked by topographical contrasts defined by its mountain ranges and river valleys. Historically, the movement of peoples and armies has been shaped by the realities of the landscape. These factors have also had an impact on the development of strong central authorities and their ability to retain control of territory. Mountains and rivers have also served as the boundary markers between states and empires.

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## **Key topography**

There are some key differences between the regions of southeastern Europe.

- Across Montenegro, Northern Albania, Northwestern Macedonia and Western Bosnia, the terrain is mountainous, with many peaks over 2000 meters.
- On the western side, the mountains drop to the sea in some places, in others yielding to a coastal plain.
- Inland, the landscape softens, most markedly in the north. The city of Zagreb is low-lying on the river Sava which flows through Sisak and Brcko in eastern Bosnia before joining the Danube in Belgrade.
- The Danube flows south and east through rich farmland, past the Croatian towns of Osijek and Vukovar before reaching Novi Sad, the capital of Vojvodina, and then Belgrade.
- Southwards from Belgrade, the main road and rail links south follow the south Morava river to Vranje and then go on to Skopje.
- From Macedonia's capital, the Vardar river valley provides a route to the rich lowlands around Thessaloniki in Greece.

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## **Transport and Communications**

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### **Communication**

Mountain ranges block easy communication, while valleys allow it. This simple truth has had considerable impact on the different histories of different parts of the Balkan peninsula.

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### **Migrations of peoples and cultures**

Slavs came to the area in the 6th or 7th century AD, although they did not penetrate the strongholds of Northern Albania.

When Ottoman armies carried the imperial expansion into Europe, cities like Belgrade and Skopje lay directly in their path as they drove northward. The inhabitants of these cities and the plains around them were directly affected by Ottoman occupation and rule. Western Macedonia, Northern Albania and Montenegro were harder to enter and of smaller strategic and economic significance for the empire, so local leaders and groups were able to preserve greater autonomy.

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### **Europe's**

When Europe's commercial influence began to penetrate the region, it followed the same routes.

**commercial influence**

Railway lines and major roads frequently followed river valleys.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was bypassed by the main rail line, which also skirted Montenegro and Kosovo. While the flow of information, goods and people was accelerated along particular routes, elsewhere it remained slow moving. The result widened the difference between those communities which benefited from the new opportunities and those that could not.

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## Early History of Southeastern Europe

### The Byzantine Period and the Early Slav Kingdoms

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**Byzantine rule and the arrival of the Slavs**

From 326 until its fall in 1453, Byzantium (or the Eastern Roman Empire) was a leading influence in the southern Balkans. Under Byzantine rule, the demography of the Balkans significantly changed, as major groups of peoples made their way there from the north and the east:

- The Slav migrations of the sixth and seventh centuries brought people south from the territory of modern Russia. They settled in lands that were thinly populated.
  - In the second half of the seventh century the Bulgars, a people related to the Tatars, swept into the region from central Asia.
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### Religious, Cultural and Political Forces Vie for Supremacy

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**Latin and Greek Christian churches**

A major religious schism developed between the Latin Christian church in the north and west of the Balkans, and the Greek Christian Church in the south and east. The line between their realms of dominance ran through modern Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Northern Albania.

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**Early Slavic Christian Kingdoms**

Different Slavic-speaking kingdoms emerged, to be absorbed or overcome by neighboring powers. These included:

- A Bulgar Kingdom, reaching its height in the ninth and tenth centuries under King Simeon before defeat by Byzantium.
- A Croatian Kingdom which fell under Hungarian control after the death of King Zvonimir in 1089.
- In the thirteenth century, Stefan Nemanja established a Serbian kingdom, while his brother, St. Sava, became head of an autonomous Serbian Church. The kingdom reached its height in the mid-fourteenth century under Stefan Dushan who made his capital in Prizren. It is in this period

that many of the monasteries and churches in modern Kosovo were constructed.

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### **Tribal system of interlinked clans in the northern mountains of Albania**

In the territory of modern Albania, a tribal system of interlinked clans persisted in the northern mountains. A similar system also survived in Montenegro, and in both places clan loyalty was more significant than religious affiliation. Along the coast and in the south were cities and towns that pledged religious alliance to either the Latin or the Greek church. Land was nominally occupied by different Slavic kingdoms, but these incursions were generally of short duration and left little trace.

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### **Byzantium, Islam and the West**

The Seljuk Turks thrust deep into the Byzantine heartland of Asia Minor by the twelfth century. Byzantium looked to the Crusades, launched from the West to reclaim the Holy Land, for assistance. But Byzantine hopes were betrayed when in 1204 the 4th Crusade sacked Byzantium, destroying its capacity to resist the Turks.

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## **Ottoman Hegemony and Legacy**

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### **Ottoman Empire and external enemies**

The armies of the Ottoman Empire continued their advance, reducing the Byzantine Empire to the size of one city, Constantinople, and sweeping on into the Balkans. Key dates in its advance were as follows:

<b>Date</b>	<b>Event</b>
<b>1389</b>	Defeat of an alliance of Christian Serbs and Albanians in the battle of Kosovo field.
<b>1453</b>	Capture of Constantinople, or Byzantium, and establishment of rule over southern Balkans.
<b>1529</b>	First siege of Vienna by Ottomans, turned back by Hapsburg Austria.
<b>1571</b>	Defeat of Ottoman fleet by the Holy League (Spain, Venice, Genoa and the Papal States) at Lepanto, preventing westward advance.
<b>1683</b>	Second Ottoman assault on Vienna failed, marking high-water mark of Ottoman expansion.
<b>1690-99</b>	Austrian, Russian and Venetian counterattacks, including the temporary recapture of Belgrade.
<b>1699</b>	Treaty of Karlowitz, where Ottomans surrendered control of

inland Croatia.

**Resistance within its frontiers**

The Empire also met resistance within its frontiers.

- In Albania, George Kastrioti, or Skanderbeg established a kingdom that kept the Ottoman armies at bay for fifteen years until his death in 1468.
- In mountainous Montenegro and in northern Albania, the inhabitants maintained a degree of local autonomy. In Montenegro, leadership was provided by the bishop-princes of Cetinje, an office founded in the early 16th century.
- Serbian religious leaders supported the Austrian offensive in the 1680s. When Ottoman forces recaptured Belgrade, the Serb patriarch led almost a quarter of a million Serbs into exile in Hapsburg territory, where they settled in the Krajina, in modern Croatia.



**Opposition overcome by force or**

For the most part, the Ottomans overcame opposition by force or persuasion. The empire permitted the practice of religions other than Islam and relied on the cooperation of religious leaders to maintain order. Individuals were nonetheless encouraged or coerced to convert.

**persuasion**

leaders to maintain order. Individuals were nonetheless encouraged or coerced to convert.

A particular point of recall in contemporary Balkan nationalisms is the devshirme, or child-tax, by which young Christian boys were recruited into the Ottoman army or civil service. More voluntary widespread conversion to Islam occurred only among the Northern Albanians after the defeat of Skanderbeg, and the Slav-speaking population of Bosnia, where neither Catholic nor Orthodox churches had acquired a firm hold.

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## Nationalism and the Fall of the Empires

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**Following the French revolution**

The following table describes events that followed the French revolution.

Date	Event
1804	Ideals of self-determination underpinned the Serb rebellion of 1804, which led to the creation of a Serbian state.
1830s	In parallel, Montenegrin autonomy was formalized and a Principality established in the 1830s.
1848	From the popular revolutions of 1848, Romania emerged as an independent state.
1878	In 1878, an uprising in Bulgaria was followed by Russian intervention and the negotiated agreement of San Stefano.
1878	The League of Prizren, an Albanian cultural association, is founded.
1903	A further rising by Orthodox Christians took place in the territory of modern Macedonia.
1909-1910	Albanians revolt against Ottoman rule.

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**Balkan Wars**

The concerted efforts of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro in the First Balkan War of 1912 ended Ottoman rule.

The Balkan allies fell out over the division of the spoils, precipitating a Second Balkan War, in which Bulgaria was defeated by Greece, Serbia and Romania. In 1913 the international community stepped in to draw new borders across the old territory of Turkey-in-Europe:

- An Albanian state was created
- Montenegro grew
- Greece and Serbia each took significant swathes of territory
- Bulgaria lost territory to Romania in its north, and gained a thin slice of territory in Macedonia, site of its most central ambition

### Territorial Growth of Yugoslavia 1815-1947



### Territorial Growth of Yugoslavia 1815-1947

-  1815 Formation of Principality of Serbia
-  1833 Turks recognize Serbian control of border regions
-  1878 Nish Pirot region ceded by Turkey
-  1913 Part of Macedonia ceded by Turkey
- 1918-1919 Kingdom of Yugoslavia formed by unification of Montenegro, and acquisitions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Slovenia from Austria  ; Croatia, Slavonia, the Voivodina, and part of the Banat from Hungary  ; and Strumitsa, Bosiligrad, Caribrod (Tsaribrod) and Timok enclaves from Bulgaria 
-  1947 Istria and the Lastovo (Lagosta) and Palagruza (Pelegosa) Islands ceded by Italy



## World War I

World War I saw the final dissolution of the Ottoman and the Hapsburg Empires. A new south Slavic state called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed in 1918; its name was changed to Yugoslavia in 1929.

Constituted as a parliamentary democracy, the new state was headed by King Alexander of the Serbian royal family and included Serbia, Montenegro, and parts of the former Austrian Empire. Delegations from Macedonia, arguing either for autonomy or for union with Bulgaria on ethnic grounds, were ignored. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's support, though, did preserve Albania from dismemberment, which was desired by Italy, Greece and Serbia.

## Inter-War Yugoslavia and Albania

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### **Serbian hegemony and its opponents in Yugoslavia**

The great internal conflict of the first Yugoslavia was over the degree of central control. As the largest national group in the country (39%) and the victors of the First World War, many Serbs and their leaders considered the new south Slavic state as "theirs."

The second largest national group, the Croats (24%) sought greater decentralization, and even autonomy. Serb hegemony also encountered violent resistance in Kosovo and Macedonia.

Violence escalated and reached the parliament on June 20, 1928, when the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Stjepan Radich was killed by a Montenegrin deputy. To restore control of the country, in 1929 King Alexander suspended the constitution and assumed the role of dictator. In pursuit of national unity, he renamed the country Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, five years later he was assassinated by Croatian and Macedonian extremists.

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### **Albania**

In Albania, internal divisions posed problems for the new country, as did the ongoing territorial claims of Italy, Greece and the new Yugoslavia. The strongest rift was a north-south divide, between Tosks in the South and Gegs in the North—groups with different dialects and histories. King Zog, a northern leader, emerged as dominant in the mid-1920s, and remained in power until 1939.

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### **Changes on the eve of World War II**

Italy invaded Albania in April, 1939. In Yugoslavia, pressure for decentralization grew stronger.

On August 26 1939, Croatian political leaders persuaded the government to grant Croatia autonomy. Slovene and Muslim demands quickly followed, reducing Yugoslavia's capacity to operate as an effective state.

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## World War II in the Region

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### **Hitler's assault**

Italy's invasion of Greece from Albania in October 1940 was beaten back. In April, 1941, Nazi Germany attacked Greece and Yugoslavia, assisted by Bulgarian forces in the latter case.

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### **Yugoslavia dismembered**

Yugoslavia was dismembered. German forces controlled the main travel artery down to Greece. They occupied Serbia, which was tightly controlled, and set up a puppet-state in Croatia under Ante Pavelich, leader of the extreme nationalist Ustase movement. This pseudo-independent state included much of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of Slovenia was assimilated by Germany, while Italy assumed control of Montenegro, the Dalmatian coast, and parts of Bosnia. Macedonia was partitioned between Bulgaria and Albania. Kosovo also became part of Albania, while eastern Vojvodina was absorbed by Hungary.

### Serbian resistance

Resistance took different forms. In Serbia, armed forces loyal to the old régime resolved to continue the struggle, under the leadership of General Draza Mihailovic. This group came to be known as the Chetniks. When their initial actions prompted massive German retaliation against civilians, they scaled down their efforts.



### Yugoslavian resistance

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito, led a more extensive resistance effort. After Germany attacked Russia, this movement grew in strength, drawing support from different national groups in Yugoslavia. In 1942 Tito announced from his headquarters in the Bosnian town of Bihac, that the national rights of all the peoples of Yugoslavia would be recognized. By mid-1943 his forces, known as Partisans, numbered over 20,000. With the collapse of Italy in September 1943, those numbers increased substantially. Their rapid growth was fueled in part by Allied commitment of support to them alone, as the most active anti-German force in the country.

REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



**Albanian resistance**

In Albania, too, there were different strands of resistance: one that could be described as nationalist, a second communist, and a third more diffuse. It was the communists, though, under the leadership of Enver Hoxha, who operated most widely. Although different groups formed a united front in 1942, Hoxha persuaded the Allies that they should only support his Partisan forces, and ultimately succeeded, as Tito did in Yugoslavia. This allowed Hoxha to defeat rivals after the collapse of Italy in 1943.

**Collaboration with Axis**

In some areas of Yugoslavia, groups supported the Axis dismantling of the country. In at least one case, collaboration extended to a duplication of Nazi crimes. The Ustase regime in Croatia operated a concentration camp, at Jasenovac, where perhaps hundreds of thousands of Jews, Gypsies, communists, and Serbs were murdered.

**Tito takes control of Yugoslavia in 1945**

In Serbia, while Tito's Partisans battled the Germans, they also fought the Chetniks. The Partisans defeated the Chetniks in the core battleground of Serbia, positioning themselves to take power in Yugoslavia at the end of the war.

## Socialist Rule in Albania and Yugoslavia

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### Enver Hoxha

In Albania, Enver Hoxha remained in power into the 1980s. In that time, Albania relied on the sponsorship of both communist superpowers, and also broke with both of them over ideological differences.

Albania remained aligned to the Soviet Union and dependent on financial aid until 1961 when the two split. Hoxha found a new source of foreign support in China, which replaced the Soviet Union as a source of funding and patronage. The new constitution of 1976 was a straightforward reassertion of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and may have contributed to the breakup with China in 1978. Both followed extensive purges by Hoxha within the ruling elite in the early 1970s.

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### Albania pursued an isolated course

Albania then pursued an isolated course, with little in the way of international contact. This was especially true for citizens, who were not permitted to travel abroad and had almost no contact with the few foreign visitors who came to Albania. Unencumbered by the national issues that played such a role in Yugoslav domestic tensions (though Albania has its own minorities), Hoxha's Albania weathered the world economic downturn of the late 1970s, and survived the death of its spiritual founder in 1985. The presidency passed smoothly to his chosen successor, Ramiz Alia, who was still the head of the state when the Cold War came to an end in 1989.

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### Yugoslavia post World War II

The Yugoslavia that emerged from World War II had the same external borders as the country that had been invaded in 1941, but it had changed within. In keeping with pledges made during the war, administrative boundaries were redrawn and the country was a federal unit composed of six republics:

- Slovenia
  - Croatia
  - Bosnia-Herzegovina
  - Serbia
  - Montenegro
  - Macedonia
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### Tito breaks with Stalin

Tito's refusal to accept absolute control by Moscow led him to break with Stalin in 1948, which put Yugoslav communism on a different track, and provided the basis for significant Western economic, and at times political support, for this independent communist state.

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### "Brotherhood and Unity"

All the domestic violence of the 1940s coupled with the hostility of the Soviet Union, made the survival of a unified communist Yugoslavia seem unlikely. Tito and the party, though, endured. They relied in part on repression, support from the West, and an ideology of "Brotherhood and Unity." Additionally, the régime continuously experimented with the constitution. There were major changes in 1953, 1963 and 1974. The last in particular represented a considerable degree of decentralization, taken in response to internal unrest, especially in Croatia and Kosovo.

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**1974  
constitution  
and Tito's  
death in 1980**

As a result of the 1974 constitution, the six republics became the main focus of political activity, with the communist party divided along republican lines. Additionally two regions within Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina, were granted autonomy. Finally the Bosnian Muslims were recognized as one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, ensuring that each of the six republics had a people, (or narod) associated with it. Federal institutions were left in place, most notably the army.

Tito did not nominate a successor. After his death in 1980, an eight-member Presidency was formed. It was composed of representatives from the six republics and the two autonomous provinces. These representatives rotated as president of the presidency, taking on the leadership role that no individual had been groomed for. The forces of centralism and greater fragmentation were now confined in a single chamber.

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## **Nationalism and Economic Downturn, 1981-1990**

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**Territorial  
integrity  
remained vital  
to the regime**

After continuing activism from its Albanian residents, Kosovo was placed under martial law in 1981. Kosovo's pursuit of formal recognition as a republic was seen in Belgrade as a first step in a secessionist agenda. Territorial integrity remained vital to the regime. Its importance only increased when the extent of foreign debt--built up during the last years of Tito's rule--came to be known.

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**Economic  
conditions**

Economic conditions nonetheless continued to worsen, partly propelled by austerity measures introduced under international pressure. Strikes became more frequent (there were 900 in 1987) and large-scale enterprises, which had run on "false" credit, collapsed. Such crises prompted calls for further revision of the country's constitution and economy, which fell into two broad camps:

- One, dominant in the wealthier republics of Croatia and Slovenia, sought greater decentralization and more republic financial and political autonomy.
- The other saw the solution to the country's woes in greater central management and the redistribution of resources, to help out the poorer regions. This idea was powerful in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

By 1982, Yugoslavia owed \$20 billion. Remittances from workers abroad, which had distinguished Yugoslavia from other Eastern European countries, had been severely reduced by the worldwide recession of the late 1970s. International Monetary Fund intervention was directed through the federal government, restoring some of the power ceded in the 1974 constitution.

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**Slobodan  
Milosevic**

There was fierce infighting within the communist parties of the Republics, and in 1987 Slobodan Milosevic became the party head in Serbia, with a mission to recentralize Serbia. The autonomy of Vojvodina was quickly rescinded, and Milosevic then turned attention to Kosovo: with loyal

allies in Montenegro and with Macedonia largely dependent upon Serbia, he would then control five of the Presidency's eight seats, and thus have power to bring about constitutional recentralization.

In Kosovo, Milosevic's bid to control the local party led to another surge in overt resistance from Kosovo's Albanians—from intellectuals to miners. Military rule was again imposed, and in 1989 Milosevic delivered his now infamous "Kosovo Polje" speech, on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, where he integrated Serbian nationalism into his communist-style centralism. In Slovenia and Croatia, leaders expressed solidarity with the Kosovo Albanian stand, and denounced Serbia actions as illegal. Milosevic nonetheless installed a virtual puppet regime in Kosovo.

### Precursors to war in Slovenia

In multiparty elections in 1990, former communists won only in Serbia and Montenegro.

Yugoslavia Prime Minister Markovic, who had overseen economic reforms and restored some confidence in the country and its currency, organized a pan-Yugoslav Reform party, but it was crowded out in the confrontation between nationalists and communists everywhere except in Macedonia.

The eight-member presidency continued to meet, with Milosevic firmly controlling four votes. In May, 1991 he mobilized that block vote to prevent the Croatian representative, Stipe Mesic, from assuming the role of president of the presidency.

This was the last straw for Croatia and Slovenia, both declared independence on June 25, 1991. The war in Slovenia started two days later.

## Croatia

### Croatia at a glance

<b>Size</b>	21,830 square miles	
<b>Capital</b>	Zagreb	
<b>Population</b>	In 2002: · 4,4 million (estimated)	<i>Between 1991 and 1998, around 130,000 Croat refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and 30,000 from Vojvodina arrived in Croatia. Some 280,000 Croatian citizens of Serb origin left, especially after 1995. Around 125,000 young educated people are also believed to have emigrated since 1991.</i>
<b>Main ethnic groups</b>	In 1991: · Croat 78.1% · Serb 12.2% (580,000)	<i>The 2001 census figures reportedly showed a two-thirds drop in the percentage of Serbs and Orthodox Christians. This reflects the exodus of many Serbs to Serbia and elsewhere, as well as the choice of many young people of mixed marriages to declare themselves as Croats.</i>
<b>Main religious groups</b>	In 1991: · Roman Catholic 76.5% · Orthodox 11.1% · Muslim 1.2%	

<p><b>Leading political parties</b></p>	<p><b>Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ)</b> Croatian Democratic Community, or HDZ. Originally nationalist, has evolved into center-right party. In government 1990-1999. Won elections in November 2003 and formed government.</p> <p><b>Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLs)</b> Croatian Social Liberal Party, or HSLs. Founded 1990. Center-left. In government coalition 2000-2002, when the party split. HSLs moved to opposition side, and a splinter party, Libra, was formed that remained in government until 2003.</p> <p><b>Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP)</b> Social Democratic Party of Croatia or SDP, former communist party. In government coalition 2000-2003.</p>
<p><b>Political System</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Formerly Bicameral, now Unicameral Parliament, (Sabor ) with 151 seats. MPs serve four-year terms.</li> <li>· President serves a five-year term, and is elected by popular vote.</li> <li>· Local government of 121 towns and 421 municipalities: state offices represented through 21 counties.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Other information</b></p>	<p><b>Currency</b> The unit of currency is the Kuna (in 2003, around 6.2 to the U.S. dollar).</p> <p><b>Language</b> The main language spoken is Croatian.</p> <p><b>Cultural</b> Before the war, Croatia relied on a tourist economy, and the Dalmatian coast remains a major source of revenue and pride. Since independence, sport has provided a powerful symbol of nationhood, with success in basketball (1992 Olympic finalists), soccer (third place in 1998 World Cup) and tennis (Goran Ivanisevic won Wimbledon in 2001).</p> <p>Croatia also produced some of the best-known feminist criticisms of socialism and the emergence of nationalism, including Slavenka Drakulic's two collections of essays <i>Balkan Express</i> and <i>How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed</i>.</p>



## Historical Background of Croatia

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### "Croatian Spring"

In the late 1960s, symbolic protest was expressed by intellectuals in Zagreb, who called for the recognition of the Croatian language. This was followed by activism by young leaders in the Croatian League of Communists, who demanded greater economic autonomy, in particular with regard to hard currency revenues from tourism. This brief period, known as the "Croatian Spring" was also marked by an upsurge in revisionist histories of Croatian nationalism: among the best-known was the denial of Ustase-sponsored murders of Serbs during World War II by a former Partisan general, Franjo Tudjman. Tito cracked down on the movement in 1972, purging the party and jailing many, including Tudjman, as dissidents.

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### The 1990s

In the first multiparty elections in Croatia, held in April 1990, the ruling League of Communists was solidly defeated. The largest share of the vote was won by the HDZ, or Croatian Democratic Community. HDZ received 42% of the popular vote, but took 58% of the seats in parliament, where Mesic became prime minister. Tudjman, leader of HDZ, became president. Under his leadership, Croatia's constitution was amended—street names and state symbols were changed, and in December 1990 the status of Serbs was changed from "constituent nation" to "national minority."

Moderate Serb parties were weakened, and more extreme pro-Belgrade forces gained ground. The Serb populations in the Krajina region—descendants of those who had left the Ottoman Empire in 1690—declared their autonomy, labeling the new Zagreb regime as Ustase. From Knin, its center, the autonomy movement expanded to include almost one fifth of Croatian territory, though less than 5% of its population. The goal of its leaders was to remain part of a state in which Serbs were a majority—whether Yugoslavia, "Greater Serbia" or, in the last resort, their own republic.

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### Boycotted Croatian referendum

When Croatia held a referendum on independence, the Krajina Serbs boycotted the process, and held their own, reaffirming their commitment to Yugoslavia. Similar sentiments were expressed in Slavonia, Croatia's right bank territory on the Danube river that forms its border with Serbia.

In May 1991, in Borovo Selo, a community close to the Danube and the border city of Vukovar, a major firefight between Serbian irregulars and Croatian police left at least fifteen people dead.

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### Croatia formally recognized in 1992

Until late 1991, Yugoslav Army, Serbian and Montenegrin forces challenged the Croatian secession. It was in this period that the high-profile sieges of Vukovar, on the Danube upstream from Novi Sad, and Dubrovnik, on the Dalmatian coast close to the Montenegrin and Bosnia borders, took place.

While the damage to Dubrovnik attracted international attention, Vukovar was systematically leveled by Yugoslav forces, and finally fell after six months of fighting, and several hundred of its defenders were murdered. Under international pressure, a ceasefire was signed in January 1992, and soon afterwards Croatia formally recognized. This left almost a third of Croatia's territory in Serb hands, with UN monitors along the confrontation lines between Croatian forces and breakaway Serb elements, while the focus of fighting shifted to Bosnia. After a limited offensive in 1993, the Croatian military launched a major military offensive in the summer of 1995. Over 200,000 Croatian Serbs fled into exile in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

in Serbia. Croatian sovereignty was restored over the whole territory except a thin slice along the Danube. Vukovar and Borovo Selo, where the violence had begun, were restored to Croatia in a UN-mediated hand-over that began in November 1995 and concluded in 1998.

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## Political Developments in Croatia

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### **Croatia's "Patriotic War"**

Throughout Croatia's perceived "Patriotic War," Tudjman and his HDZ party remained dominant, and until 1994, supported the creation and expansion of "Herceg-Bosna," in areas of Western Bosnia with Croat majorities.

Although many Bosnian Croats supported the Bosnian government in its fight against the Yugoslav National Army, violent Croat-Bosnian fighting took place in 1993, especially around the city of Mostar, on the Neretva river. In November 1993, Croatian bombardment destroyed the bridge at Mostar, dating from the sixteenth century. Fighting accompanied by atrocities continued until February 1994 when an internationally brokered ceasefire and agreement was made to form a Bosniak-Croat Federation.

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### **Challenge to Bosnian sovereignty and independence**

Tudjman and his allies nonetheless continued to extend support to Herceg-Bosna, challenging Bosnian sovereignty and independence. This stance drove Stipe Mesic to leave the HDZ to found the Croatian Independent Democrats (HND) in 1994.

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### **Opposition parties triumphed in 2000**

In 1998, HSLs and SDP formed an opposition coalition for elections in 2000. HSS formed a wider opposition coalition with the HNS and two other smaller parties, and the two coalitions cooperated loosely. Benefiting from international assistance, public concern with HDZ cronyism, and perhaps most centrally, Tudjman's death in December 1999, opposition parties triumphed. In the 151-seat assembly, the SDP won 44 seats, HSLs 24, and HSS 16. The HDZ won 40 seats, including seats allotted to "Croats abroad" and largely determined by Croats in Bosnia who favor the expansionist ideals of the HDZ. SDP leader Ivica Racan became prime minister. His coalition partner, Drazen Budisa, stood for election as president, but was defeated by Mesic: both outpolled the HDZ candidate, Mate Granic, who broke with HDZ in Spring 2000 to form a new party.

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### **Inter-party disputes and reorganized coalitions**

Prime Minister Racan and President Mesic both favored policies of breaking with Croatia's nationalist past and taking the country into the European Union. Their willingness to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague (ICTY) and pursue pragmatic policies upset some political allies as well as opponents. Drazen Budisa resigned as HSLs leader in 2001 when two Croat generals, Ante Gotovina and Rahim Ademi, were indicted by the ICTY and the government pledged willingness to extradite them. Budisa resumed his leadership later that year, but in 2002 a more serious rift between HSLs and SDP occurred, over cooperation with Slovenia. When the coalition collapsed, Racan resigned as prime

minister. Mesic reappointed him, and Racan formed a new coalition which included SDP and a number of smaller parties, one of which was the new Libra, formed by a majority of HSL's former ministers in government. Budisa resigned again as HSL's leader. Squabbles with Slovenia continued, including a high profile dispute over control of territorial waters.

In parliamentary elections on November 23 2003, SDP's new coalition won only 41 seats, while the HDZ, under the new leadership of Ivo Sanadar, won 66. HDZ was able to form a majority government in coalition with the Croatian Peasant Party, the HSP. HDZ's new leader, Sanadar, is widely viewed as a moderate figure, who has already made symbolic gestures of reconciliation towards Croatia's Serbs.

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### **Goal of accession into NATO and the EU**

The post-Tudjman government of 1999-2003 pursued good relations with the international community with the goal of accession into NATO and the EU. Although Croatia was not named as one of the countries scheduled for EU accession in 2004, integration remained a key goal, signaled by the creation of a Ministry for European Integration.

HDZ's election victory in 2003 reportedly represented voter frustration at slow economic improvement, rather than a rejection of pro-European policy.

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### **OSCE**

Established in 1996, the [OSCE mission to Croatia](#) plays the following roles:

- assisting in the protection of human rights and the rights of minorities, including the return of refugees and internally displaced persons
- deploying of civilian police monitors
- face-lifting the building of democratic institutions and civil society

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## **Issues for the Future**

### **Herceg-Bosna aspirations of autonomy**

Herceg-Bosna and the aspirations of its leaders for autonomy will continue to pose pressures on Croatian international relations. Incidents like the declaration of self-rule for three Croat dominated cantons by a Croat Assembly in Mostar, and subsequent dismissal of the Croat member of the presidency, Ante Jelavic by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2001 posed a dilemma for the Croatian government. Sanadar's new government, as it seeks to maintain the international dialogues set in motion by its predecessor, faces the same balancing problems as it aims towards membership of the EU, but remains aware of the need to retain the support of citizens fiercely proud of the country's hard-won independence.

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## **Mini-Quiz**

### **The HDZ under new leader Ivo Sanadar:**

- is guarded on good relations with the international community and integration in Western institutions
- has moved from its nationalist roots to become a center-right party
- opposes cooperation with the International Criminal Court of the former Yugoslavia
- has a tense relationship with OSCE

## Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

### Macedonia at a glance

<b>Size</b>	9,780 square miles.	
<b>Capital</b>	Skopje	
<b>Population</b>	In 2002 (results announced December 2003): · 2.022 million	
<b>Main ethnic groups</b>	In 2002: · Macedonian 64.18% · Albanian 25.17% · Turkish 3.85% · Roma 2.66% · Serb 1.78 % · other 2.4%	<i>Albanians have claimed that censuses have consistently under-represented the number of Albanians.</i>
<b>Main Religious groups</b>	In 1991: · Macedonian Orthodox 67% · Muslim 30%	
<b>Leading Political Parties</b>	<p><b>SDSM, or Social Democratic Party of Macedonia</b> Former Communist Party. Headed by Branko Crvenkovski.</p> <p><b>VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity</b> Founded 1989. Nationalist, Center-right. Headed by Ljubcho Georgievski until his resignation in 2003. Subsequently headed by Nikola Gruevski.</p> <p><b>DUI, or Democratic Union for Integration</b> Leading Albanian party formed 2001, led by former National Liberation Army (UCK) leader Ali Ahmeti.</p> <p><b>DPA, or Democratic Party of Albanians</b>(also known as PDPA-NDP) Formed by a faction of PDP in 1994. Headed by Arben Xhaferi.</p>	
<b>System of government</b>	Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991.  It has a directly elected president, serving a five-year term: and an Assembly of 120 seats, whose members serve a four-year term. They are currently elected by a mixed system of direct election from voting districts, and proportional representation.	
<b>Other information</b>	<p><b>Currency</b> The unit of currency is the Denar.</p> <p><b>Language</b> · The official language is Macedonian, a Slavic language, as well as any other language (e.g. Albanian) spoken by at least 20% of the population. · Albanian is used extensively, especially in the northern and western areas of the country.</p>	

**Culture**

The country has experienced earthquakes in the past, the most devastating of which in modern times destroyed Skopje in 1963. The city was rebuilt in high modernist style, and grew from 80,000 to 600,000 inhabitants.

There is a wide gap between levels of development in different parts of the country: some villages remain almost inaccessible by car.

Macedonia gained international visibility in 1994 with the release of the film *Before the Rain* by director Milcho Manchevski, a fictional portrayal of love and violence between cultures.



## Historical Background of Macedonia

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**Bulgaria,  
Greece, Serbia  
claims  
Macedonian  
territory**

In the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the "Macedonian question" was a major problem for European diplomats. Bulgarian claims on the area were based primarily on ethnic and linguistic arguments, while Greece appealed to classical history.

Following Russia's military victory over the Turkish Empire, the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano created a "Greater Bulgaria" which included almost all of "greater" Macedonia as well as much of modern Albania. The other great powers overturned this treaty, leaving Macedonia under Ottoman rule for another thirty-five years, during which time Serbia and Greece also launched claims on its territory and people.

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**Ilinden Uprising**

In 1893, a secret Macedonian revolutionary organization was formed by a group of teachers and other activists in the region. The organization, known as VMRO, also had internal

## **against Ottoman rule**

divisions, as some of its members favored close links with Bulgaria, while others pursued greater autonomy. In August 1903, the organization staged the Ilinden Uprising against Ottoman rule, anticipating external intervention from the European powers, as had occurred elsewhere. Their hopes were disappointed: the Ottoman army and Muslim population launched savage reprisals, and the organization split into leftist (later communist) and rightist (generally pro-Bulgarian) factions, that fought running battles with Ottoman forces, Greek and Serbian guerrilla bands, and each other.

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## **Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria pooled their military resources**

By 1912, Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria had decided to pool their military resources. In the First Balkan War, together with Montenegro, they defeated Ottoman forces on every front.

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## **Bulgaria launches second Balkan War**

After the war, Bulgaria asked that Serbia transfer territory to it, as the alliance had agreed. Serbia, however, refused, keeping the area around Ohrid, Bitola and Skopje as recompense for the territory in Albania that was expected, but which the Great Powers had turned into a new nation-state. Bulgaria then launched the Second Balkan War against its former allies, and was quickly defeated. Today, Macedonia (FYROM) comprises that area taken by Serbia.

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## **Patterns of Balkan Alliance**

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### **1941 and 1944**

The struggle over Macedonia drove Balkan alliances in World War II as in World War I. In each case Bulgaria threw in its lot with Germany in return for the promise of expansion into Macedonia.

Bulgaria occupied Macedonia from 1941 to 1944. Macedonia emerged in 1944 as a Republic in the new Yugoslavia federal state established by Tito. This was the first time Macedonia was recognized as a nation.

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### **Symbolic nationalism**

Symbolic nationalism was encouraged during the Tito period despite the commitment to federalism: the Macedonian language was codified, and the Macedonian Orthodox Church restored in 1967 – on the two-hundredth anniversary of the closure of the Ohrid Bishopric under Ottoman rule.

Tito also used the Macedonian question as a weapon of foreign policy when needed, contrasting the "free" expression of Macedonian identity in Yugoslavia with its denial in Bulgaria and Greece.

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## **Macedonia dependent on Yugoslavia and Serbia**

Within federal Yugoslavia, Macedonians fared well, though the republic was seen as a backwater. In economic and cultural terms, it was dependent on Yugoslavia, and especially its large neighboring Republic of Serbia. A key point of influence was in the realm of relations between the Slavic majority and the growing Albanian minority, where Macedonia's relationship with its Western areas resembled Serbia's with Kosovo.

Between 1951 and 1981, Albanian cultural rights in Macedonia steadily improved. After the demonstrations in Pristina in 1981, though, Macedonian authorities followed the Serbian lead in taking repressive measures against the minority. As elsewhere, adversity strengthened the will and resolve of Macedonia's Albanians, many of whose elites had been educated in Pristina.

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## **Fissures in Macedonian politics**

The elections of 1990 showed the fissures in Macedonian politics. A new nationalist coalition was headed by VMRO-DPMNE, which revived the name of the 1893 revolutionary organization and won 37 seats. The former League of Communists won 30 seats, while a pro-Yugoslav coalition around Yugoslav Prime Minister Markovic's Reform Alliance won 17 seats.

Macedonia's Albanians, in an early sign that they saw their political future in different terms, voted for ethnically defined parties, the largest of which was the Party for Democratic Prosperity, with 24 seats.

The parliament chose Kiro Gligorov, a prominent figure from the League of Communists, as President. As Yugoslavia approached its collapse, Gligorov worked with other Republic Presidents to try and patch together a solution in the form of an asymmetrical federation. Macedonia's representative to the collective presidency, Vasil Tupurkovski, also pursued the same agenda, trying to manufacture a compromise.

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## **Republic of Macedonia Declared**

### **Republic of Macedonia unrecognized independence**

After a referendum in November 1991 expressing overwhelming support (but boycotted by Albanians) the Republic of Macedonia declared independence. It then applied for recognition from the European Community's Badinter Commission, a panel of experts created to guide EC policy on recognition of Yugoslavia's Republics as independent states.

While the Badinter Commission recommended recognition of Macedonian independence owing to its compliance with international norms on human rights, the EC did not follow the recommendation. Objections were raised by Greece, which saw in the creation of a state named Macedonia the possibility of claims on northern Greece, a region which was the heart of so-called "Historical Macedonia."

The Republic thus entered a twilight zone of unrecognized independence. It avoided involvement in the Yugoslav wars of succession, as President Gligorov successfully negotiated the departure of Yugoslav National Army forces, and in 1993 arranged the stationing of UN forces in Macedonia, known as UNPROFOR initially, then as UNPREDEP, as a check on any future Serbian aggression. Financially though the Republic was

devastated. Cut off from its old markets and connections in Serbia and beyond by international sanctions, it was unable to create new ones until its status was resolved.

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### **1994 parliamentary and presidential elections**

In parliamentary and presidential elections (held together in 1994) VMRO-DPMNE, led by Ljubcho Georgievski, challenged the government record and put up a famous theater director, Ljubisha Georgievski (no relation) as presidential candidate. Gligorov's personal standing allowed him to gain a second term, and the first round of voting in parliamentary elections indicated that the SDSM Social Democrat-led alliance, which included Liberals and Socialists, had held off the opposition challenge. Claiming electoral fraud, VMRO-DPMNE boycotted the second round, leaving the alliance with 97 out of 120 seats in parliament.

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## **Albanian Dissent**

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### **Albanians seek greater cultural rights and constitutional reform**

The same election saw the division of PDP, the main Albanian party. A more radical faction under the leadership of Arben Xhaferi formed a new party, the PDPA, which later called itself the Democratic Party of Albanians, or DPA. This jockeying was accompanied by the development of more active Albanian dissent.

Following the boycott of the referendum and the 1991 census, radical factions emerged which campaigned for greater cultural rights and constitutional reform.

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### **Conflict breaks out**

Violent clashes occurred between Albanians and security forces on several occasions, the most visible being in Tetovo in 1995, when an illegal Albanian-language university was opened. In the course of confrontations between crowds and police trying to close down the university, several people were killed.

In Gostivar two years later, a dispute occurred over the display of Turkish and Albanian flags at a local government office. This was declared illegal and prevented by police action.

There were also scattered border incidents and bomb attacks, suggesting that armed and militant factions existed among Macedonia's Albanians.

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### **Accord between FYROM and Greece**

An agreement was finally signed between Skopje and Athens in 1995 that normalized relations between the two states and lifted the Greek blockade despite Athens' objections to what it considers Skopje's use of a Hellenic name and symbols for itself. The agreement facilitated Macedonian recognition and entry into international institutions.

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## Economic Conditions in Macedonia

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### **Grey and black economy in Macedonia**

The period after 1994 also saw the further development of an illegal economy in Macedonia. War profiteers had operated sanctions-busting smuggling in the early years of international sanctions against Belgrade: their activities now diversified. Gligorov himself was the target of a car bomb in September 1995. He survived, though he lost an eye. Public discontent grew as stories of insider buy-outs of state assets became widely known, and other scandals broke, including the collapse of a pyramid savings bank in 1997.

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## Domestic Politics in Macedonia

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### **Cooperation between Parties**

VMRO-DPMNE spent this period consolidating its support base at the local level. Conscious of the need to be internationally credible as a party of government, the party publicly transformed itself from nationalist to center-right.

In the run-up to the 1998 parliamentary elections, VMRO-DPMNE also forged an alliance with the Democratic Alternative, a new party founded by Vasil Tupurkovski, who had spent most of the period since 1990 in the USA. Tupurkovski pledged economic recovery through foreign investment—an updated version of Yugoslav tactics. VMRO-DPMNE, meanwhile, mobilized the strong power base they had built across the country. The VMRO/DA coalition took 59 seats: the SDSM, alienated from its former coalition partners, 29.

What was still more surprising was the subsequent announcement of a governing coalition between VMRO and DA and Xhaferi's DPA, which took 11 seats to PDP's 12.

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### **The Taiwan Flap**

Soon after their victory Tupurkovski announced that to fulfill his pre-election commitment, he had secured major support from Taiwan, and that Macedonia would extend diplomatic recognition to Taiwan.

The extension of UNPREDEP in the Republic was then blocked by China: with the escalation of tensions in Kosovo, NATO forces deployed under a UN mandate stayed in place, but as a NATO force. The Taiwan deal collapsed, and Tupurkovski was widely discredited. It was assumed that he would be put forward as a coalition candidate for President in 1999 to succeed Gligorov, whose legal term would end. In the event, all three coalition partners entered the race, as did three others: Tupurkovski was eliminated in the first round, and in the second Boris Trajkovski, the VMRO candidate, defeated Tito Petkovski, from SDSM.

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### **1998 Presidential Elections**

The elections were marked by virulent anti-Albanian rhetoric from the SDSM candidate, and afterwards by opposition accusations of vote fraud, especially in areas with majority Albanian population, where Trajkovski outpolled Petkovski by a massive margin.

At the level of government, cooperation between Albanian and Macedonian parties continued including agreement on a university in Tetovo and progress toward greater

decentralization. Relations with Bulgaria, Albania and Greece improved, and the international community clearly welcomed the new government's pragmatism.

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### **Mutual Mistrust between Macedonians and Albanians**

The government was able to cope with the 1999 Kosovo crisis, when over 250,000 Kosovar Albanians found refuge in the country, and NATO's presence in Macedonia expanded considerably.

Mutual mistrust between Macedonians and Albanians nonetheless continued to rise. The war in Kosovo and post-war conditions there were widely taken as signs that NATO, and especially the USA, were now solidly pro-Albanian.

Facing widespread employment as a result of state sector reform, many Macedonians believed that the new government was selling off national industry for short-term personal profit, and permitting Albanian criminal networks to evade legal oversight and operate unchecked in Western Macedonia.

For their part, Macedonia's Albanians continued to press for constitutional change and greater regional autonomy. In the wake of numerous scandals, the Democratic Alternative left government, as did a splinter group of VMRO-DPMNE MPs, but the coalition of VMRO-DPMNE and DPA survived, with DPA assuming an ever-greater prominence.

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### **Prizren Document**

Macedonia's northern border with Yugoslavia was finally confirmed, after nine years of indeterminacy, in early 2001. Immediately afterwards a border village, Tanusevci, was occupied by armed Albanians of the National Liberation Army, or NLA, a new force led by Ali Ahmeti. With some assistance from KFOR troops in controlling the border, Macedonian security forces recaptured the village. The NLA regrouped and expanded its activities to villages around Tetovo and Kumanovo, in north and northwest Macedonia, and also moved into Aracinovo, a suburb of Skopje, in the late Spring.

The Macedonian media was strident in its criticism after Albanian political leaders from Macedonia met with KLA leaders and signed a common platform, known as the Prizren document. The European Union led mediation efforts between Albanian and Macedonian parliamentary parties while sporadic fighting continued, displacing thousands of Albanians and Macedonians, and leaving at least a hundred people dead.

Human rights violations on both sides were reported. Under heavy European and U.S. pressure, peace accords called the Framework Agreement were signed in Ohrid in mid-August 2001 by representatives from VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, PDP and DPA. NATO troops oversaw disarmament of the separatists while parliament continued to debate proposed constitutional changes.

Since then, the primary goal of the international community in Macedonia has been to support implementation, by all Macedonian parties, of the Framework Agreement. In early 2003, the EU took over peacekeeping duties in Macedonia from NATO.

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### **2002 Elections**

The Social Democrats (SDSM) led by Branko Crvenkovski headed a coalition "For Macedonia Together" that included the Liberal Democratic Party under Petar Goshev and a number of other smaller parties. The coalition defeated the VMRO-DPMNE-led coalition. Crvenkovski had been Prime Minister for six years (1992-1998) following Macedonia's

independence in 1991.

The other winner with 12% of the vote was the ethnic Albanian based Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), led by former National Liberation Army (UCK) leader Ali Ahmeti. The Democratic Party of Albanians, a coalition partner of the VMRO-DPMNE, won just 4% of the vote.

The OSCE election observation mission assessed the elections as largely in accordance with international standards. The election was peaceful, despite some incidents of violence in the preceding days.

SDSM formed a governing coalition with DUI and a number of other smaller parties. Ali Ahmeti himself did not take a post in the new government.

Subsequently, VMRO-DPMNE and DPA leaders publicly called for the partition of Macedonia along ethnic lines, between Macedonian and Albanian regions. Ljupcho Georgievski resigned as VMRO-DPMNE leader, replaced by the more moderate Nikola Gruevski. Arben Xhaferi offered his resignation as DPA leader, but party members persuaded him to remain at the helm. While these two leaders have disowned the Ohrid Agreement they signed, the government has continued to work to implement its terms.

SDSM and DUI have worked more slowly towards full implementation of the Ohrid Agreement than the original timetable envisaged. A particularly tough issue remains the law on decentralization, which calls for the redrawing of municipal boundaries, and provokes fears among different ethnic groups that they may become neglected minorities in the new units.

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### Trajkovski Killed in Plane Crash

President Trajkovski was killed in an airplane crash in February 2004. The Speaker of Parliament, Ljupco Jordanovski, became Acting President.

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## Macedonian Culture

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### Old and new

Skopje, the country's capital, is home to between a quarter and a third of the country's total population. In between its modern high rises one can still see a more practical economy at work: sheep and horses grazing on patches of green, people fishing in the river. These are reminders that the influx of international personnel and business has not altered everyone's lives.

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### Workday

A shift is underway from a 7a.m. - 3p.m. working day, with some adopting a more "westernized" 9-5. But for most families, the main meal of the day remains *ruchak*, a (late) lunch eaten around 3pm. This fits with a pattern of taking a short rest from around 5-7 in the afternoon, which then allows for socializing in the evening.

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## Social

Different generations go out at different times: so the main square in Skopje in the afternoon will be full of pensioners, at around 8 pm young families, and at around midnight, teenagers. Different parts of the city are popular with different sets: after the tensions of recent years, Macedonians have tended to favor cafes and bars in the more homogenous shopping centers like those of Karposh. Even in hard economic times or during threats of armed conflict, people continue to value sociability.

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## Traditional way of life

Outside the capital and large cities like Tetovo, you can feel like you are entering a different world. Some mountain villages, where stone houses are closely clustered on the hillsides, can be reached only with four-wheel drive vehicles. Often only the elderly remain, as younger generations have left for Skopje or, increasingly after the end of Yugoslavia, and in line with earlier practice, to seek their fortunes abroad.

But in the plains of the west people still live by agriculture and work the fields-- tobacco is a major crop (smoking is very much a part of social life), as are peppers, beans and onions. Goats and sheep graze in the hills. Some of the remote villages are very poor-- often water supplies are erratic, and school facilities for children run-down or absent.

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## Families

In the very hot months of the summer, Skopje slows down, and towns and villages may appear busier, as people seek refuge from the heat in weekend homes, or *vikendici*, in the hills around Skopje, or in their familial village or town. Most people in Skopje still have relatives outside the city, and communities remain close and tight-knit. Families are generally close, and people often also identify closely with their graduating high school class. Gender divisions remain strong, especially in household labor.

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## Relaxation and entertainment

The summer also sees the resort towns on Lake Ohrid booming, as Skopje empties out. People find it expensive to vacation abroad. Internet cafes are commonplace in Skopje and are spreading into other communities, especially serving teenagers who almost all study English now, and thirst for contact with the wider world. But the pace of life remains relaxed, and most people still value "home-made" entertainment over mass-produced substitutes.

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## Food and hospitality

Hospitality remains an ideal: the "traditional" offering of some kind of sweet, or *slatko*, and water, is still commonplace, followed by either alcohol or Turkish coffee, which can be served sweet, medium, or bitter.

There is a certain pride in having homemade brandy to offer a guest: and people generally prefer home-cooked food, especially regional specialties like the red pepper relish, or *ajvar*, and oven-baked beans. So people shop regularly for fresh produce, and the Bit Pazar, the city's largest market, is a feast for the senses, where one can also buy household goods for the best prices in the city. Now, though, supermarkets like the Greek-owned Vero are increasingly popular, especially for young, two-career families.

One dish people go out for is *burek*: pastry filled with cheese, meat or spinach, and eaten late at night or as breakfast, usually with yogurt. Sit-down restaurants' main domestic trade comes from weddings, which are often lavish affairs.

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## Celebrations

The religious calendar remains important. New Year's Eve, Easter for Orthodox Christians, and *Bajram* for Muslims are major celebrations. Christians also celebrate name days (that is, the feast of the saint who bears their name). Birthdays are also celebrated, especially for children. It is a sign of things to come, perhaps, that one of the favorite locations for children's birthday parties is the downtown McDonalds.

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## Prospects and Challenges

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### Fate of Kosovo

The fate of Kosovo is also relevant to Macedonia, as the NLA has close links with the KLA, including personnel and leaders in common, and more moderate Albanian leaders find themselves under pressure from radical factions.

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### Macedonian paramilitaries are now operational

Moderates on the Macedonian side, too, face challenges from more militant elements, and there are reports that Macedonian paramilitaries also exist. The international presence in and commitment to Macedonia continues to play a key role, and the OSCE mission, present since 1992, is a critical component.

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### Growth of a grey economy

The economy remains a key site of tension: the fragility of the formal sector has undoubtedly contributed to the growth of a significant illegal economy. Beyond tax avoidance and smuggling lie more overt forms of corruption and criminality, which the state is unable to police effectively. The violence of 2001 was often interpreted as ethnic, but some argue that it was largely driven by disputes over the control of cross-border traffic in drugs, weapons and people, including women for prostitution. Sporadic violence against individuals and property, including symbols of the state, continues to be a problem, especially in western Macedonia.

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### Narod

Like other former republics, Macedonia continues to struggle with the Yugoslav legacy, which shapes current debates over human rights.

For Albanian and Macedonian political parties, the distinction between majority and minority remains more critical than the issue of individual human rights. Other viewpoints, whether from Macedonia's other smaller ethnic groups which mostly support the government, or from the women's movement, which points to lack of education and opportunity, especially among the rural population, are marginalized in the present conflict.

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## Mini-Quiz

### The Ohrid Framework Agreement seeks to:

- prevent the "spillover" of conflict from Serbia into FYROM
- resolve differences between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo
- establish a mutually satisfactory relationship between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in the FYROM
- build a new relationship between the FYROM and Serbia (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)

## Bosnia-Herzegovina

### Bosnia-Herzegovina at a glance

<b>Size</b>	19,740 square miles	<i>Internally divided between the joint Bosniak/Croat Federation (about 51% of the territory) and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (about 49% of the territory)</i>
<b>Capital</b>	Sarajevo	
<b>Population</b>	In 1991: · 4.3 million.  In 2002: · 3.96 million (estimated)	<i>The distribution of this population is disputed, partly because of the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Republika Srpska is home to between 20% and 33% of the total.</i>
<b>Main ethnic groups</b>	In 1991: · Muslim (now Bosniak) 44% · Serb 31% · Croat 17% · Yugoslav 5.5%.	<i>Republika Srpska, in 2001, is 95% Serb. The Federation remains ethnically diverse, but exact figures are hard to produce due to the number of refugees and IDPs. Estimates from 2000 were Bosniak 48%, Serb 37.1%, Croat 14.3%, other 0.5%.</i>
<b>Main Religious groups</b>	In 1991: · Muslim 40% · Orthodox 31% · Roman Catholic 15% · Protestant 4%	
<b>Leading Political Parties</b>	<p><b>Social Democratic Party, or SDP</b> Created in 1998 from existing social democratic parties in the Federation; has led the Coalition for a Democratic and United Bosnia-Herzegovina (KCD) since 2000, though support for the party slumped from 26% to 16% in the 2002 general elections.</p> <p><b>Party for Democratic Action, or SDA</b> Muslim-led, dominant in Republic and Federation politics from 1990-2000. Regained ground in 2002 elections.</p> <p><b>Croatian Democratic Community, or HDZ.</b> Dominant in Herzegovina and other Croat-majority areas.</p> <p><b>Party for Bosnia Herzegovina, or SBH</b> Founded by former SDA Prime Minister Haris Siladzic in 1996.</p> <p><b>Serbian Democratic Party, or SDS.</b></p>	

	<p>Dominant in Republika Srpska .</p> <p><b>Independent Social Democratic Party, or SNSD</b>          Founded in Banja Luka, 1992.</p>
<b>System of government</b>	<p>The 1995 Dayton Agreement created a joint multi-ethnic and democratic government. This national government—based on proportional representation similar to that which existed in the former socialist regime—is charged with conducting foreign, economic, and fiscal policy.</p> <p>A second tier of government, is comprised of two entities-- a joint Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska (RS).</p> <p>The 1995 Dayton Agreements also created the Office of the High Representative (OHR), held by an international administrator with far-reaching powers. Wolfgang Petritsch, HR from 1999-2002, used these powers to bring about constitutional change and outlaw nationalist politicians. Since 2002, Lord Paddy Ashdown has sought to increase Bosnians' responsibility for and ownership of their future.</p>
<b>Other information</b>	<p><b>Currency</b>          The Konvertible Mark (KM) is fixed at the rate of the Euro and is used throughout BiH.</p> <p><b>Languages</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Serbo-Croat</li> <li>· Bosnian</li> <li>· Serbian</li> <li>· Croatian</li> </ul> <p>The three main peoples used to all speak dialects of a single language called Serbo-Croat, but language has been politicized and now three languages, Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian exist, all largely mutually intelligible.</p> <p><b>Culture</b></p> <p>Sarajevo produced much of Yugoslavia's best-loved rock music in the 1970s, featuring bands like <i>Belo Dugme</i> (White Button). Bosnia-Herzegovina was also the birthplace of 1961 Nobel Laureate for Literature Ivo Andric, whose best known work is the 1945 <i>Bridge on the Drina</i>.</p> <p>Danis Tanovic became a national hero when he won the Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film for his anti-war film <i>No Man's Land</i>.</p> <p>Bosnians prided themselves also on brewing the best Turkish coffee in the former Yugoslavia.</p>



## Historical Background of Bosnia-Herzegovina

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### Unique among Yugoslavia's republics in not having a *narod*

Bosnia, with its population of Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosniaks, was unique among Yugoslavia's republics in not having a single dominant majority people, or *narod*. Muslims were only recognized as a *narod* in the 1974 constitution: used as a national category, the term did not necessarily denote strong religious conviction.

Sarajevo was perhaps the most diverse city in Yugoslavia, and played host to the winter Olympics in 1984.

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### Multiparty elections in November 1990

In multiparty elections in November 1990, ethnically based parties won 86% of the Bosnian Assembly's 240 seats. The two largest parties were the Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA) with 86 seats, and the Serbian Democratic party SDS, with 72 seats.

SDA had two prominent leaders: Fikret Abdic, a successful businessman who had strong regional support around Bihac, and the Sarajevan Alija Izetbegovic, who had served a prison sentence for promoting Islamic views in the 1980s. Izetbegovic won the presidency.

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### Serbian and Croatian planning to divide up the

Many Serbs and Croats appealed to their co-nationals in Bosnia, with the goal of dividing up the Republic. Responding to the threat, Izetbegovic supported an internationally brokered model of "cantonization" which was to satisfy the overlapping claims to self-determination made by the republic's different populations. Many parts of the country, though, were already under the control of the Yugoslav National Army, and many Bosnian Serbs resisted the

## Republic

creation of an international frontier between themselves and Serbia.

Referenda held in Serbian areas between November 1991 and January 1992 expressed a majority desire to be excluded from a sovereign, independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. As that outcome drew nearer, given the massive support expressed by Bosniaks and Croats in a referendum in February 1992, Bosnian Serb political leaders, among whom Radovan Karadzic was prominent, declared their own constitution.

Escalating violent incidents came to a head on April 6, 1992, when the European Community recognized Bosnia, and Serbian gunmen killed participants in a peace demonstration in Sarajevo.

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## The Bosnian War: 1992-1995

### **278,000 people killed, 1.25 million refugees**

According to figures from the post-war Bosnian government, 278,000 people were killed during the fighting in Bosnia, and 1.25 million people left the country as refugees. The levels of savagery, which included rape as a weapon and the murder of civilians or surrendered enemies generated enormous hate, fear and mistrust.

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## Territory

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was over territory, and went through several phases. The Bosnian government, in which Muslims, Serbs and Croats participated, originally fought a largely defensive battle to try and retain enough land to make a viable state. They had considerable support in cities, where the multi-ethnic ideal was strongest.

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### **Bosnian Serb militants under Karadzic**

The Bosnian Serb militants under Karadzic, with considerable support from the Yugoslav National Army, sought to establish complete control in areas where they were in the majority, as well as a large part of the countryside. Their two political centers were Pale and Banja Luka. They also laid siege to urban centers that supported the government, including Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Tuzla.

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### **Serb forces sought to secure communications between Serb areas in Bosnia**

Serb forces also sought to secure communications between Serbia and enclaves in the Krajina, which is why the town of Brcko was so important to them, as a corridor between two Serb-dominated areas in Bosnia. Serbs were also the local majority in the extreme South of the country, around the city of Trebinje.

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### **Many Croats aligned to Zagreb**

While many Bosnian Croats supported the Bosnian government, others saw their futures as aligned to Croatia. The latter faction were particularly strong in Western Herzegovina, under the leadership of Mate Boban, where their goal was control of the city of Mostar and eventual inclusion in "Greater Croatia."

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**Separatist Croats and Serbs count on help from neighboring countries**

Separatist Croats and Serbs could initially count on logistic help from neighboring countries: the Bosnian government was isolated, and militarily at a disadvantage. Its main asset was the continuing support of many Bosnians of all ethnic groups, and international recognition.

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**Bosnian government hoped for an internationally enforced peace settlement**

In the first months of the war, the Bosnian government pinned its hopes on surviving until an internationally enforced peace settlement was reached. In the region of Bihac, Fikret Abdic pursued a different policy of accommodation with Croat and Serb forces, eventually declaring regional autonomy and signing a separate peace in 1992.

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## **Disunity of International Community**

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**International Peacekeeping Failed to End Violence**

During 1992-1995, international forces were deployed under the auspices of United Nations peacekeeping, but under a mandate which restricted soldiers' capacity to deter violence.

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**Bosnian separatists saw no compelling reason to cease military action**

The result was that Bosnian Serb and Croatian nationalist militants each saw no compelling reason to cease successful military action. In July 1992, Boban followed the Serbian lead by declaring autonomy in Herceg-Bosnia. By early 1993, Croat and Bosnian government forces were in direct conflict.

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**Bosnian-Croatian Federation**

International intervention stepped up after February 6, 1994, when a mortar shell killed 68 civilians and wounded 200 in Sarajevo's marketplace, prompting action to enforce the removal of Bosnian Serb artillery from around Sarajevo. In a determined and internationally driven effort to equalize military capacity, a Bosnian-Croatian Federation was formed.

The new Federation launched successful attacks in central Bosnia against the Serbs. Its priority, though, was to re-establish central control over Abdic's Bihac Bosniak fiefdom, which was achieved in August 1994. Abdic and over 20,000 Bosniak supporters retreated into Croatia.

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**Bosnian Serb military seeks to eliminate UN-supported "safe havens"**

Recognition that the tide had turned prompted the Bosnian Serb military to launch a new assault in 1995 to eliminate the UN-supported "safe havens" in Bosnia. Among these was Srebrenica, where UN peacekeeping troops failed to prevent Serb forces led by General Mladic from killing over 8,000 Bosniak civilians on July 11-12 1995 after the fall of the town.

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**Srebrenica sparks international action**

Together with renewed Serb paramilitary "ethnic cleansing" in Western Bosnia, the outrage in Srebrenica sparked more resolute international action.

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**Shift in military dominance leads to negotiated end to the war**

NATO air strikes against Serbian artillery and command structures began in August, and a broad Bosnian government offensive in Western Bosnia recaptured significant territory and reached a position within 12 kilometers of Banja Luka, the Bosnian Serb capital. The shift in military dominance compelled the Serb leadership to seek a negotiated end to the war, to avoid losing even more of the territory had seized.

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## **The Dayton Peace Accords, 1995**

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**Dayton Agreement signed in 1995**

Representatives of the three sides in the conflict met at Dayton, Ohio and initialed the Dayton Agreement on November 21, 1995. The agreement was formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.

Under UN war crimes indictment, Bosnian Serb leaders Mladic and Karadzic could not participate, and so Yugoslav leader Milosevic represented the Bosnian Serbs, while Tudjman represented the Bosnian Croats, and Izetbegovic the Muslim-led Bosnian government. Richard Holbrooke, an Assistant Secretary of State and former U.S. ambassador, and Carl Bildt, a former Swedish Prime Minister, representing in the EU, were co-chairs.

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## **Bosnian state composed of the Federation and Republika Srpska**

The agreement created a Bosnian state composed of two distinct entities: the Federation and the Republika Srpska. By creating three different electorates along ethnic lines-- Serb, Croat, and Bosniak -- the constitution aimed to protect each group against domination by the others, or by central government. Yet in so doing it created a system in which political success depends on appealing to one's "own" ethnic group and thus continuation of the power of the ethnically based parties that began the war.

The terms of the agreement included insistence on the right of return of refugees, but did not institute mechanisms for their return. Instead, the constitution created separate armed forces, and a two-tier system of government with multiple checks and balances that provide easy ways to block the business of government.

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## **System of transitional administration**

Overlaid on this was a system of transitional administration in which an Office of the High Representative, or OHR, has sweeping powers in a virtual protectorate

NATO forces lead a stabilization force, or SFOR. It was originally called IFOR, or Intervention Force.

The [OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina](#) has a broad mandate to monitor elections, build institutions, and in coordination with the UN, supervise refugee returns.

The [UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina](#) focused on reforming the various police forces organized on an ethnic war-time footing, into smaller professional multi-ethnic forces, each with human rights training, working in accountable structures, with modern police equipment. The Mission also coordinated the work of the various UN organizations in country. The UN Mission's mandate ended December 31, 2002, and its police monitoring role has been taken on by the European Union Police Mission.

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## **Dayton Accords**

The Dayton Accords ended the war, but also established a structure of government with significant flaws:

- The stress given to the ethnic collectivities as electoral and political units weakens central government.
- Foreign rule and international economic support have narrowed people's horizons further, reducing incentive and opportunity to build political and business ties with other groups.
- The return of refugees is often obstructed by local officials and populations.

OHR actions to try and "fix" problems, which has included the removal from politics of elected leaders categorized as extremists or as uncooperative, have only increased local feelings of disempowerment. Rather than building a common state, many have preferred to focus on their own ethnic enclave.

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## Politics After Dayton

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### **Victories for ethnic nationalists**

This pattern was set in the first post-Dayton elections of September 1996, which represented victories for the ethnic nationalist parties: SDS in the Republika Srpska, SDA among Bosniaks, and HDZ among Croats in the Federation. Social Democratic opposition parties were again fragmented in elections in September 1998. Additionally, in the Republika Srpska's election for president a hard-line nationalist, Nikola Poplashen, was elected.

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### **International efforts shape the political landscape**

In January 1999, with considerable international support, a single Social Democratic Party (SDP) was formed. In March, the High Representative fired Poplashen.

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### **Political trend among Bosniaks shifting**

In municipal elections in April 2000, and general elections in September 2000, the new SDP won around the same share of the vote as the SDA in the Federation. In the new government, SDP leader Lagumdžija became Foreign Minister, and in July, Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina. With the stepping down of SDA leader Izetbegović from the presidency in October 2000, international observers considered that the political climate among Bosniaks shifted from nationalism back to a multicultural vision. However, 2002 general elections saw the SDA regain its leading position among Bosniak voters. Turnout was low, and the SDA was able to capitalize on popular dissatisfaction with the incumbent SDP's attempts at reform.

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### **Among Bosnia's Croat and Serb populations nationalism still exists**

Among Bosnia's Croat and Serb populations, nationalist parties have consistently flourished. Political figures have also emerged, however, who express opposition to narrow nationalism, and promise to lead the implementation of Dayton. The most prominent have been Milorad Dodik, leader of independent social democrats in the Republika Srpska, and Kresimir Zubak, who in 1998 left HDZ to found a pro-Dayton party, the HCI. Dodik was prime minister in the Republika Srpska from 1998-2001 at the head of an anti-SDS coalition.

In elections in 2000, though, SDS returned to power, and Dodik's bid for the presidency failed. Among Croats, Zubak's HCI was comprehensively defeated by HDZ, under the leadership of presidency member Ante Jelavic. In both populations, opposition to Dayton appears to run high. HDZ organized a referendum on Croat status in the Federation, in spite of UN warnings that this was illegal. In March 2001, pursuing the same policy one step further, Jelavic convened a Croat assembly in Mostar and declared regional autonomy. The High Representative immediately dismissed him from office.

In the 2002 general elections, SDS and HDZ outpolled their non-nationalist rivals.

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### **First locally-run elections**

The October 2002 general elections, although signalling the persistent electoral power of divisive nationalism, were the first post-Dayton election organized and run locally, rather than by the OSCE. Despite the low turnout, the election process was considered free, fair and successful.

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**Refugee return and reintegration**

Refugee return and reintegration remain the most explosive issues, especially in the Republika Srpska. In May 2001, initiatives to rebuild historic mosques in Trebinje and Banja Luka were met with violent street protests from Serb residents in which, among others, Foreign Minister Lagumdžija was injured. By the end of 2002, though, foreign monitors reported that rates of return had increased, and a total of 900,000 displaced people were living in their pre-war homes.

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**Euro-Atlantic integration**

Bosnia joined the Council of Europe in April 2002.

NATO demanded appointment of a Federation defense minister by mid-February 2004 if Bosnia wanted its application for membership in the Partnership for Peace Program to be discussed at the Alliance's June summit. In response, the Bosnian Parliament hammered out an agreement in to name a Serb as the Federation's first defense minister, and balanced this appointment with a Bosniak to be commander of the army and a Croat to head the operations command. Disagreements among the Bosnian parties over who should become defense minister, however, resulted in Bosnia's missing the deadline.

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## Challenges and Pressures

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**Backdrop of failing economy and public disillusion**

All this political activity occurs against a backdrop of a failing economy, and public disillusion. According to international estimates, unemployment is at 40 or 50%, and property claims created by war and displacement will take years to process. The summer of 2003 was marked by public debate and dispute over tax and customs reforms, and other economic measures strongly urged by the OHR.

Over a quarter of a million Bosnians are still refugees abroad, and over half a million registered as internally displaced people (IDPs). The international mandate continues, but increasingly "Bosnia fatigue" is a factor.

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**Violent crime and illicit business**

Alongside political problems, crime and illicit business also continue to threaten institution building. Smuggling networks created during the war continue to function, and their leaders and members are prepared to use extreme means to defend their livelihoods. One example was the car bomb assassination of HDZ member and Federation deputy minister Jozo Leutar in Sarajevo in March 1999. An ongoing investigation has narrowed in on former Croatian paramilitaries with ties to important institutions and individuals in Herzegovina, demonstrating that in this case, despite rhetoric to the contrary from HDZ, violence is not an inter-ethnic issue.

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**Politician profiteering, cronyism, and graft**

At the level of society there remains a profound lack of trust, not only between people of different ethnic backgrounds, but between people and political elites. Politicians are widely believed to have amassed personal fortunes from profiteering, cronyism and graft.

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**International presence a source of income and resentment**

The large ongoing international presence in the country is both a source of income and resentment. The interference in democratic process, by which laws are implemented and elected officials are removed from office if their views and policies contravene international expectations, is perceived by some as subverting the democratic process, and unintentionally, giving local politicians the freedom to engage in irresponsible rhetoric. Conversely, those politicians that cooperate with the international community find themselves vulnerable to charges of treason or subjection.

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**Mini-Quiz**

**Bosnia's ability to recover from the war and develop into a stable, democratic state is undercut by:**

- the absence of a robust international military stabilization force
- the lack of a permanent status agreement
- a political structure that depends on appealing to one's own economic group
- too many multi-ethnic parties

**Serbia and Montenegro**

**Serbia and Montenegro**

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**Serbia and Montenegro**

The Yugoslav Parliament adopted a Constitutional Charter in February 2003 to establish the new state of Serbia and Montenegro, replacing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Most power will remain with the governments of the two member states.

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**Federal Republic of Yugoslavia**

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been formed in April 1992 by Serbia and Montenegro in the wake of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Although not internationally recognized as its legitimate successor, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia took the same name and had the same capital, Belgrade.

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## Serbia and Montenegro at a glance

<b>Size</b>	39,500 square miles.	<i>Distributed as follows:</i> 14% Montenegro 86% Serbia (including Kosovo and Vojvodina)
<b>Population</b>	In 1991: · 10.4 million.	<i>Distributed in the ratio:</i> 6% Montenegro 94% Serbia (including Kosovo and Montenegro)
<b>Main ethnic groups</b>	In 1991: · 62% Serbs · 16% Albanians · 5.6% Montenegrin · 3.2% Muslims · 3% Hungarians · 3% Yugoslavs (including Kosovo and Montenegro)	
<b>Main religious Groups</b>	In 1991: · Orthodox 70% · Muslim 20%	
<b>System of Government</b>	Serbia and Montenegro will have a 126 member Parliament, with 91 from Serbia and 35 from Montenegro. The President of the new union will be elected by Parliament. He/she will nominate a Council of Ministers and oversee their work. A Court will have constitutional and administrative functions relating to the standardization of judicial practices. Military forces will be commanded by a Supreme Defense Council, which will reach decisions by consensus. Member states will have the right to change the union arrangements or depart from the union after three years.	



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The University of Texas at Austin

## Serbia, including Vojvodina

### Serbia, including Vojvodina, at a glance

<b>Introduction</b>	Serbia was the largest single republic of the former Yugoslavia, and included two provinces granted substantial autonomy in 1974, Kosovo and Vojvodina. In the late 1980s much of this autonomy was rescinded in a series of events that precipitated the wars in the former Yugoslavia.	
<b>Size</b>	Total for Serbia: 34,100 square miles · Serbia proper: 21,600 square miles (Roughly equal to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia) · Vojvodina: 8,300 square miles · Kosovo: 4,200 square miles	
<b>Capital</b>	Belgrade	
<b>Population</b>	Total for Serbia: 9.7 million · Serbia proper: 5.75 million · Vojvodina: 2 million · Kosovo: 1.95 million	
<b>Main Ethnic groups</b>	In 1991. <b>Serbia proper</b> · 87% Serb · 3% Yugoslav · 10% other.  <b>Vojvodina</b> · 57% Serb · 16% Hungarian · 8% Yugoslav · 5% Croat  <b>Kosovo</b> · 10% Serb · 90% Albanian	<i>Figures for Kosovo and Albanian population are estimates, due to widespread Albanian boycott of the 1991 census.</i>
<b>Internal displacement and flight overseas</b>	Internal displacement and flight overseas have had major impacts since 1991.  · Kosovo's Albanian population was temporarily displaced in 1999, and has for over a decade relied for survival on labor migration to Western Europe. · At least half of Kosovo's Serbian population fled the province after the 1999 war. · Serbs driven out of Krajina in Croatia by Operation Storm in 1995 found refuge in Serbia. · Vojvodina received Hungarian and Serb refugees from Western Croatia.  An estimated 300,000-600,000 young professionals emigrated in the 1990s, in search of better opportunities abroad. All these movements, as well as the direct impact of war, poverty and uncertainty on death rates and birthrates make current estimates of population unreliable.	
<b>Main religious groups</b>	· Orthodox 65% · Muslim 20%.	

<p><b>Main Political Parties</b></p>	<p><b>Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)</b>          Headed by President Vojislav Kostunica, this party left the DoS coalition government in 2003, and has rejected cooperation with the DS. DSS emerged from elections of December 2003 as the largest single pro-democracy party in parliament, with 52 seats.</p> <p><b>Democratic Party (DS)</b>          Founded January 1990. Headed by Zoran Djindjic, Prime Minister of Serbia until his assassination in March 2003. Zoran Zivkovic now heads the party.</p> <p><b>G17 Plus</b>          Formerly an economic think-tank, this group of professionals and scholars, which played a key role in the DoS coalition, became a political party in December 2002. Miroslav Labus was the first President.</p> <p><b>Socialist Party of Serbia, or SPS</b>          The former communists led various government coalitions until 2000. Headed by Slobodan Milosevic until his arrest in 2000 and extradition to the Hague for trial by the ICTY..</p> <p><b>Serbian Radical Party, or SRS</b>          A radical nationalist party founded 1990. Headed by Vojislav Seselj. On trial by the ICTY in the Hague.</p> <p><b>Serbian Renewal Movement, or SRM (aka SPO)</b>          Founded in January 1990, liberal and democratic, with nationalist dimension. Headed by Vuk Draskovic, and now in coalition with the New Serbia Party.</p>
<p><b>Major Coalitions/movements</b></p>	<p><b>Democratic Opposition of Serbia ( DoS)</b>          18 parties, contested and won 2000 elections in Serbia</p> <p><b>Zajedno</b>          Included DP, SPO and the Civic Alliance of Serbia, headed by Vesna Pesic. Contested 1996 municipal elections.</p> <p><b>Yugoslav United Left, or YUL</b>          Formed in 1997 from 23 small left-wing parties, headed by Milosevic's wife, Mirjana Markovic.</p> <p><b>OTPOR</b>          Founded 1998, a student anti-Milosevic movement that played a significant role in voter mobilization in 2000. OTPOR became a political party in November 2003, but won only 1.6% of the vote in December 2003 elections.</p>
<p><b>System of government</b></p>	<p>The Republic of Serbia has a President and National Assembly.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· The President holds a five-year term. The three elections held in 2002 and 2003 failed to elect a President because voter turnout was below the 50 percent then required by law.</li> <li>· The Serbian National Assembly has 250 seats and the last elections were held in December 28, 2003.</li> </ul> <p>The province of Vojvodina also has an assembly of 120 seats. Since 1988 it has had little power, but has increased to restore greater autonomy since the fall of Milosevic activism.</p>
<p><b>Other Information</b></p>	<p><b>Currency</b>          The currency is the Dinar. The Euro is widely accepted, though not everywhere.</p> <p><b>Language</b>          Serbian is the main language spoken.</p>

	<p><b>Cultural</b> As in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, there is a strong rural-urban, and generational divide. Draft-dodging and anti-war activism were widespread among city youth during the Balkan wars of the 1990s.</p> <p>In the course of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, Serbs found themselves demonized as a people, and this contributed to a sense of victimhood, also promoted by the bombing of the country in 1999 by NATO.</p>
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## Contemporary Serbia

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### World War II

Serbia was devastated during World War II. A Federal Republic was established under Tito's communist rule in 1945. Macedonians and Montenegrins were recognized as distinct nations. While Serbs still constituted the largest single national group, they were divided between republics, with around 2 million living in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Serbian nationalism was kept in check, as was nationalism in other Republics, by the communist authorities.

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### 1974-1986

As regional autonomy grew in the Yugoslav system, especially after the 1974 constitution, Serbian leaders and intellectuals identified two grievances.

- First, it appeared that Kosovo and Vojvodina were approaching de facto Republic status, thus threatening to rob Serbia of nearly 30% of its territory.
  - Second, the moves toward greater autonomy for existing Republics put the rights of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, in particular, at risk.
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### Milosevic

More than any other Republic, Serbia's story in the 1990s was seen as that of its leader. Milosevic is now categorized as a nationalist, but his long political career was more characterized by opportunism. By the end of his time in power, though, the dreams of Serb nationalists in the mid-1980s, of either a "Greater Serbia" which united all Serbs in one state, or of control over the symbolic heartland of Kosovo, were both in tatters. Additionally, the country's economy had been crippled, and its international status reduced to that of pariah.

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## Milosevic's Rise

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### How did Milosevic remain so powerful for so long?

When he became Serbian Communist Party head in 1987, other leaders believed he would be easily controlled. Many consider that his visit to the Kosovo field in 1989 on the six hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo was a turning point, when he recognized the potential power of Serbian national sentiment. His party won the first Serbian multi-party elections with less than 50% of the popular vote, but benefited from an electoral system which gave them 194 of 250 seats.

In the face of demonstrations in Belgrade in 1991 protesting state control of media, Milosevic called in the Yugoslav Army. In elections in December 1992 his party received less than

30% of the vote, and only 101 seats. He retained domestic power by forming an alliance with Vojislav Seselj, whose nationalist SRS had profited from Serbian perceptions of threat from Croatia and Bosnia, and who actively aided the military campaigns of Serbs in both Republics. Milosevic himself became President of Serbia, a position he occupied until 1997.

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**Serbia and Montenegro placed under sanctions**

For their involvement in the fighting, Serbia and Montenegro were placed under sanctions by the international community

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**Domestic Resistance and State Oppression**

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**Sanctions ended**

If in 1992-3 Western leaders wanted to oust Milosevic, by 1994 they appeared invested in his survival. Milosevic was seen as the figure who could deliver peace by controlling Serbian leaders in Bosnia and Croatia and in 1995, at Dayton, he did just that. Sanctions against Serbia were ended in December 1995.

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**Opposition parties**

Opposition parties nonetheless continued to gain support, and before municipal elections in 1996 three major democratic parties forged the Zajedno, or unity coalition.

The opposition movement was the political expression of wider disillusion with the policies of Milosevic, that had also generated other forms of anti-regime protest, in the form of alternative media like the newsmagazine Vreme and the radio station B92, anti-war groups like Women in Black, and widespread draft-avoidance. As well as struggling against the powerful state apparatus, the opposition had to overcome public apathy, withdrawal and hopelessness. They were also hampered by the boycotting of Serbian elections by Kosovar Albanians, which immediately yielded seats either to the SPS or more extremist nationalist parties elected by Kosovo's Serbs.

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**Municipal elections in 1996**

The opposition outpolled Milosevic's Socialist Party in several large urban centers, including Belgrade, and claimed victory in the local elections. Milosevic blocked confirmation of the results, prompting three months of peaceful protest before he gave way, and opposition parties took control of fourteen cities. Zoran Djindjic, head of the Democratic Party, became Mayor of Belgrade.

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**Presidential and parliamentary**

In the run up to Presidential and parliamentary elections in 1997, the opposition coalition came apart. Milosevic, having served two terms as President of Serbia, could not stand again and was selected as President of Yugoslavia-- previously a position with little power

## **elections in 1997**

One effect of this was to increase Montenegrin nervousness about Serbian domination of the Yugoslav federation. The other was to create rivalry between prominent opposition figures over the race for the Presidency.

Vuk Draskovic and Zoran Djindjic could not reach agreement, and when Draskovic insisted on running, Djindjic called for Democratic Party voters to boycott the elections altogether.

In the campaign for the Serbian presidency, the other "opposition" candidate, Vojislav Seselj outpolled Draskovic, only to be defeated in the final round by Milan Milutinovic, of the SPS. In the assembly, SPS and a leftist coalition, JUL, headed by Milosevic's wife Mira Markovic, won 110 seats: Seselj's SRS 82, and Draskovic's SPO 45. Eventually, a government was formed which again united the forces of socialism and nationalism, as SPS formed a coalition with Seselj's SRS.

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## **Consequences of Kosovo**

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### **Electoral success of SRS was owed to the Kosovo situation**

Part of the electoral success of SRS was related to the deteriorating Kosovo situation, where since 1996 Albanian resistance to Serb rule had taken a violent turn with the first actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA. Fears of Albanian secession in Kosovo and stories of the victimization of Serbs there had been central to the first-wave of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s. In the 1990s after Dayton, it appeared to many Serbs, with access only to state-controlled media, that those fears were being realized.

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### **Milosevic refused to accept the Rambouillet Conference treaty's terms**

The crisis in Kosovo escalated in 1998, and a last effort to defuse the situation was made at the Rambouillet Conference of January 1999. Milosevic refused to accept the proposed agreement's terms, which would have placed NATO troops on the ground in Kosovo. Outrage at Serbian state-sanctioned violence against Albanians in Kosovo eventually prompted NATO to launch an air campaign against Serbia and Montenegro on March 24, 1999.

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## **Milosevic's Downfall and its Aftermath**

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### **Milosevic struggles to hold on to power**

The return to "outcast" status led the Milosevic régime to increase pressure on its enemies, and also contributed to the increasing criminalization of the state and public life. Radio stations and media outlets like B92 had always been subject to attempts at control, now those attempts intensified. In April 1999, a prominent opposition journalist was murdered in a ritual-style killing and an attempt was reportedly made on Vuk Draskovic's life in October.

Former allies of the regime were also killed, including the general secretary of JUL and the paramilitary leader Arkan in January 2000. Some of the killings served to eliminate potential witnesses to Milosevic's past actions.

The Kosovo war ended with the Yugoslav army and paramilitaries withdrawn from the province, and over two hundred thousand Serbian civilians also leaving.

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## After the war

Serbia's pariah status continued as long as Milosevic was in power. International financial support for free media and the political opposition continued to reach Serbia, along with the promise that further aid for reconstruction and recovery would be allocated for any new democratically elected government.

In the meantime, the atmosphere in Serbia became more violent than ever, as mafia-type killings and assassinations became almost commonplace. A new opposition coalition was formed, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia: this time, they agreed on a single candidate for the Federal Presidency, which Milosevic was seeking for a second term.

His opponent, Vojislav Kostunica, was a lawyer and a nationalist generally recognized as wholly free of the corruption that had become such a feature of Serbian politics. Drawing on support from the coalition and from OTPOR, an anti-Milosevic student-led organization, Kostunica won in the first round. As he had done earlier in his political career, Milosevic disputed the results. This time, though, opposition protests were organized and widespread, and the security forces did not or could not resort to force to quell them. Milosevic conceded defeat. The events of October 2000, when a broad coalition of Serbian citizens acted in concert to topple Milosevic, is documented on the website <http://www.pbs.org/weta/dictator/>. Some of the deals struck that day between reformists and erstwhile supporters of Milosevic—including that between Djindjic and security forces leader Legija—came back to haunt the country later.

In Serbian parliamentary elections three months later the DOS won a convincing majority, taking 176 of 250 seats, and Djindjic became Prime Minister of Serbia. The Socialist Party of Serbia kept 37 seats, Seselj's SRS 23, and Arkan's old party, the Party of Serbian Unity, 14.

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## Milosevic extradited to the Hague

On 28 June 2001, the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Milosevic was extradited to the Hague to face trial. Immediately afterwards, an international donor's conference pledged over a billion dollars to Serbian reconstruction, and Yugoslavia was readmitted to international organizations. Subsequently, Serbian police have filed charges against Milosevic in connection with the murder of his former mentor, Ivan Stambolic, in 2000.

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## Anti-Milosevic coalition splinters

The decision to send Milosevic to the Hague divided the Serbian public, and divided the government coalition. Infighting between Kostunica's and Djindjic's parties continued to worsen, and in June 2002, Kostunica's DSS withdrew from the Serbian government and parliament after the Djindjic-led DOS replaced 21 DSS members for boycotting assembly meetings.

Kostunica's position was further weakened by the new constitution of Serbia-Montenegro, which effectively eliminated his position. He sought election as President of Serbia in October 2002. Although he won a majority of the votes cast, a low turnout resulted in the vote being declared invalid. The same non-result was reached in December 2002, and in March 2003 Kostunica stepped down from office, and became a private citizen.

Djindjic's career was tragically ended in the same month, assassinated in Belgrade. Security

forces rapidly identified Belgrade's organized crime rings as culprits, and in the weeks following the Prime Minister's death hundreds of people were arrested. Djindjic's successor, Zoran Zivkovic, vowed to continue his predecessor's policy of pursuing integration with Europe.

After Djindjic's death, the Serbian government faced additional problems. Miroljub Labus, who had contested presidential elections against Kostunica, and his G17 Plus party left the DoS coalition in July 2003, accusing the government of playing politics in its removal of the G17 Plus Vice President Mladjan Dinkic from his post of Governor of the National Bank.

This move was further evidence of a power struggle between factions in the government. Serbian presidential elections held November 16, 2003 failed once again due to the lack of the minimum 50% of registered voters going to the polls. The 39% of the registered voters who did cast ballots gave Tomislav Nikolovic of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party 46.9% of the vote, more than the 36% share won by Dragoljub Micunovic of the fragmenting DOS coalition.

Parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of 2004 were brought forward to December 2003. In those elections, the Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Seselj, received a plurality of votes in a low turnout and won 82 seats. Vojislav Kostunica's DSS won 53 seats, G17 plus 34, and the former government coalition leading party, DS, 37. With the 22 votes of the Serb Renewal Party and New Serbia, reform-oriented parties could command a majority in the 250-seat house: however, the rancor of the breakup of DoS, and the personal rivalries between Labus (G17 plus), Kostunica (DSS), and the DS leadership made political cooperation impossible. As a result, Kostunica established a minority government on March 4, 2004 composed of DSS, G 17 plus, the Serb Renewal Party and New Serbia, with the support of the Socialist Party of Serbia.

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## OSCE

The OSCE established a new [mission in Belgrade](#) in 2001 (renamed in 2003 to OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro), with a focus on democratization, protection of human rights and minorities, and media development.

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## Serbian Culture

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### Belgrade

As the former capital of a country of almost 30 million people, Belgrade feels more like a major European city. Home to the former Yugoslavia's most prestigious university, its students contribute to a vibrant cultural and intellectual life that endured the years of war. Students were also at the forefront of political opposition to the Milosevic regime.

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### Cultural Notes

The city nonetheless bears the scars of war. NATO air strikes against the city had a profound material and broader psychological effect, increasing hostility towards the international community. This does not generally extend to the level of individual interaction.

The inequalities in wealth that were driven here by communism and war profiteering, are striking still: while regular incomes have shrunk precipitously in real terms, the scope for fast profit through illegal trading was considerable in the years of sanctions. Many had to resort to

this grey or black economy for bare survival. It also created a class of newly wealthy people, who ostentatiously display their good fortune in their clothes, accessories and behavior.

One of the cultural forms created in the last few years is music known as turbo-folk, which combines traditional folk with rock, rap and Communist nostalgia.

### New Union

In March 2002, Serbian and Montenegrin negotiators signed an [agreement](#) brokered by the EU for a new union named "Serbia and Montenegro"

### Rich agricultural resources

The country survived in part from its rich agricultural resources: south of Belgrade and in the northern province of Vojvodina the soil is fertile. As elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, dairy products are often exceptional, including *kajmak*, a thick creamy buttery spread. Other foods show again Turkish influence, like the grilled meats available on the streets of Belgrade.

## Mini-Quiz

### Serbia's problems two years after the ouster of Milosevic include

- resolving the final status of Kosovo
- tackling organized crime and political corruption
- maintaining reforms
- all of the above

## Montenegro

### Montenegro at a glance

<b>Size</b>	5,400 square miles.	
<b>Population</b>	In 1991: · 680,000	<i>Since 1991 refugees from other parts of Yugoslavia have found temporary haven in Montenegro. In 1992 their numbers reportedly reached 63,000, or almost 10% of the population. Numbers peaked again during the war in Kosovo in 1999, and in December 2000 the number of refugees and internally displaced people in Montenegro was still over 40,000.</i>
<b>Main ethnic groups</b>	In 1991: · 62% Montenegrins · 14% Muslims · 9% Serbs · 6% Albanian	
<b>Main Religious</b>	In 1991: · Over 70% Orthodox (split between Montenegrin and Serbian Church)	

<b>groups</b>	· Over 15% Muslim
<b>Leading Political Parties</b>	<p><b>Democratic Party of Socialists, or DPS</b>            Founded 1991 from the old League of Communists. Main party in the "Victory for Montenegro" coalition formed for elections in 2001.</p> <p><b>Socialist People's Party, or SNP</b>            Formed 1998, after an internal division in the DPS. Main party in the "United For Yugoslavia" coalition formed for elections in 2001.</p>
<b>System of government</b>	Montenegro is now part of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro. The President of Montenegro and the 77-seat Assembly are elected for four-year terms.
<b>Other information</b>	<p><b>Currency</b>            The Euro is used in Montenegro.</p> <p><b>Languages</b>            Serbian is the main language.</p> <p><b>Terrain</b>            The country is mountainous, and travel difficult. However, the country provides Federal Yugoslavia's access to the sea.</p> <p><b>Culture</b>            Montenegrin society was historically organized in clans and relied on a pastoral economy. Blood feuds were commonplace, as in Northern Albania. This is part of the reason for the commonly held view that Montenegrin men are prone to violence, and the society remains patriarchal. Montenegro was the birthplace of one of Tito's most famous aides, Milovan Djilas, who became a dissident. He describes his Montenegrin childhood and family history in <i>Land Without Justice</i>.</p>

## Contemporary Montenegro

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### World War II

During World War II, Montenegrins played a major role in the Partisan forces, and were afterwards well-represented among the new Yugoslavia's élites. Montenegro was recognized as a republic, and Montenegrins as one of the constituent peoples in the federation. Underdeveloped before the war, Montenegro received major investment during the Yugoslav period. For the most part, like inhabitants of the other poorer, smaller republics, Montenegrins supported the Yugoslav ideal.

## Domestic Politics in Montenegro

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### Multiparty elections of 1990

In the multiparty elections of 1990, the League of Communists won a two-thirds majority in the Republican parliament, and its head, Momir Bulatovic, a 76% share of the vote for President. The new prime minister was Milo Djukanovic. The League was renamed the Democratic Party of Socialists, or DPS, in June 1991.

After Croatia and Slovenia seceded, to be followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, the Montenegrin electorate supported the creation of the new federal Yugoslavia, as a partner of Serbia.

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**Montenegro served as refuge for Serbian refugees from Croatia**

In Presidential elections in November 1992, DPS head Bulatovic defeated Nikola Kostic, who had formerly represented Montenegro on the Yugoslav eight-member presidency. DPS also won 46 seats in the national assembly, and Djukanovic returned as prime minister. DPS was closely aligned with the regime of Milosevic during the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Montenegrin forces took part in the war in Croatia, participating in attacks on the southern Dalmatian coast, including Dubrovnik. Montenegro also served as a refuge for Serbian refugees from Croatia.

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**Milo Djukanovic**

In the mid-1990s, as Serbia and Yugoslavia became international pariahs, Djukanovic pursued a new policy, to distance himself from Milosevic. Among other gestures towards the West, he floated the idea of allowing international use of the Montenegrin ports for support of operations in Bosnia. In mid-1997 he ousted Bulatovic as the party head, and stood in the presidential election as the party candidate. In a contested election result he narrowly defeated Bulatovic, who ran as an independent candidate, by the margin of 51% to 49%.

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**Agenda of greater financial autonomy from Serbia**

In March 1998, Bulatovic created the new Socialist People's Party. Republic parliamentary elections revealed his continuing support, as Djukanovic's DPS won 30 seats while Bulatovic's SNP won 29. DPS formed a government coalition with other smaller parties, including social democrats and liberals, as Djukanovic pursued an agenda of greater financial autonomy from Serbia while avoiding direct confrontation with Milosevic. In May 1998, Bulatovic became Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, expressing again his own and his party's commitment to continuing the close Serbia-Montenegro relationship.

In late 1999, Djukanovic made increasingly bold moves, introducing the German Mark as legal tender alongside the Yugoslav dinar to combat inflation, and declaring exclusive Montenegrin control of airports.

Democratization in Serbia has reduced international support for Montenegrin independence, and the balance of public opinion between "Montenegrins" and "pro-Yugoslavs" was revealed to be almost even in the Montenegrin parliamentary elections of April 2001.

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**Pathway to independence not clear**

In the April 2001 parliamentary elections, the pro-independence coalition "Victory for Montenegro" won 36 seats, while their opposition, "United For Yugoslavia" 33 seats. The Liberal Party got six seats and two Albanian parties got one seat each in the 77-seat parliament.

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**"Serbia and Montenegro" Agreement**

In February 2003 the Yugoslav federal Parliament adopted the Constitutional Charter for the new state of Serbia and Montenegro. The new agreement would forestall any independence referendum by either state for three years.

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## 2002 Municipal Elections

The Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and its coalition partners made gains in the May 2002 municipal elections, and were seen as supportive of the political line of President Djukanovic. The OSCE termed the elections as generally in line with OSCE standards. The subsequent parliamentary elections in October 2002 gave Djukanovic's party an outright majority, and he stepped down as President to become Prime Minister. After two elections to replace him were declared invalid because of low turnout, the law was changed, and subsequently Milo Vujanovic, a Djukanovic supporter, was elected.

In 2002, with only a slender majority of the population behind them, and international focus now on encouraging a Montenegrin contribution to Yugoslav democratization, the pathway to independence for Montenegro looked less clear than it did in the late 1990s. However, the subsequent electoral success of Djukanovic has breathed fresh life into the agenda of independent statehood.

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## Montenegrin Culture

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### Montenegro retained an openness

Montenegrins had a reputation for their stature, bravery, and quick tempers. Yet the Republic has successfully avoided the direct effects of war, coming under attack only during NATO's air campaign in 1999. Montenegro has retained an openness that others have not. Media operated more freely there than under Milosevic in Serbia, and many refugees from Kosovo took refuge there.

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### Building for the future

The capital Podgorica (formerly Titograd) is changing with new building programs. Several old sections of town, however, survived the destructive socialist urban renewal during the Tito period.

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### Popular coastal areas

Montenegro's old capital, Cetinje, and the tomb of the country's famous poet, Njegos, can be reached by road through dramatic mountain scenery, which continues virtually to the coast. The coast is still a major vacation site for Serbs, for this is the only piece of coast still in Yugoslavia.

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## Key Issues

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### War guilt and crime

While Montenegro's future political status obviously dominates, two other issues are of considerable importance for Montenegrins: war guilt and crime. Feelings still run high in Croatia concerning Montenegrin involvement in hostilities in Croatia, especially the shelling of Dubrovnik in 1991. Some major political personalities from that period are still active and

international efforts to mete out justice via international courts may have a domestic impact.

### Corruption and crime

There is also speculation that major political figures amassed personal fortunes either through criminal activities and profiteering during the 1990s. As in Milosevic's Serbia, the distribution of wealth has been uneven, and charges of cronyism and corruption have been commonplace, as well as suspicion that violence and fear continue to be seen as viable components of politics.

### Mini-Quiz

A key issue facing Montenegro is:

- ethnic tensions
- language divisions
- the deployment of international peacekeepers on its territory
- its political status and relationship to Serbia

## Kosovo

### Kosovo at a glance

<b>Size</b>	4,200 square miles	
<b>Population</b>	In 1991: · 1.95 million.  In 1998: · 2.2 million	Over half of Kosovo's population is under 20. Average household size is large (six to seven members) and the demographic growth rate, at twenty per thousand, is already the highest in Europe. In the 1990s, many Kosovo Albanians emigrated to Western Europe, their number reaching an estimated 400,000 by 1996. A majority are in Switzerland and Germany.
<b>Main Ethnic Groups</b>	1991-1999: · Albanians 90% · Serbs 10%	By most estimates, fewer than 100,000 Serbs remained in Kosovo after the war of 1999, mostly around the northern city of Mitrovica. The majority fled to Serbia, including refugees from Bosnia or Croatia who had settled in the province. Smaller minorities, including Roma and Gorani have also departed.
<b>Main Religious Groups</b>	1991-1999: · Muslim 90% · Orthodox 10%.	Most Kosovar Albanians are Muslim. Despite secularism during the Yugoslav period, religious sentiment remained powerful, especially for Bektashi, a version of Islam.
<b>Leading Political parties</b>	<p><b>Democratic League of Kosovo, or LDK</b> Also known as Democratic Alliance of Kosovo or DAK. Founded December 1989, led by Ibrahim Rugova.</p> <p><b>Democratic Party of Kosovo, or PDK</b> Formerly Party for a Progressive and Democratic Kosovo, or PPK. Established after the demilitarization of the KLA, led by Hasim Thaci.</p> <p><b>Alliance for the Future of Kosovo. or AAK</b></p>	

	<p>Established after the demilitarization of the KLA, led by Ramush Haradinaj.</p> <p><b>Coalition for Return, or KP, or Povratak</b> Represents Kosovar Serbs. It was led by Rada Trajkovic until December 2002, when she resigned as party whip, and was replaced by Dragisa Krstovic.</p>
<p><b>System of Government</b></p>	<p>Since June 1999, the NATO-led KFOR has been responsible for security, and the UN Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), responsible for civil administration. These international agencies were to provide a framework for the rebuilding of institutions of governance, in which other international organizations, including OSCE, participate.</p> <p>Local elections were held in October 2000 in Kosovo's thirty municipalities. The LDK won 58% of the popular vote. The province elected a 120-seat Assembly in November 2001 in which the LDK was the big winner with 47 seats.</p> <p>In March 2002, the Assembly elected Ibrahim Rugova as President of Kosovo, and approved the creation of a coalition government with 10 ministries, to include ministers from the LDK, PDK, AAK, and KP.</p> <p>Local elections were held again in October 2002. LDK outpolled opponents again, but by a reduced margin, and firmly controlled only 11 of the province's 30 municipalities. 28.5% of representatives elected were women.</p>
<p><b>Cultural Information</b></p>	<p>Although Serbo-Croat was taught in schools and used in government until the 1990s, the main language is now Albanian, in its Geg variant. Albanians call the province Kosova, with the stress on the second syllable, arguing that Kosovo was its Slavic name.</p> <p>The province is studded with medieval Serbian Orthodox churches, but also contains symbolic sites for Albanian history, including the town of Prizren.</p>



## Historical Background of Kosovo

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### **An anomaly in the Yugoslav system**

Kosovo (or, in Albanian, Kosova) and its majority Albanian population always constituted an anomaly in the Yugoslav system. More numerous as a people than Macedonians, Montenegrins and Slovenians, Albanians were categorized as a nationality or narodnost. The rationale was that unlike the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, Albanians constituted the majority in a neighboring nation-state, Albania. Thus they already "had" a state of their own. Instead of being grouped into a single Republic, then, Yugoslavia's Albanian population was divided between three Republics (Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia) and constituted a linguistic and cultural minority in all three. The largest number lived in Kosovo, where they constituted a local majority, and where Albanian cultural and political activism was concentrated.

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### **New constitution of 1974 granted Kosovo status close to that of a republic**

Tito's government policy of addressing underdevelopment brought federal funding to Kosovo, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Much of it was spent on modern public buildings and housing in Pristina, the capital. The city's University was opened in 1970 and attracted Albanian students and intellectuals from elsewhere in Yugoslavia. The new constitution of 1974 granted Kosovo status close to that of a republic, with a government, constitution, control of legal and educational systems, and representation in the presidency of Yugoslavia.

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### **Kosovo did not have the constitutional right to secede**

As an "autonomous province" of Serbia, Kosovo resembled republics in every respect save one: it did not have the constitutional right to secede. This remained part of the agenda of Kosovo's Albanian leaders and, as in other parts of Yugoslavia, individuals were tried and jailed for secessionist or anti-Yugoslav activities. One of the more famous "martyrs" of the Yugoslav period was Adem Demaci, a poet who spent over a decade in jail. (He is now a leading political figure in Kosovo). Activism nonetheless continued, and in 1981 after Tito's death, generated large-scale unrest, sparked by student demonstrations in Pristina. Federal security forces were deployed, and Amnesty International reported over 300 Albanians were killed.

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### **Tensions between Serbs and Albanians**

Police repression continued throughout the 1980s against Albanians. At the same time, Serbian emigration from the province increased, as did Serbian media assertions of atrocities committed by Albanians against Serbs. Tensions between Serbs and Albanians continued to rise, and came to a head after the accession to power of Milosevic in 1987 in Serbia.

Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy, staging a vote by the province's parliament, effectively to dissolve itself. Protests over specific grievances, including a hunger strike by Albanian miners at the Trepca lead and zinc mines, changed into massive demonstrations, prompting violent reprisals by police as had occurred in 1981.

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## Organized Non-Violence

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### **Parallel administration**

Milosevic's regime set about eliminating state institutions of their Albanian employees, including schools, hospitals, factories, and public administration. Kosovo's Albanian political leaders continued to resist. In December 1989, Ibrahim Rugova founded the LDK, and in July 1990, with wide support, declared Kosovo a republic. This initiated a period of "parallel administration" in Kosovo.

Rugova's parallel administration organized an underground referendum in September 1991, which indicated overwhelming support for independence, and then elections, in which the LDK dominated the new parliament, and Rugova became president. The "shadow state" offered employment and services to Kosovo's Albanians who had lost their jobs and who were increasingly treated as second-class citizens by the Serbian authorities.

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### **Kosovo's Albanian population preached and practiced non-violence**

Under Rugova's leadership, Kosovo's Albanian population preached and practiced non-violence. The violent break-up of Yugoslavia, and the future status of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, meanwhile, diverted the attention of the Belgrade leadership. The two sectors of Kosovo—a Serb-dominated official administration, and a rival Albanian society—did not clash often, and so little violence occurred. Potential Serbian aggression was also curbed by a clear statement from the first Bush Administration to Milosevic that any such aggression would be met by U.S. intervention.

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## After Dayton

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### **Uneasy impasse**

The uneasy impasse, though, was brought to an end after the Dayton Accords in 1995. The U.S. brokered peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not address the situation in Kosovo, and Serbian military resources shifted for action in Kosovo.

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### **Kosovo Liberation Army**

In the meantime, a new force had appeared in Kosovo, calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA (in Albanian, UCK) and targeting the Serbian presence in the province.

One of its spokesmen was Adem Demaci, who continued to advocate unification with Albania. A younger generation of militant leaders had also developed, the most prominent of whom was Hashim Thaci. By early 1998, violent clashes between the KLA and Serbian police were widespread, and Rugova's place as leader of Kosovo's Albanians in question. Rugova was re-elected as president by Kosovo Albanians, but in response to demands from within his electorate, called for outright independence.

The international community, led by the U.S., tried to persuade both sides to moderate their positions. But violence continued to escalate as Serbian forces sought to destroy the KLA and regain control of the province.

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## **Peace conference in Rambouillet**

Over half a million people were internally displaced by the fighting, which culminated in major successes for the security forces in September 1998. The threat of NATO air strikes in October finally forced Milosevic to cease all-out offensives, withdraw some forces, and permit international observers.

The OSCE was to send in a force of approximately 2000 civilians to aid in conflict management in the tense situation, referred to as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). Its mandate called for the KVM to verify the agreement brokered by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke of the United States in October 1998. However, since the OSCE did not have a roster of civilians to be recruited for the KVM, the force was slow to be filled. It had only reached about 1400 persons when the decision was made to withdraw in February 1999 as violence continued to escalate.

Military activity nonetheless continued on both sides. A turning point was reached when in mid-January 1999, international observers reported that Serbian security forces killed over 40 Albanian civilians in the village of Racak. Again, air strikes were threatened to force the Belgrade government to attend a peace conference held in Rambouillet in February and March. The Albanian delegation included Rugova and Thaci, but not Demaci. Albanian delegates signed an agreement that called for almost 30,000 NATO soldiers to enter Kosovo to ensure compliance: the Serb delegation refused, and the Serbian parliament confirmed its decision.

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## **Evidence of mass killings**

In the face of enormous ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians by Serbian security forces, and amid international determination not to permit mass murder of civilians as had occurred in Bosnia, a NATO air campaign was launched against Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999 and continued for almost three months.

After the air campaign began, the scale of Yugoslav military operations against the Albanian civilian population increased, and Serbian paramilitaries also began to operate in the province. Mass killings of at least 2,000 Kosovar Albanians occurred in the province, and hundreds of thousands of people were forced from their homes. Fearing for their own safety from government forces and the paramilitaries, over half of Kosovo's Albanian population sought refuge outside Yugoslavia, either in Albania or Macedonia. While a majority of the refugees were sheltered privately by family or friends, many were housed in camps. The KLA, meanwhile, continued to fight against Yugoslav forces.

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## **After the War**

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### **NATO military and UN civilian presence was established**

As soon as Milosevic agreed to withdrawal of Serbian military and paramilitary forces from the province in June 1999, Kosovar Albanian refugees began to return, and Serbs and others began to leave. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 authorized and established a large NATO-led military and UN civilian presence to oversee post-war rebuilding. NGOs mushroomed in Pristina and elsewhere, to provide services and assist in the rebuilding of civil society.

The fourth UNMIK head of mission, former Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri, took up office in July 2003, succeeding Michael Steiner of Germany. International personnel are also present as municipal and other officials throughout Kosovo.

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## **Postwar instability**

There was an initial spurt of "revenge" killings of Serbs and perceived collaborators, which also hastened the departure of those who considered themselves targets.

One priority of the international community therefore was reestablishing law and order in the province. The UN deployed international civilian police (CivPol). The OSCE Mission in Kosovo organized the training of local police, in addition to playing a wider role in institution building, conducting elections, human rights monitoring and support of a democratic media.

KFOR maintains a strong presence in the country, with 25,000 troops still on the ground in May 2003. The presence is being slowly reduced and responsibilities handed over to Kosovar institutions. KFOR continues to maintain security for Serbian communities, target smuggling and organized crime, and actively pursue war criminals.

The KLA was formally demilitarized and was transformed into various political parties. Several thousand KLA-members became the nucleus of the Kosovo Protection Corps, or KPC, having an emergency disaster response mission. Some former KLA members retained arms and continue to use them for political and private purposes.

Serbs in particular continue to be targets for attacks.. In June 2003, three Serbs were hacked to death in their sleep in the town of Obilic. In August, Serbian teenagers swimming in a river in Western Kosovo were attacked by gunmen, leaving two dead and four severely injured.

Deadly violence is also used in political struggles among different Albanian parties. The municipal elections of October 2000 were both preceded and followed by assassinations of political leaders. One of Rugova's closest aides was killed within days of the LDK victory, and this was followed in turn by the violent deaths of several former KLA leaders. The mayor of Suhareka Uke Bytyqi was shot to death by political opponents in 2002. In January 2003, a former KLA leader Tahir Zemaj was killed in broad daylight in Peja/Pec, together with his son and nephew.

A joint OSCE-UNHCR report on the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo issued in April 2002 noted that while violence continued to decline, freedom of movement by minorities remained problematic due to fears of harassment and violence.

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## **Self-government**

Elections at the municipal level in October 2000 and for a Kosovo-wide assembly in November 2001 established the basis for democratic self-government in Kosovo. A government with limited powers under the authority of UNMIK was formed in March 2002. The major Albanian parties and the Serb Povratak Party have portfolios in the new government. LDK holds 47 seats, PDK 26, and the Serbian coalition Povratak, with only 11% of the popular vote, 22 seats in the Kosovo Assembly.

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## **Problems and prospects**

### **Status of Kosovo remains undecided**

UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which provided for the withdrawal of Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces and the establishment of KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo, did not define the province's final status. The future of Kosovo remains undecided. Formally, it remains a part of Serbia, and the departure of Milosevic and accession of a new government in Belgrade has made resolution of its status less pressing for the international community. Kosovo's Albanians continue to insist on independence, while Kosovo's Serb minority insist on remaining within Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, Kosovars face the challenge of working together to deal with pressing current issues.

In December 2002, resigning Povratak leader Rada Trajkovic called for Serbian deputies in the parliament to withdraw their cooperation. Her move mirrored fears among Kosovo's Serbs that their political voice is not heard, and serves only as a symbol of interethnic cooperation that is far from the reality of an increasingly mono-ethnic Kosovo desired—and at times openly spoken of—by Albanian political figures.

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**Belgrade-  
Pristina  
Dialogue**

Under international sponsorship and prodding, senior leaders from Serbia and Kosovo met in Vienna in October 2003 and agreed to launch direct talks on practical issues. The first meeting of an energy-working group was held in Pristina in March 2004 to discuss electricity shortages in Kosovo. Another working group was scheduled to discuss missing persons.

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## Kosovar Culture

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### **Ancestral home to Serbs and homeland to Albanians**

The very name of the province reveals its double character, seen as ancestral home by Serbs and homeland by Albanians. Under international jurisdiction since 1999, it is home to real foreign armies: KFOR—Kosovo Force—French, U.S. , British, Italian, Russian and German troops, among others, and a virtual army of UN and other international organization administrators and police. The Euro is its currency and the UN provides travel documentation to residents.

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### **Infrastructure**

In the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, humanitarian relief efforts have fuelled a building boom, led by the domestic sector. Unevenness remains a feature of the province, however, despite the efforts of volunteer and governmental agencies from abroad, and many of Kosovo's people. In Pristina, property-owners can make high rents by letting out property to the large numbers of international organizations and non-governmental organizations now operating there.

But infrastructure of various kinds still poses major constraints: electricity and heat supply problems continue, especially in the winter, when it can get very cold. High-technology solutions remain vulnerable; computer viruses are especially a problem for large organizations. Low-technology power production results in smog and air pollution, at least in Pristina, where grim socialist architecture left its mark. Other smaller urban centers, like Prizren, offer more of a glimpse of older patterns of life. Extremist Serbs in the divided city of Mitrovica also have resorted to violence to maintain control.

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### **Violence**

Crime statistics from Kosovo may be down from the high after the war but ongoing violence continues against Serbs and Roma, or gypsies, by segments of the Albanian majority, as well as fights between Albanian political factions.

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### **Lack of Prospects**

Many of Kosovo's large young population, as elsewhere in the Balkans, still see their best employment hopes as lying abroad, due to the lack of opportunities and the depressed economic situation.

## Mini-quiz

Which of the following has not taken place in Kosovo?

- the holding of elections at the municipal and Kosovo-wide levels
- the determination of its permanent status
- training of local police
- the formation of a Kosovo government with limited powers under UNMIK authority

## Albania

### Albania at a glance

<b>Size</b>	11,100 square miles	
<b>Capital</b>	Tirana	
<b>Population</b>	In 1989: · 3.2 million In 2001: · 3 - 3.5 million (estimated).	<i>An estimated 600,000 Albanians now work abroad, mostly in Greece or Italy, making population calculations difficult.</i>
<b>Main Ethnic groups</b>	In 1989: · Albanian 95% · Greeks 3%. · Other 2% (Vlachs, Serbs, Gypsies, and Bulgarians)	<i>Albania also has small minorities of Roma and Macedonians that are officially denied. The numbers of all minorities are contested.</i>
<b>Main Religious Groups</b>	In 1989: · Muslim 70% · Albanian Orthodox 20% · Roman Catholic 10%	
<b>Leading political parties</b>	<p><b>Albanian Socialist Party or SP</b> Formerly the Albanian Workers Party. In government 1991, 1997- present.</p> <p><b>Democratic Party or DP</b> Democratic Party,. In government 1992-1997.</p>	
<b>System of Government</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Elected parliament with 140 seats, members have a four-year term.</li> <li>· Parliament elects the President, who serves a five-year term.</li> <li>· Government ministries work across twelve prefectures.</li> <li>· The 1998 constitution aimed to introduce local government at this level, and replace existing 36 districts composed of municipalities and communes.</li> </ul>	
<b>Other Information</b>	<p><b>Currency</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· The currency is the Lek.</li> <li>· Foreign currency is also widely used.</li> </ul> <p><b>Language</b></p> <p>The Albanian language has two principal dialects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Geg (Northern)</li> <li>· Tosk (Southern)</li> </ul> <p><b>Cultural</b></p> <p>Albanian literature boasts a Nobel prize winner, Ismail Kadare, whose work uses Albanian history and tradition to criticize the excesses of communism.</p>	



## Historical Background of Albania

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### End of the Cold War not marked by revolution

The end of the Cold War was not marked by revolution in Albania. President Ramiz Alia, who was Hoxha's anointed successor, continued as president, and under popular pressure pushed through gradualist reform. In 1990 religious expression, banned since 1967, was permitted again, and the first opposition party formed.

In elections in Spring 1991, the Socialist Party won 67% of the vote, and the reformer Fatos Nano was confirmed as prime minister. He was replaced when the opposition Democratic Party joined a government of national salvation, as economic hardships increased and thousands tried to flee the country.

A law permitting private ownership was passed in August 1991, which included land. In December, the Democratic Party withdrew from government, forcing new elections in March 1992. DP swept to victory, and Alia resigned as President, to be replaced by Sali Berisha.

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### Foreign and domestic issues

The new government faced considerable foreign and domestic issues. As Yugoslavia broke up, Albania denounced Serbian aggression against Kosovar Albanians. Tensions also rose with Greece over the Greek minority in Albania, and the large numbers of illegal labor migrants from Albania in Greece.

At home, unemployment continued to rise. The new government also expended considerable energy in prosecuting former leaders, among them Hoxha's widow, and former President Alia, for crimes against the state and the Albanian people committed during socialist rule. Many were jailed, including Fatos Nano, for corruption.

The activities of Berisha's government at this time fueled impressions of a north-south, Geg-Tosk divide. Berisha's power base is in the North, while Nano's is in the South. While the younger generation reportedly think beyond these categories (and also religious loyalties, which reportedly matter little) some of the older leaders may be influenced by them. On

Kosovo in particular, where a majority of Albanians are Gëgs, Berisha has been consistently more strident in asserting Albania's interests there than his rivals.

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### **Pyramid schemes collapse**

Berisha's Democratic Party won the elections again in 1996, despite international concerns over voting procedures. The party had overseen the rapid introduction of a free-market economy. Pyramid schemes of investment, which promised large and swift returns on capital investment by private individuals, were numerous.

In early 1997, a number of these schemes collapsed (as they were bound to), enriching some at the expense of many other, smaller investors, who reportedly lost over a billion dollars. This prompted a virtual insurrection against the state in the Tosk-occupied south of the country, which spread later to Tirana and the north. Huge quantities of weapons were looted from barracks and armories. Berisha's government lost control of the southern third of the country, and Berisha himself was the target of an assassination attempt. It is estimated that over 2,000 people were killed in the course of fighting.

Assigned blame for the unrest by many, and unable to campaign in southern Albania, Berisha's Democratic Party was soundly defeated by the Socialist Party and its allies, which took a total of 117 seats in the 155-seat assembly in the internationally supervised election in June and July 1997.

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### **OSCE presence**

Responding to the breakdown of law and order, the OSCE Permanent Council deployed an "OSCE Presence" in Albania in April, 1997.

The OSCE Presence worked with a multinational protection force (established under UN Security Council Resolution 1101, under Italian command, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance) and other international organizations and NGOs to help stabilize the country. This effort helped put Albania back on the path toward stability and democratization.

The OSCE, working with the Council of Europe, assisted Albanian authorities in preparing and in monitoring new parliamentary elections. The OSCE Presence continues to focus on democratization, promotion of human rights, and preparation of elections.

[OSCE Presence in Albania.](#)

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### **Hostility between the rival parties escalated**

Berisha was replaced by Rexhep Mejdani as Albania's president. Fatos Nano returned as prime minister. Democratic Party members continued to protest the election process. Hostility between the rival parties escalated when in September 1998 Democratic Party MP Azem Hajdari was shot and killed in Tirana. In response, government offices were stormed by Democratic Party supporters, and more peaceful demonstrations continued for the rest of the year. Fatos Nano stepped down as prime minister.

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### **Kosovar Albanian refugees**

Albania's domestic trials were overshadowed by the Kosovo crisis in the Spring of 1999 when up to half a million Kosovar Albanians crossed the border to find refuge. Two thirds of the refugees were accommodated with host families, a further 20% in tent camps and 13% in collective centers. During this time, the OSCE Presence played a border monitoring role, as well as helped coordinate responses to the refugee crisis.

Humanitarian aid helped Albanians deal with the pressure on already stretched resources. NATO action allowed most Kosovar Albanians to return to the province by the end of the year.

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**20% of Albania's working population employed outside the country**

Since 1990, it is estimated that 20% of Albania's working population have been consistently employed outside the country, as legal or illegal labor migrants. Their remittances are conservatively estimated at \$1million per day—some place the figure as high as \$700 million a year—which constitutes more than a quarter of Albania's GDP.

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**Referendum to change the constitution**

In late 1998, a referendum to change the country's constitution provoked further political conflict. Cracks had by now developed within the two main parties as well as between them.

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**Meta's government has international support**

The old alignments, though, remained critical in general elections in June through July 2001. The Socialist Party won 73 seats in the 140-member legislature, and Ilir Meta was made Prime Minister for another term, fighting off a challenger backed by Nano. The Union for Victory (UfV) coalition, led by the Democratic Party (DP), won 46 seats. Since the elections they have consistently denied the legality of the process. Meta's government, though, has international support, largely due to its policy of preserving or restoring good neighborly relations, and urging Kosovar and Macedonian Albanians to use dialogue rather than violence to achieve political aims.

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**Moisiu elected president**

Parliament elected ex-general Alfred Moisiu President in June 2002, replacing Rexhep Meidani. The 72-year old Moisiu was elected due to his acceptability to the major political parties and his image of having good contacts with the West. His election was viewed as a hopeful sign of cooperation between arch-rivals Nano and Berisha, who cooperated for the first time in a decade. In July 2002, Moisiu decreed that Fatos Nano should serve as Prime Minister - his third time holding that office.

In August 2003, Ilir Meta quit the government after calling on Nano to speed reform and stamp out corruption. The rift between Meta and Nano weakens the Socialist Party, pitting a younger generation of reformists against more experienced political actors, and also serving to strengthen Berisha's position. Nano was still trying to resolve deadlock in his cabinet at the end of 2003.

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## Prospects

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### **Deep political divisions**

Deep political divisions remain in Albania, and have spilled over into violent confrontation. The concept of Greater Albania—uniting ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania in one state—has not featured largely in domestic politics, but the country will undoubtedly be affected by any changes in the status of Kosovo and by events in Macedonia. It appears that there is little enthusiasm for ethnic union among Albania's younger elites, who are pursuing the path of European integration as best they can, aware of the distance Albania has to cover.

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### **Radical Islam**

Some commentators in Albania point to the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism in the country. In January 2003 moderate Muslim religious leader Sali Tivari was killed in Tirana, fueling fears of conflict within Albania's majority Muslim population between a less radical form, as practiced in the Balkans over centuries, and a stricter interpretation of the Koran, as advanced by well-funded Islamic organizations from Saudi Arabia and other foreign donors.

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## Albanian Culture

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### **One of the poorest countries in the region**

Albania remains one of the poorest countries in the region, and also the youngest in terms of its population. The legacy of its communist isolation is still visible in the bunkers that dot the landscape. Like other countries where public servants have seen the real value of wages drop, and where everything but time appears as a scarce resource, its bureaucracy can be oppressive.

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### **Wild capitalism**

The opening up of the country led to an extreme form of "wild capitalism" in which bribery and corruption played a major part, and "money talks." This money is generated outside the country. Seasonal labor migration keeps people alive, and the border between Albania and Greece, in particular, is heavily traveled by Albanians drawn to working opportunities in Greece. Criminal networks have also developed. The "pyramid" investment schemes of the early 1990s were a sophisticated form of crime which ultimately robbed many ordinary Albanian families of hard-won earnings from abroad, and further eroded people's capacity to trust others.

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### **Organized Crime**

Corruption and organized crime continue to be pervasive problems. Police forces across Western Europe contend that Albanian mafia-type organizations control drugs and prostitution in many cities, including London and Milan.

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**Kanun:  
traditional code  
of honor**

The traditional code of honor in Albania's northern mountains was based on a code of law called the kanun. Among the key concepts on which it rests is that of besa, which can be translated as honor, pledge, or alliance-- somewhat similar to the idea that one's word is one's bond. These ideas are now being reinvigorated all across the country: old feuds, which arise when besa is violated, are said to lie behind much of contemporary politics. Kanun drives sharp distinctions between men and women, and tends to exclude women from public life.

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**Food**

Tirana, the capital, remains a difficult place to live, with erratic electricity and water supply. As elsewhere, people rely on local fresh produce for subsistence, and shop regularly in the city's open air market. Meat is seen as a necessary component in celebrations, but remains hard for people to afford.

Noteworthy: Among Albania's agricultural produce are walnuts, featured in distinctive sweets and main dishes, and citrus fruits.

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**Transportation**

Many of the roads outside the capital are in poor repair, though more investments in infrastructure are now being made, especially to link ports to highways in neighboring countries. Public transportation remains difficult, but there are now plenty of private taxis for hire by visitors.

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**Mini-Quiz**

**The OSCE "Presence" in Albania**

- began with the establishment of a mission of long duration at the end of the Cold War
- was authorized by UNSC Resolution 1101
- includes chairing the local Friends of Albania Group
- was withdrawn during the 1999 Kosovo crisis

**Challenges Facing Southeastern Europe**

**Minorities Across The Balkans**

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## The Roma

The origins of the Romani people, often referred to as Roma or Gypsies, remain a subject of speculation. There is a general consensus that these people, who practice various religions, have ties to a migrant movement from India to Europe in the Middle Ages. Their numbers are disputed, as they have been historically subjected to persecution and assimilation from European states. Hitler's Nazi regime killed over half a million Gypsies between 1941 and 1945: since the end of the Cold War, they have been new targets of racist attacks and discrimination across Eastern Europe, notably in Romania and Hungary, where they are the most numerous and visible minority.



OSCE  
More than half of the Roma communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina still live in informal settlements.

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## Roma economically and politically marginalized

In the Balkan countries discussed in this module, official statistics put their total number at around 200,000, 70% of which are in Serbia. Advocacy NGOs claim a more realistic figure is around 800,000, with around 50% in Serbia, 30% in Macedonia, 10% in Albania, and smaller numbers in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. What is generally agreed is that they have been economically and politically marginalized. In Serbia and Macedonia, where they are most numerous, they have formed political parties, and appear to enjoy better relations with the Slavic majority than with the large Albanian minorities. Most of the Roma from Kosovo have left in the wake of the war and Albanian assertion of dominance. Humanitarian organizations are working to improve educational and health services, but Roma nonetheless continue to face significant challenges.

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## Conflicting Interpretations of the Past

### Conflicting interpretations of the past play an important role in contemporary

In Southeastern Europe, conflicting interpretations of the past and its influence on the present play an important role in contemporary politics. Challenges to accepted historical truth are not mounted only by marginal groups, but divide large national groups.

Similarly, it is common for politicians and others to insist that those living today have a direct connection with, and bear responsibility for evil committed in the past. Current political

## **politics**

debates often center on the linked issues of blame, responsibility and justice. When trying to assess rival arguments what is often noticeable is the difference in time-scales that different sides invoke, and the intensity of perceptions of injustice.

Also striking is the concern to claim extended and continuous national and, where feasible, state roots in current or expanded territories.

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## **Bosnia**

Serbian accounts of the past highlight that Ottoman Turks conquered the Balkans from outside the region.

During the Bosnian war and in post-Dayton Bosnia, it permits extreme Serbian nationalists to present Bosniaks as the descendants either of invaders of the region, or of natives who betrayed their "true" faith by adopting Islam under Ottoman occupation.

Both arguments turn Bosniaks into "foreigners" in their home republic, and justify Bosnian Serb attempts to reclaim territory for themselves.

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## **Kosovo**

In Kosovo, the site of the Ottoman victory of 1389, Serbian association of predominantly Muslim Albanians with the Ottoman Turks again serves as justification for a view that they are not the true owners of the land. The complex fact that Albanians fought alongside Serbs in the battle, and also that some Serbs fought on the Turkish side is discounted in favor of a simplistic version of the past, populated only with aggressors and victims.

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## **Croatia**

In Croatia, at least under the leadership of Tadjman, nationalist enthusiasm for state tradition highlighted the autonomous state of Croatia between 1941 and 1944. The fact that the ruling regime of that time, the Ustase, was a fascist movement, influenced and funded by Mussolini's Italy in the 1930s for his own political purposes, was ignored-- as was the regime's participation in the murder of Jews, Gypsies and Serbs in collaboration with Nazis. The use of symbols from the Ustashe period in Tadjman's Croatia sent a frightening signal to Croatia's Serbs. This has diminished in the post-Tadjman period.

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## **Historical assignment of blame, responsibility and justice**

These different ways of viewing the past clearly impact on people's interpretations of the most recent round of violence in the region. When challenged over the justice of their actions, or the actions of their compatriots, some people immediately seek refuge in historical parallels. Current aggression is presented as legitimate revenge to past victimization.

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## **Global Politics and Their Impact**

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**Global politics  
and their  
impact**

All the countries of the former Yugoslavia save Slovenia, and Albania, face daunting economic challenges. Humanitarian and development assistance from Europe, the United States, and (especially in Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia) the Gulf States reached high levels in the late 1990s, but especially since September 11 2001 international attention has moved away from the region. Accession to the EU remains a goal for these countries, but governments and populations recognize that the acceptance of a set of countries in 2004 may delay further expansion. Some have opted for closer links with the United States, which already has bases in Kosovo and is discussing with the Albanian government establishing a presence there. In other regions—especially Serbia, since the Kosovo war of 1999—anti-Americanism remains a powerful force, which political parties may yet mobilize, especially if rifts between Europe and the United States widen.

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**Criminal  
economies**

As long as the final status of some of the region's frontiers (especially those of Kosovo) remains uncertain, and states continue to be weak, the grey and black economies in the region will continue to flourish. This has been recognized by the OSCE as a regional problem calling for regional cooperation, and police and customs in the different countries are coordinating their efforts. They still face a tough challenge in dealing with transnational organized crime, which has long roots in the region, was bolstered by the wars and unrest of the 1990s, and continues to influence politics.

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**Congratulations!**

**You have completed:**

**Module 5: Southeastern Europe**

**If you would like to take the test for this module, please go to the interactive test on the [REACT website](#).**

*Please note, you must be a U.S. candidate with a user name and password to take the test.*