

**U.S. Online Training Course for OSCE,
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Module 5. Southeastern Europe

Developed by the
United States Institute of Peace

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Overview

Topography shaped geopolitical reality

Southeastern Europe

This module on Southeastern Europe focuses on the work of the OSCE missions in:

- Croatia
- Macedonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
- Bosnia-Herzegovina
- Serbia and Kosovo
- Montenegro
- Albania



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Topography shaped geopolitical reality, Continued

Mountains and Rivers

Southeastern Europe is marked by topographical contrasts defined by its mountain ranges and river valleys. Historically, the movement of peoples and armies has been shaped by the realities of the landscape. These factors have also had an impact on the development of strong central authorities and their ability to retain control over territory. Mountains and rivers have also served as the boundary markers between states and empires.

Key topography

There are some key differences between the regions of southeastern Europe.

- Across Montenegro, Northern Albania, Northwestern Macedonia and Western Bosnia, the terrain is mountainous, with many peaks over 2000 meters.
 - On the western side, the mountains drop to the sea in some places; in others, they yield to a coastal plain.
 - Inland, the landscape softens, most markedly in the north. The city of Zagreb is low-lying on the river Sava, which flows through Sisak and Brcko in eastern Bosnia before joining the Danube in Belgrade.
 - The Danube flows south and east through rich farmland, past the Croatian town of Vukovar before reaching Novi Sad, the capital of Vojvodina, and then Belgrade.
 - Southwards from Belgrade, the main road and rail links follow the south Morava River to Vranje and then go on to Skopje.
 - From Macedonia's capital, the Vardar river valley provides a route to the rich lowlands around Thessaloniki in Greece.
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Transport and communications

Communication Mountain ranges block easy communication, while valleys allow it. This simple truth has had considerable impact on the different histories of different parts of the Balkan peninsula.

Migrations of peoples and cultures Slavs came to the area in the 6th or 7th century AD, although they did not penetrate the strongholds of Northern Albania.

When Ottoman armies carried the imperial expansion into Europe, cities like Belgrade and Skopje lay directly in their path as they drove northward. The inhabitants of these cities and the plains around them were directly affected by Ottoman occupation and rule. Western Macedonia, Northern Albania and Montenegro were harder to enter and of smaller strategic and economic significance for the empire, so local leaders and groups were able to preserve greater autonomy.

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Transport and communications, Continued

Europe's commercial influence

When Europe's commercial influence began to penetrate the region, it followed the same routes. Railway lines and major roads frequently followed river valleys.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was bypassed by the main rail line, which also skirted Montenegro and Kosovo. While the flow of information, goods and people was accelerated along particular routes, elsewhere it remained slow moving. The result widened the difference between those communities that benefited from the new opportunities and those that could not.

Early History of Southeastern Europe

The Byzantine period and the early Slav kingdoms

Byzantine rule and the arrival of the Slavs

From 326 until its fall in 1453, Byzantium (or the Eastern Roman Empire) was a leading influence in the southern Balkans. Under Byzantine rule, the demography of the Balkans significantly changed, as major groups of peoples made their way there from the north and the east:

- The Slav migrations of the sixth and seventh centuries brought people south from the territory of modern Russia. They settled in lands that were thinly populated.
 - In the second half of the seventh century the Bulgars, a people related to the Tatars, swept into the region from central Asia.
-

Religious, cultural and political forces vie for supremacy

Latin and Greek Christian churches

A major religious schism developed between the Latin Christian church in the north and west of the Balkans, and the Greek Christian Church in the south and east.

Early Slavic Christian Kingdoms

Different Slavic-speaking kingdoms emerged, to be absorbed or overcome by neighboring powers. These included:

- A Bulgar kingdom, reaching its height in the ninth and tenth centuries under King Simeon before its defeat by Byzantium.
 - A Croatian kingdom that fell under Hungarian control after the death of King Zvonimir in 1089.
 - A Serbian kingdom was established by Stefan Nemanja in the thirteenth century, while his brother, St. Sava, became head of an autonomous Serbian Church. The kingdom reached its height in the mid-fourteenth century under Stefan Dushan, who made his capital in Prizren. It is in this period that many of the monasteries and churches in modern Kosovo were constructed.
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Tribal system of interlinked clans in the northern mountains of Albania

In the territory of modern Albania, a tribal system of interlinked clans persisted in the northern mountains.

A similar system also survived in Montenegro, and in both places clan loyalty was more significant than religious affiliation.

Along the coast and in the south were cities and towns that pledged religious alliance to either the Latin or the Greek church. Different Serbian kingdoms nominally occupied these areas, but these occupations were generally of short duration and left little trace.

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Religious, cultural and political forces vie for supremacy, Continued

Byzantium, Islam and the West

By the twelfth century the Seljuk Turks had thrust deep into the Byzantine heartland of Asia Minor. Byzantium looked to the Crusades, launched from the West to reclaim the Holy Land, for assistance. But Byzantine hopes were betrayed when in 1204 the 4th Crusade sacked Byzantium, destroying its capacity to resist the Turks.

Ottoman hegemony and legacy

Ottoman Empire and external enemies

The armies of the Ottoman Empire continued their advance, reducing the Byzantine Empire to the size of one city, Constantinople, and sweeping on into the Balkans. Key dates in its advance were as follows:

| Date | Event |
|---------|---|
| 1389 | Defeat of an alliance of Christian Serbs and Albanians in the battle of Kosovo field. |
| 1453 | Capture of Constantinople, or Byzantium, and establishment of rule over southern Balkans. |
| 1529 | First siege of Vienna by Ottomans turned back by Habsburg Austria. |
| 1571 | Defeat of Ottoman fleet by the Holy League (Spain, Venice, Genoa and the Papal States) at Lepanto, preventing westward advance. |
| 1683 | Second Ottoman assault on Vienna failed, marking high-water mark of Ottoman expansion. |
| 1690-99 | Austrian, Russian and Venetian counterattacks, including the temporary recapture of Belgrade. |
| 1699 | Treaty of Karlowitz, where Ottomans surrendered control of inland Croatia. |

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Ottoman hegemony and legacy, Continued

Resistance within its frontiers

The Empire also met resistance within its frontiers.

- In Albania, George Kastrioti, or Skanderbeg established a kingdom that kept the Ottoman armies at bay for fifteen years until his death in 1468.
- In mountainous Montenegro and in northern Albania, the inhabitants maintained a degree of local autonomy. In Montenegro, the bishop-princes of Cetinje provided leadership.
- Serbian religious leaders supported the Austrian offensive in the 1680s. When Ottoman forces recaptured Belgrade, the Serb patriarch led almost a quarter of a million Serbs into exile in Habsburg territory, where they settled in the Krajina, in modern Croatia.

OTTOMAN BORDERS 1699-1912



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Ottoman hegemony and legacy, Continued

Religion and order

The empire permitted the practice of religions other than Islam and relied on the cooperation of religious leaders to maintain order. Individuals were nonetheless encouraged or coerced to convert. One example was the devshirme, or child-tax, by which young Christian boys were recruited into the Ottoman army or civil service. More voluntary widespread conversion to Islam occurred only among the Northern Albanians after the defeat of Skanderbeg, and the Slav-speaking population of Bosnia, where neither Catholic nor Orthodox churches had acquired a firm hold.

Nationalism and the fall of the empires

Following the French revolution

The following table describes events that followed the French revolution.

| Step | Action |
|-----------|--|
| 1804 | Ideals of self-determination underpinned the Serb rebellion of 1804, which led to the creation of a Serbian state. |
| 1830s | In parallel, Montenegrin autonomy was formalized and a Principality established in the 1830s. |
| 1848 | From the popular revolutions of 1848, Romania emerged as an independent state. |
| 1878 | In 1878, an uprising in Bulgaria was followed by Russian intervention and the negotiated agreement of San Stefano. |
| 1878 | The Great Powers met at the Congress of Berlin and modified many provisions of the San Stefano Agreement. Bulgaria was split into three parts, with only one becoming autonomous; Romania, Serbia and Montenegro were declared independent; while Austria received special rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina. |
| 1878 | The League of Prizren, an Albanian cultural association, was founded. |
| 1903 | Another uprising by Orthodox Christians took place in the territory of modern Macedonia. |
| 1908 | Bulgaria declared its independence, and Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. |
| 1909-1910 | Albanians revolted against Ottoman rule. |

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Nationalism and the fall of the empires, Continued

Balkan Wars

The concerted efforts of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro in the First Balkan War of 1912 ended Ottoman rule.

The Balkan allies fell out over the division of the spoils, precipitating a Second Balkan War, in which Bulgaria was defeated by Greece, Serbia and Romania. In 1913 the international community stepped in to draw new borders across the old territory of Turkey-in-Europe:

- An Albanian state was created
- Montenegro grew
- Greece and Serbia each took significant swathes of territory
- Bulgaria lost territory to Romania in its north, and gained a thin slice of territory in Macedonia, site of its most central ambition

YUGOSLAVIA: 1918-1947



TERRITORIAL GROWTH OF YUGOSLAVIA

- 1815 Formation of Principality of Serbia
- 1833 Turks recognize Serbian control of border regions
- 1878 Nish Piroć region ceded by Turkey
- 1913 Part of Macedonia ceded by Turkey
- 1918-1919 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes formed by unification of Montenegro, and acquisitions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Slovenia from Austria;
- Croatia, Slavonia, the Voivodina, and part of the Banat from Hungary; and Strumitsa, Bosiligrad, Caribrod (Tsaribrod) and Timok enclaves from Bulgaria
- 1947 Istria and the Lastovo (Lagosta) and Palagruza (Pelagosa) Islands ceded by Italy



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Nationalism and the fall of the empires, Continued

World War I

World War I saw the final dissolution of the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires. A new south Slavic state called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed in 1918; its name was changed to Yugoslavia in 1929.

Constituted as a parliamentary democracy, the new state was headed by King Alexander of the Serbian royal family and included Serbia, Montenegro, and parts of the former Austrian Empire. Delegations from Macedonia, arguing either for autonomy or for union with Bulgaria on ethnic grounds, were ignored. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's support, though, did preserve Albania from dismemberment, which was desired by Italy, Greece and Serbia.

Inter-war Yugoslavia and Albania

Serbian hegemony and its opponents in Yugoslavia

The great internal conflict of the first Yugoslavia was over the degree of central control. As the largest national group in the country (39%) and the victors of the First World War, many Serbs and their leaders considered the new south Slavic state as "theirs."

The second largest national group, the Croats (24%) sought greater decentralization, and even autonomy. Serb hegemony also encountered violent resistance in Kosovo and Macedonia.

Violence escalated and reached the parliament on June 20, 1928, when a Montenegrin deputy killed the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Stjepan Radich. To restore control of the country, in 1929 King Alexander suspended the constitution and assumed the role of dictator. In pursuit of national unity, he renamed the country Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, five years later Croatian and Macedonian extremists assassinated him.

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Inter-war Yugoslavia and Albania, Continued

Albania

In Albania, internal divisions posed problems for the new country, as did the ongoing territorial claims of Italy, Greece and the new Yugoslavia. The strongest rift was a north-south divide, between Tosks in the South and Gegs in the North -- groups with different dialects and histories. King Zog, a northern leader, emerged dominant in the mid-1920s, and remained in power until 1939.

Changes on the eve of World War II

Italy invaded Albania in April 1939.

In Yugoslavia, pressure for decentralization grew stronger. In August 1939, Croatian political leaders persuaded the central government to grant Croatia autonomy. Slovene and Muslim demands quickly followed, reducing Yugoslavia's capacity to operate as an effective state.

World War II in the region

Hitler's assault Italy's invasion of Greece from Albania in October 1940 was beaten back. In April 1941, Nazi Germany attacked Greece and Yugoslavia, assisted by Bulgarian forces in the latter case.

Yugoslavia dismembered Yugoslavia was dismembered. German forces controlled the main travel artery down to Greece. They occupied Serbia, which was tightly controlled, and set up a puppet-state in Croatia under Ante Pavelich, leader of the extreme nationalist Ustase movement. This pseudo-independent state included much of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of Slovenia was assimilated by Germany, while Italy assumed control of Montenegro, the Dalmatian coast, and parts of Bosnia. Macedonia was partitioned between Bulgaria and Albania. Kosovo also became part of Italian-occupied Albania, while eastern Vojvodina was absorbed by Hungary.

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World War II in the region, Continued

Serbian resistance

Resistance took different forms. In Serbia, armed forces loyal to the old régime resolved to continue the struggle, under the leadership of General Draza Mihailovic. This group came to be known as the Chetniks. When their initial actions prompted massive German retaliation against civilians, they scaled down their efforts. Later, many Chetniks collaborated with the Germans to fight Tito's Partisans.



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World War II in the region, Continued

Yugoslavian resistance

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito led an extensive resistance effort. After Germany attacked Russia, this movement grew in strength, drawing support from different national groups in Yugoslavia. In 1942, Tito announced from his headquarters in the Bosnian town of Bihac, that the national rights of all the peoples of Yugoslavia would be recognized. By mid-1943 his forces, known as Partisans, numbered over 20,000. With the collapse of Italy in September 1943, those numbers increased substantially. Their rapid growth was fueled in part by Allied commitment of support to them alone, as the most active anti-German force in the country. Tito declared formation of a new federal organization of Yugoslavia in Jacje, November 29, 1943.

REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



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World War II in the region, Continued

Albanian resistance

In Albania, too, there were different strands of resistance: one that could be described as nationalist, a second communist, and a third more diffuse. It was the communists, though, under the leadership of Enver Hoxha, who operated most widely. Although different groups formed a united front in 1942, Hoxha persuaded the Allies that they should only support his Partisan forces, and ultimately succeeded, as Tito did in Yugoslavia. This allowed Hoxha to defeat rivals after the collapse of Italy in 1943.

War crimes

Duplicating Nazi crimes, the Ustase regime in Croatia operated several concentration camps, at Jasenovac, Stara Gradiska and elsewhere, where perhaps hundreds of thousands of Jews, Gypsies, communists, anti-fascist Croats, and Serbs were murdered.

Chetnik bands reportedly also murdered Muslims in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Tito takes control of Yugoslavia in 1945

In Serbia, while Tito's Partisans battled the Germans, they also fought the Chetniks. The Partisans defeated the Chetniks in the core battleground of Serbia, positioning them to take power in Yugoslavia at the end of the war.

Socialist rule in Albania and Yugoslavia

Enver Hoxha

In Albania, Enver Hoxha remained in power into the 1980s. Albania first aligned itself with the Soviet Union and was dependent on its financial aid until 1961 when the two split. Hoxha then found a new source of foreign support in China, which replaced the Soviet Union as a source of funding and patronage. The new constitution of 1976 was a straightforward reassertion of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and may have contributed to the breakup with China in 1978. Both followed extensive purges by Hoxha within the ruling elite in the early 1970s.

Albania pursued an isolated course

Albania then pursued an isolated course, with little in the way of international contact. This was especially true for citizens, who were not permitted to travel abroad and had almost no contact with the few foreign visitors who came to Albania. Unencumbered by the national issues that played such a role in Yugoslav domestic tensions (though Albania has its own minorities), Hoxha's Albania weathered the world economic downturn of the late 1970s, and survived the death of its spiritual founder in 1985. The presidency passed smoothly to his chosen successor, Ramiz Alia, who was still the head of the state when the Cold War came to an end in 1989.

Yugoslavia post World War II

The Yugoslavia that emerged from World War II had slightly larger external borders than the country that had been invaded in 1941, and it had also been restructured. In keeping with pledges made during the war, administrative boundaries were redrawn and the country was a federal unit composed of six republics:

- Slovenia
- Croatia
- Bosnia-Herzegovina
- Serbia
- Montenegro
- Macedonia

As well as two autonomous provinces:

- Kosovo and Metohia
 - Vojvodina.
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Socialist rule in Albania and Yugoslavia, Continued

Tito breaks with Stalin

Tito's refusal to accept absolute control by Moscow led him to break with Stalin in 1948, which put Yugoslav communism on a different track, and provided the basis for significant Western economic, and at times political support, for this independent communist state.

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Socialist rule in Albania and Yugoslavia, Continued

"Brotherhood and Unity"

The internal violence of the 1940s coupled with the hostility of the Soviet Union made the survival of a unified communist Yugoslavia seem unlikely. Tito and the party, though, endured. They relied in part on repression, support from the West, and an ideology of "Brotherhood and Unity." Additionally, the régime continuously experimented with the constitution. There were major changes in 1953, 1963 and 1974. The last in particular represented a considerable degree of decentralization, taken in response to internal unrest, especially in Croatia and Kosovo.

1974 constitution and Tito's death in 1980

As a result of the 1974 constitution, Tito became President for Life. The six republics became the main focus of political activity, with the communist party divided along republican lines.

Tito did not nominate a successor. After his death in 1980, an eight-member Presidency was formed composed of representatives from the six republics and the two autonomous provinces. These representatives rotated as president of the presidency, taking on the leadership role that no individual had been groomed for. The forces of centralism and fragmentation were now confined in a single chamber.

Nationalism and economic downturn, 1981-1990

Territorial integrity remained vital to the regime

After continuing activism from its Albanian residents, Kosovo was placed under martial law in 1981. Kosovo's pursuit of formal recognition as a republic was seen in Belgrade as a first step in a secessionist agenda. Territorial integrity remained vital to the regime. Its importance only increased when the extent of foreign debt -- built up during the last years of Tito's rule -- came to be known.

Economic conditions

Economic conditions nonetheless continued to worsen, partly propelled by austerity measures introduced under international pressure. Strikes became more frequent (there were 900 in 1987) and large-scale enterprises, which had run on "false" credit, collapsed. Such crises prompted calls for further changes in the country's constitution and economy, which fell into two broad trends:

- One, dominant in the wealthier republics of Croatia and Slovenia, sought greater decentralization and more republic financial and political autonomy.
- The other saw the solution to the country's woes in greater central management and the redistribution of resources, to help out the poorer regions. This idea was powerful in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

By 1982, Yugoslavia owed \$20 billion. Remittances from workers abroad, which had distinguished Yugoslavia from other Eastern European countries, had been severely reduced by the worldwide recession of the late 1970s. International Monetary Fund intervention was directed through the federal government, restoring some of the power ceded in the 1974 constitution.

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Nationalism and economic downturn, 1981-1990, Continued

Slobodan Milosevic

There was fierce infighting within the communist parties of the Republics, and in 1987 Slobodan Milosevic became the party head in Serbia, with a mission to recentralize Serbia. The autonomy of Vojvodina was quickly rescinded, and Milosevic then turned attention to Kosovo: with loyal allies in Montenegro and with Macedonia largely dependent upon Serbia, he would then control five of the Presidency's eight seats, and thus have power to bring about constitutional recentralization.

In Kosovo, Milosevic's bid to control the local party led to another surge in overt resistance from Kosovo's Albanians -- from intellectuals to miners. Military rule was again imposed, and in 1989 Milosevic delivered his infamous "Kosovo Polje" speech, on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, where he integrated Serbian nationalism into his communist-style centralism. Slovenian and Croatian leaders expressed solidarity with the Kosovo Albanian stand, and denounced Serbia actions as illegal. Milosevic nonetheless installed a virtual puppet regime in Kosovo.

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Nationalism and economic downturn, 1981-1990, Continued

Precursors to war in Slovenia

In multiparty elections in 1990, former communists won only in Serbia and Montenegro.

Yugoslavia Prime Minister Ante Markovic, who had overseen economic reforms and restored some confidence in the country and its currency, organized a pan-Yugoslav Reform party, but it was crowded out in the confrontation between nationalists and communists everywhere except in Macedonia.

The eight-member presidency continued to meet, with Milosevic firmly controlling four votes. In May 1991 he mobilized that block vote to prevent the Croatian representative, Stipe Mesic, from heading the presidency.

This was the last straw for Croatia and Slovenia; both declared independence on June 25, 1991. The war in Slovenia started two days later.

Croatia

Overview

At a glance

The following table describes geographic and demographic information for Croatia.

| Item | Description |
|-----------------------|--|
| Size | 21,830 square miles |
| Capital | Zagreb |
| Population | 4.49 million (est. 2008) Between 1991-1998, 130,000 Croat refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and 30,000 from Vojvodina arrived in Croatia. Some 280,000 Croatian Serbs left, especially after 1995. About 125,000 young educated people are also believed to have emigrated since 1991. |
| Main ethnic groups | In 2001 (census): <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Croat 89.6%• Serb 4.5%• Others 5.9% The 2001 figures showed a two-thirds drop in the percentage of Serbs and Orthodox Christians (as well as in all minorities) compared to 1991. This reflects the exodus of many Serbs and other minority group members, as well as the choice of many young people of mixed marriages to declare themselves as Croats. In 1991, the population was: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Croat 78.1%• Serb 12.2% (580,000)• Others (including Bosniak, Hungarian, Slovene, Czech, and Roma) 9.7% |
| Main religious groups | In 2001 (census): <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Roman Catholic 87.8%• Orthodox 4.4%• Muslim 1.3%• Other Christian .4%• Other .9% |

| | |
|--|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• None 5.2% |
|--|---|

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Overview, Continued

At a glance (continued)

| Item | Description |
|---------------------------|---|
| Leading political parties | <p>Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) Originally nationalist, has evolved into a center-right party. In government 1990-1999 and since 2003. Won elections in November 2007 and formed government.</p> <p>Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) Formed in 1904. Left of center in advocating pro-farmer policies and greater state intervention in the economy, while conservative in social policy. Formed coalition with HSLs in 2007, and part of Prime Minister Sanader's governing coalition.</p> <p>Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLs) Croatian Social Liberal Party, or HSLs. Founded 1990. Center-left. In government coalition 2000-2002, when the party split. HSLs moved to opposition side, and a splinter party, Libra, was formed that remained in government until 2003. HSLs formed coalition with HSS in 2007, and part of Prime Minister Sanader's governing coalition.</p> <p>Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) Social Democratic Party of Croatia or SDP, former communist party. In government coalition 2000-2003.</p> |
| Political System | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formerly Bicameral, now Unicameral Parliament (Sabor), with 151 seats. MPs serve four-year terms. • President serves a five-year term, and is elected by popular vote. • Local government of 121 towns and 421 municipalities: state offices represented through 21 counties. |
| Head of State | Stjepan (Stipe) Mesic has been president since 2000, winning re-election in 2005 to serve until 2010. |
| Standard of Living | Estimated GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) was \$15,500 in 2007. |

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Overview, Continued

At a glance (**continued**)

| Item | Description |
|-------------------|---|
| Other information | <p>Currency The unit of currency is the Kuna (in 2006, around 5 to the U.S. dollar).</p> <p>Language The main language spoken is Croatian.</p> <p>Culture Before the war, Croatia relied on a tourist economy, and the Dalmatian coast remains a major source of revenue and pride. Since independence, sport has provided a powerful symbol of nationhood, with success in basketball (1992 Olympic finalists), soccer (third place in 1998 World Cup) and tennis (Goran Ivanisevic won Wimbledon in 2001).</p> <p>Croatia also produced some of the best-known feminist criticisms of socialism and the emergence of nationalism, including Slavenka Drakulic's two collections of essays <i>Balkan Express</i> and <i>How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed</i>.</p> |

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Overview, Continued

Map The following graphic is a map of Croatia.



Historical background of Croatia

"Croatian Spring"

In the late 1960s, intellectuals in Zagreb, who called for the recognition of the Croatian language, expressed symbolic protest. This was followed by activism by young leaders in the Croatian League of Communists, who demanded greater economic autonomy, in particular with regard to hard currency revenues from tourism. This brief period, known as the "Croatian Spring" was also marked by an upsurge in revisionist histories of Croatian nationalism: among the best-known was the denial of Ustase-sponsored murders of Serbs during World War II by a former Partisan general, Franjo Tujman. Tito cracked down on the movement in 1972, purging the party and jailing many, including Tujman, as dissidents.

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Historical background of Croatia, Continued

The 1990s

In the first multiparty elections held in 1990, the ruling League of Communists was solidly defeated. The HDZ, or Croatian Democratic Community won the largest share of the vote. HDZ received 42% of the popular vote, but took 58% of the seats in parliament, where Stjepan (Stipe) Mesic became prime minister. Tudjman, leader of the HDZ, became president. Under his leadership, Croatia's constitution was amended--street names and state symbols were changed, and in December 1990 the status of Serbs was changed from "constituent nation" to "national minority."

Moderate Serb parties were weakened, and more extreme pro-Belgrade forces gained ground. The Serb populations in the Krajina region--descendants of those who had left the Ottoman Empire in 1690--declared their autonomy, labeling the new Zagreb regime as Ustase. From Knin, its center, the autonomy movement expanded to include almost one fifth of Croatian territory, though less than 5% of its population. The goal of its leaders was to remain part of a state in which Serbs were a majority--whether Yugoslavia, "Greater Serbia" or, in the last resort, their own republic. Croats were to be expelled or murdered.

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Historical background of Croatia, Continued

Boycotted Croatian referendum

When Croatia held a referendum on independence, the Krajina Serbs boycotted the process, and held their own, reaffirming their commitment to Yugoslavia. Similar sentiments were expressed in Slavonia, Croatia's right bank territory on the Danube river that forms its border with Serbia.

In May 1991, in Borovo Selo, a community close to the Danube and the border city of Vukovar, a major firefight between Serbian irregulars and Croatian police left at least fifteen people dead.

The war in Croatia

Until late 1991, Yugoslav Army, Serbian and Montenegrin forces challenged the Croatian secession. It was in this period that the high-profile sieges of Vukovar, on the Danube upstream from Novi Sad, and Dubrovnik, on the Dalmatian coast close to the Montenegrin and Bosnia borders, took place.

While the damage to Dubrovnik attracted international attention, Vukovar was systematically leveled by Yugoslav forces, and finally fell after six months of fighting, and several hundred of its defenders were murdered. Under international pressure, a ceasefire was signed in January 1992, and soon afterwards Croatia was formally recognized. This left almost a third of Croatia's territory in Serb hands, with UN monitors along the confrontation lines between Croatian forces and breakaway Serb elements, while the focus of fighting shifted to Bosnia. The Croatian military launched a major military offensive ("Operation Storm") in the summer of 1995, overrunning the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina. During this period, over 200,000 Croatian Serbs fled to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Croatian sovereignty was restored over the whole territory except a thin slice along the Danube. Vukovar and Borovo Selo, where the violence had begun, were restored to Croatia in a UN-mediated hand-over that began in November 1995 and concluded in 1998.

Political developments in Croatia

Croatia's "Patriotic War"

Throughout Croatia's perceived "Patriotic War," Tudjman and his HDZ party remained dominant, and supported the creation and expansion of "Herceg-Bosna," in areas of Western Bosnia with Croat majorities.

Although many Bosnian Croats supported the Bosnian government in its fight against the Yugoslav National Army, violent Croat-Bosnian fighting took place in 1993, especially around the city of Mostar, on the Neretva river. In November 1993, Croatian bombardment destroyed the bridge at Mostar, dating from the sixteenth century. Fighting accompanied by atrocities continued until February 1994 when an internationally brokered ceasefire and agreement was made to form a Bosniak-Croat Federation.

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Political developments in Croatia, Continued

Challenge to Bosnian sovereignty and independence

Tudjman and his allies nonetheless continued to extend support to the Croatian statelet of Herceg-Bosnia, challenging Bosnian sovereignty and independence. This stance drove Stipe Mesic to leave the HDZ to found the Croatian Independent Democrats (HND) in 1994.

Opposition wins in 2000

In 1998, the Social Democrats (SDP) and Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSL) formed an opposition coalition for elections in 2000. The Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) formed a wider opposition coalition with the Croatian People's Party (HNS) and two other smaller parties, and the two coalitions cooperated loosely. Benefiting from international assistance, public concern with HDZ cronyism, and perhaps most centrally, Tudjman's death in December 1999, opposition parties triumphed. In the 151-seat assembly, the SDP won 44 seats, HSL 24, and HSS 16. The HDZ won 40 seats, including seats allotted to "Croats abroad" and largely determined by Croats in Bosnia who favored the expansionist ideals of the HDZ. SDP leader Ivica Racan became prime minister. His coalition partner, Drazen Budisa, stood for election as president, but was defeated by Mesic: both outpolled the HDZ candidate, Mate Granic, who broke with HDZ in Spring 2000 to form a new party.

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Political developments in Croatia, Continued

Inter-party disputes and reorganized coalitions

Prime Minister Racan and President Mesic both favored policies of breaking with Croatia's nationalist past and taking the country into the European Union. Their willingness to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague (ICTY) and pursue pragmatic policies upset some political allies as well as opponents. Drazen Budisa resigned as HSLs leader in 2001 when two Croat generals, Ante Gotovina and Rahim Ademi, were indicted by the ICTY and the government pledged willingness to extradite them.

Budisa resumed his leadership later that year, but in 2002 a more serious rift between the SDP and HSLs occurred, over cooperation with Slovenia. When the coalition collapsed, Racan resigned as prime minister. Mesic reappointed him, and Racan formed a new coalition which included SDP and a number of smaller parties, one of which was the new Libra, formed by a majority of HSLs's former ministers in government. Budisa again resigned as HSLs leader. Squabbles with Slovenia continued, including a high profile dispute over control of territorial waters.

2003 parliamentary elections

The SDP's new coalition won only 41 seats, while the HDZ, under the new leadership of Ivo Sanader, won 66. HDZ was able to form a majority government in coalition with the Croatian Peasant Party. Sanader, viewed as a moderate who quickly made symbolic gestures of reconciliation towards Croatia's Serbs, indicated his intention to cooperate fully with the International War Crimes Tribunal, and identified judicial reform as a priority.

2005 presidential elections

Mesic won re-election in the second round of the presidential elections in January 2005. His 66% victory was a sharp defeat for the HDZ and indirectly for Prime Minister Sanader.

Continued on next page

Political developments in Croatia, Continued

2007 parliamentary elections

The key winners were Sanader's HDZ with 66 seats, followed by the SDP with 56 seats (with a new leader, Zoran Milanovic, after Ivica Racan's death from cancer), and the Croatian Peasant Party-Croatian Social Liberal Party with 8 seats. Both HDZ and the SDP sought to put together a parliamentary majority, but it was the HDZ that succeeded. Sanader presented another government that was approved by parliament in January 2008.

An OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission reported that the elections were administered transparently, professionally and represented further progress in fully meeting OSCE commitments for democratic elections. The campaign took place in a competitive and pluralistic environment, and the media generally provided voters with sufficient information about the candidates and campaign activities.

Goal to join NATO and EU

The post-Tudjman government of 1999-2003 pursued good relations with the international community with the goal of accession into NATO and the EU.

HDZ's election victory in 2003 reflected voter frustration at slow economic improvement, rather than a rejection of a pro-European policy. European recognition of HDZ's transformation was confirmed in April 2004, when Croatia was considered ready for European Union candidate status -- a tangible step towards accession. The EU in March 2005 postponed negotiations to begin accession because Croatia was not fully cooperating with the Hague Tribunal. In October, however, the EU reversed itself and made a surprise decision to open membership talks with Croatia. This decision boosted popular support for the HDZ. However, the first annual report by the European Commission on Croatia's progress in meeting the requirements for EU membership was a cautious one, highlighting that membership by 2010 was contingent on institutional changes within the EU and on continued reform progress within Croatia.

The arrest of General Ante Gotovina in Spain in December 2005 and his extradition to face war crimes charges at the Hague put discussion of Croatia's EU accession on track again. The continued efforts of the Croatian authorities to bring accused war crimes perpetrators to justice have increased Croatia's chances for membership in the EU.

Croatia's deployment of troops to Afghanistan and modernization of its military enhanced its prospects for NATO membership. The March 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit extended an invitation to Croatia to join the Alliance.

Continued on next page

Political developments in Croatia, Continued

OSCE

The [OSCE Office in Zagreb](#) opened January 1, 2008, replacing the OSCE Mission to Croatia. The office's mandate is to monitor war crimes proceedings, and the implementation of the housing programs for refugees and displaced persons.



The OSCE Office in Zagreb was established in December 2007. (OSCE/Dorijan Klasnic)

The closed OSCE mission, established in 1996, had played the following roles:

- assisted in the protection of human rights and the rights of minorities,
- deployed civilian police monitors
- assisted in the building of democratic institutions and civil society

The return of refugees and internally displaced persons was one of the mission's highest priorities. The 1991-95 conflict in Croatia resulted in more than 300,000 ethnic Serb refugees, less than half of who have returned to Croatia.

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Political developments in Croatia, Continued

Looking ahead Sanader's government faces problems in balancing its aim towards EU membership and the citizens' pride for the country's hard-won independence. These problems evolve around the EU demands for economic policy reforms, which will affect significant portions of the Croatian population.

Croatia has a longstanding complaint against Serbia in the International Court of Justice for genocide and aggression during the 1990s war in the former Yugoslavia. The ICJ's failure to fully validate Bosnia's complaint suggests a similar outcome for Croatia's case before the court.

Croatia and Montenegro agreed in March 2008 to have the International Court of Justice arbitrate the status of the Prevlaka Peninsula.

Mini-quiz

Multiple choice The HDZ, led by Ivo Sanader:

- has reservations regarding integration in Western institutions
 - has moved from its nationalist roots to become a center-right party
 - opposes cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia
 - has a tense relationship with OSCE
-

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Overview

At a glance

The following table describes geographic and demographic information for Macedonia.

| Item | Description |
|-----------------------|---|
| Size | 9,780 square miles. |
| Capital | Skopje |
| Population | 2.06 million (est. 2008): |
| Main ethnic groups | Albanians have claimed that censuses have consistently under-represented the number of Albanians. In 2002, the population was: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Macedonian 64.18%• Albanian 25.17%• Turkish 3.85%• Roma 2.66%• Serb 1.78%• other 2.4% |
| Main Religious groups | According to the 2002 Census: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Macedonian Orthodox 64.7%• Muslim 33.3%• Others 2% |

Continued on next page

Overview, Continued

At a glance (continued)

| Item | Description |
|---------------------------|---|
| Leading Political Parties | <p>SDSM, or Social Democratic Party of Macedonia Former Communist Party. Headed by Branko Crvenkovski, until his election as President in 2004. Now under leadership of Radmilla Sekerinska.</p> <p>VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity Founded 1989. Nationalist, Center-right. Headed by Ljubcho Georgievski until his resignation in 2003. Subsequently headed by Nikola Gruevski.</p> <p>DUI, or Democratic Union for Integration Leading Albanian party formed 2001, led by former National Liberation Army (UCK) leader Ali Ahmeti.</p> <p>DPA, or Democratic Party of Albanians (also PDPA-NDP) Formed by a faction of PDP in 1994. Headed by Menduh Thaci.</p> <p>PDP, or Party for Democratic Prosperity Albanian party, formed in 1990. Led by Abduljihadi Veiseli.</p> |
| System of government | <p>Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991.</p> <p>It has a directly elected president, serving a five-year term: and an Assembly of 120 seats, whose members serve a four-year term. They are currently elected by a mixed system of direct election from voting districts, and proportional representation.</p> |
| Standard of Living | <p>The estimated per capita GDP (purchasing power parity) was \$8,400 in 2007.</p> |

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Overview, Continued

At a glance (**continued**)

| Item | Description |
|-------------------|---|
| Other information | <p>Currency The unit of currency is the Denar. Its current exchange rate is about 4 to the U.S. dollar.</p> <p>Language The official language is Macedonian, a Slavic language, as well as any other language (e.g. Albanian) spoken by at least 25% of the population. Albanian is used extensively, especially in the northern and western areas of the country.</p> <p>Culture The country has experienced earthquakes in the past, the most devastating of which in modern times destroyed Skopje in 1963. The city was rebuilt in high modernist style, and grew from 80,000 to 600,000 inhabitants. There is a wide gap between levels of development in different parts of the country: some villages remain almost inaccessible by car. Macedonia gained international visibility in 1994 with the release of the film <i>Before the Rain</i> by director Milcho Manchevski, a fictional portrayal of love and violence between cultures. His subsequent film, <i>Dust</i> (2001) was seen by many as a veiled critique of Western intervention in the region.</p> |

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Overview, Continued

Map The following graphic is a map of Macedonia.



Historical background of Macedonia

Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia claim Macedonian territory

In the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the "Macedonian question" was a major problem for European diplomats. Bulgarian claims on the area were based on ethnic and linguistic arguments, while Greece appealed to classical history.

Following Russia's military victory over the Turkish Empire, the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano created a "Greater Bulgaria" which included most of "greater" Macedonia as well as much of modern Albania. The other great powers overturned this treaty, leaving Macedonia under Ottoman rule for another thirty-five years, during which time Serbia and Greece also made claims on its territory and people.

Ilinden Uprising against Ottoman rule

In 1893, a secret Macedonian revolutionary organization was formed by a group of teachers and other activists. The organization, known as VMRO, had internal divisions, as some of its members favored close links with Bulgaria, while others pursued greater autonomy. In August 1903, the organization staged the Ilinden Uprising against Ottoman rule, expecting intervention from the European powers, as had occurred elsewhere. Their hopes were disappointed: the Ottoman army and Muslim population launched savage reprisals, and the organization split into leftist (later communist) and rightist (generally pro-Bulgarian) factions, that fought running battles with Ottoman forces, Greek and Serbian guerrilla bands, and each other.

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Historical background of Macedonia, Continued

Pooling of military resources

By 1912, Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria had decided to pool their military resources. In the First Balkan War, together with Montenegro, they defeated Ottoman forces on every front.

Bulgaria launches Second Balkan War

After the war, Bulgaria asked that Serbia transfer territory to it, as the alliance had agreed. Serbia, however, refused, keeping the area around Ohrid, Bitola and Skopje as recompense for the territory in Albania that was expected, but which the Great Powers had turned into a new nation-state. Bulgaria then launched the Second Balkan War against its former allies, and was quickly defeated. Today, Macedonia (FYROM) comprises that area taken by Serbia.

Patterns of Balkan alliance

1941 and 1944 The struggle over Macedonia drove Balkan alliances in World War II as in World War I. In each case Bulgaria threw in its lot with Germany in return for the promise of expansion into Macedonia.

Bulgaria occupied Macedonia from 1941 to 1944. Macedonia emerged in 1944 as a Republic in the new Yugoslav federal state established by Tito. This was the first time Macedonia was recognized as a nation.

Symbolic nationalism Symbolic nationalism was encouraged during the Tito period despite the commitment to federalism: the Macedonian language was codified, and the Macedonian Orthodox Church restored in 1967 – on the two-hundredth anniversary of the closure of the Ohrid Bishopric under Ottoman rule.

Tito also used the Macedonian question as a weapon of foreign policy when needed, contrasting the "free" expression of Macedonian identity in Yugoslavia with its denial in Bulgaria and Greece.

Macedonia dependent on Yugoslavia and Serbia Within federal Yugoslavia, Macedonians fared well, though the republic was seen as a backwater. In economic and cultural terms, it was dependent on Yugoslavia, and especially its large neighboring Republic of Serbia. A common concern of the two was the relationship between the Slavic majority and a growing Albanian minority, where Macedonia's relationship with its Western areas resembled Serbia's with Kosovo.

Between 1951 and 1981, Albanian cultural rights in Macedonia steadily improved. After the demonstrations in Pristina in 1981, though, Macedonian authorities followed the Serbian lead in taking repressive measures against the minority. As elsewhere, adversity strengthened the will and resolve of Macedonia's Albanians, many of whose elites had been educated in Pristina.

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Patterns of Balkan alliance, Continued

Fissures in Macedonian politics

The elections of 1990 showed the fissures in Macedonian politics. A new nationalist coalition was headed by VMRO-DPMNE, which revived the name of the 1893 revolutionary organization and won 37 seats. The former League of Communists won 30 seats, while a pro-Yugoslav coalition around Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic's Reform Alliance won 17 seats.

Macedonia's Albanians, in an early sign that they saw their political future in different terms, voted for ethnically defined parties, the largest of which was the Party for Democratic Prosperity, with 24 seats.

The parliament chose Kiro Gligorov, a prominent figure from the League of Communists, as President. As Yugoslavia approached its collapse, Gligorov worked with other Republic Presidents to try and patch together a solution in the form of an asymmetrical federation. Macedonia's representative to the collective presidency, Vasil Tupurkovski, also pursued the same agenda, trying to produce a compromise.

Republic of Macedonia declared

Republic of Macedonia unrecognized independence

After a referendum in November 1991 expressing overwhelming support (but boycotted by Albanians) the Republic of Macedonia declared independence. It then applied for recognition from the European Community's Badinter Commission, a panel of experts created to guide EC policy on recognition of Yugoslavia's Republics as independent states.

While the Badinter Commission recommended recognition of Macedonian independence owing to its compliance with international norms on human rights, the EC did not follow the recommendation. Objections were raised by Greece, which saw in the creation of a state named Macedonia the possibility of claims on northern Greece, a region that was the heart of so-called "historical Macedonia."

The Republic thus entered a twilight zone of unrecognized independence. It avoided involvement in the Yugoslav wars of succession, as President Gligorov successfully negotiated the departure of Yugoslav National Army forces. In 1993 he arranged the stationing of UN forces in Macedonia, known as UNPROFOR initially, then as UNPREDEP, as a check on any Serbian aggression and the spillover of conflict into Macedonia. It was admitted to the United Nations under the name "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." Financially, though, the Republic was devastated. Cut off from its old markets and connections in Serbia and beyond by international sanctions, it was unable to create new ones until its status was resolved.

1994 parliamentary and presidential elections

In parliamentary and presidential elections (held together in 1994) VMRO-DPMNE, led by Ljubcho Georgievski, challenged the government record and put up a famous theater director, Ljubisha Georgievski (no relation) as presidential candidate. Gligorov's personal standing allowed him to win a second term, and the first round of voting in parliamentary elections indicated that the SDSM Social Democrat-led alliance, which included Liberals and Socialists, had held off the opposition challenge. Claiming electoral fraud, VMRO-DPMNE boycotted the second round, leaving the alliance with 97 out of 120 seats in parliament.

Accord between FYROM and Greece

Skopje and Athens signed an agreement in 1995 that normalized relations between the two states, and lifted the Greek blockade despite Athens' continued objections to what it considers Skopje's use of a Hellenic name and symbols. The agreement facilitated Macedonian recognition and entry into international institutions. Nonetheless, the name issue was not fully resolved.

Albanian dissent

Albanians seek greater cultural rights and constitutional reform

The 1994 election saw the division of PDP, the main Albanian party. A more radical faction under the leadership of Arben Xhaferi formed a new party, the PDPA, which later called itself the Democratic Party of Albanians, or DPA. This jockeying was accompanied by the development of more active Albanian dissent.

Following the boycott of the referendum and the 1991 census, radical factions emerged, which campaigned for greater cultural rights and constitutional reform.

Conflict breaks out

Violent clashes occurred between Albanians and security forces on several occasions, most significantly in Tetovo in 1995, when an illegal Albanian-language university was opened. In the course of confrontations between crowds and police trying to close down the university, several people were killed.

In Gostivar two years later, a dispute occurred over the display of Turkish and Albanian flags at a local government office. This was declared illegal and prevented by police action.

There were also scattered border incidents and bomb attacks, showing that armed and militant factions existed among Macedonia's Albanians.

Economic conditions in Macedonia

Grey and black economy in Macedonia

The period after 1994 also saw the further development of an illegal economy in Macedonia. War profiteers had operated sanctions-busting smuggling in the early years of international sanctions against Belgrade: their activities now diversified. Gligorov himself was the target of a car bomb in September 1995. He survived, though he lost an eye. Public discontent grew as stories of insider buy-outs of state assets became widely known, and other scandals broke, including the collapse of a pyramid savings bank in 1997.

Domestic politics in Macedonia

Cooperation between Parties

VMRO-DPMNE spent this period consolidating its support base at the local level. Conscious of the need to be internationally credible as a party of government, the party publicly transformed itself from nationalist to center-right.

In the run-up to the 1998 parliamentary elections, VMRO-DPMNE also forged an alliance with the Democratic Alternative, a new party founded by Vasil Tupurkovski, who had spent most of the period since 1990 in the USA. Tupurkovski pledged economic recovery through foreign investment--an updated version of Yugoslav tactics. VMRO-DPMNE, meanwhile, mobilized the strong power base it had built across the country. The VMRO/DA coalition took 59 seats: the SDSM, alienated from its former coalition partners, 29. What was still more surprising was the subsequent announcement of a governing coalition between VMRO and DA and Xhaferi's DPA, which took 11 seats to PDP's 12.

The Taiwan Flap

Soon after their victory Tupurkovski announced that to fulfill his pre-election commitment, he had secured major support from Taiwan, and that Macedonia would extend diplomatic recognition to Taiwan.

The extension of UNPREDEP in the Republic was then blocked by China: with the escalation of tensions in Kosovo, NATO forces deployed under a UN mandate stayed in place, but as a NATO force. The Taiwan deal collapsed, and Tupurkovski was widely discredited.

1998 presidential elections

It was assumed that Tupurkovski would be put forward as a coalition candidate for president in 1998 to succeed Gligorov, whose legal term would end. In the event, all three coalition partners entered the race, as did three others: Tupurkovski was eliminated in the first round, and in the second Boris Trajkovski, the VMRO candidate, defeated Tito Petkovski, from SDSM.

Continued on next page

Domestic politics in Macedonia, Continued

Anti-Albanian rhetoric during elections

The 1998 Presidential elections were marked by virulent anti-Albanian rhetoric from the SDSM candidate, and afterwards by opposition accusations of vote fraud, especially in areas with majority Albanian populations, where Trajkovski outpolled Petkovski by a massive margin.

At the level of government, cooperation between Albanian and Macedonian parties continued, including agreement on a university in Tetovo and progress toward greater decentralization. Relations with Bulgaria, Albania and Greece improved, and the international community clearly welcomed the new government's pragmatism.

Mutual Mistrust between Macedonians and Albanians

The government coped with the 1999 Kosovo crisis, when over 250,000 Kosovo Albanians found refuge in the country, and NATO's presence in Macedonia expanded considerably.

Mutual mistrust between Macedonians and Albanians nonetheless continued to rise. The war in Kosovo and post-war conditions there were widely taken as signs that NATO, and especially the USA, were now solidly pro-Albanian.

Facing widespread unemployment as a result of state sector reform, many Macedonians believed that the new government was selling off national industry for short-term personal profit, and permitting Albanian criminal networks to evade legal oversight and operate unchecked in Western Macedonia.

For their part, Macedonia's Albanians continued to press for constitutional change and greater regional autonomy. In the wake of numerous scandals, the Democratic Alternative left government, as did a splinter group of VMRO-DPMNE MPs, but the coalition of VMRO-DPMNE and DPA survived, with DPA assuming an ever-greater prominence.

Continued on next page

Domestic politics in Macedonia, Continued

Albanian insurgency ended by Ohrid Agreement

Macedonia's northern border with Yugoslavia was finally confirmed, after nine years of indeterminacy, in early 2001. Immediately afterwards a border village, Tanusevci, was occupied by armed Albanians of the National Liberation Army, or NLA, a new force led by Ali Ahmeti. With some assistance from KFOR troops in controlling the border, Macedonian security forces recaptured the village. The NLA regrouped and expanded its activities to villages around Tetovo and Kumanovo, in north and northwest Macedonia, and also moved into Aracinovo, a suburb of Skopje, in the late spring.

The Macedonian media was strident in its criticism after Albanian political leaders from Macedonia met with NLA leaders and signed a common platform, known as the Prizren document. The European Union led mediation efforts between Albanian and Macedonian parliamentary parties while sporadic fighting continued, displacing thousands of Albanians and Macedonians, and leaving at least a hundred people dead.

Human rights violations on both sides were reported. Under heavy European and U.S. pressure, representatives from VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, PDP and DPA signed peace accords called the Framework Agreement in Ohrid in August 2001. NATO troops oversaw disarmament of the separatists while parliament continued to debate proposed constitutional changes.

Since then, the primary goal of the international community in Macedonia has been to support implementation, by all Macedonian parties, of the Framework Agreement. In early 2003, the EU took over peacekeeping duties in Macedonia from NATO.

Continued on next page

Domestic politics in Macedonia, Continued

2002 Elections

The Social Democrats (SDSM) led by Branko Crvenkovski headed a coalition "For Macedonia Together" that included the Liberal Democratic Party under Petar Goshev and a number of other smaller parties. The coalition defeated the VMRO-DPMNE-led coalition. Crvenkovski had been Prime Minister for six years (1992-1998) following Macedonia's independence in 1991.

The other winner with 12% of the vote was the ethnic Albanian based Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), led by former National Liberation Army (UCK) leader Ali Ahmeti. The Democratic Party of Albanians, a coalition partner of the VMRO-DPMNE, won just 4% of the vote.

The OSCE election observation mission assessed the elections as largely in accordance with international standards. The election was peaceful, despite some incidents of violence in the preceding days.

SDSM formed a governing coalition with DUI and a number of other smaller parties. Ali Ahmeti did not take a post in the new government.

Subsequently, VMRO-DPMNE and DPA leaders publicly called for the partition of Macedonia along ethnic lines, between Macedonian and Albanian regions. Ljupcho Georgievski resigned as VMRO-DPMNE leader, replaced by the more moderate Nikola Gruevski. Xhaferi offered his resignation as DPA leader, but party members persuaded him to remain at the helm. These two leaders then disowned the Ohrid Agreement they signed, but the government continued to work to implement its terms.

Continued on next page

Domestic politics in Macedonia, Continued

A new President and continuation of policy

President Trajkovski was killed in an airplane crash in February 2004. As was the case when President Gligorov was badly injured in an assassination attempt in 1995, Macedonia's constitutional machinery worked in the face of crisis, and the Speaker of Parliament, Ljupco Jordanovski, became Acting President. In special presidential elections, Candidates from four parties (SDSM, VMRO-DPMNE, DUI and DPA) ran in special presidential elections, Branko Crvenkovski, the premier and leader of SDSM, won the first round, and then faced a run-off battle against VMRO-DPMNE candidate Saso Kedev in April 2004. DUI, the leading Albanian party and coalition partner to SDSM, supported Crvenkovski, who won with 63% of the vote. Former banker and Interior Minister Hari Kostov became Prime Minister.

At the time of his accident, Trajkovski had been about to deliver Macedonia's application for accession to the EU. The formal delivery took place on March 22, 2004. (The EU Council of Ministers granted Macedonia candidate status for EU membership in December 2005.)

Opposition in disarray

Within VMRO-DPMNE, progressive and pro-European leader Nikola Gruevski faced challenges from former party leader Ljubcho Georgievski after the party's defeat in the 2004 presidential elections. After Georgievski's move to unseat Gruevski failed, Georgievski formed a rival party, VMRO-Narodna.

Continued on next page

Domestic politics in Macedonia, Continued

2004 referendum

A November 7 referendum championed by the opposition VMRO-DPMO and smaller nationalist groups failed to overturn the key decentralization package of the Ohrid Agreement. Turnout for the referendum was 26.3%, far less than the 50% required by law to be valid. While many ethnic Macedonians were not enthusiastic about the terms of the Ohrid Agreement, the majority did not want to kill a deal already approved by parliament and opt for a more uncertain future. Prime Minister Kostov resigned after the referendum, accusing coalition partners of corruption and nepotism. Vlado Buckovski replaced him.

A U.S. announcement on November 4 recognizing the Republic of Macedonia as the name of the country, as well as the EU's strong support for the Ohrid Agreement, contributed to the defeat of the referendum. Macedonians believe the U.S. decision will eventually lead the EU and others to accept the country's preferred name, despite continuing Greek opposition.

2005 local elections

Local elections in the new (85) municipalities were held in March 2005. Competition was intense, with 379 candidates running for positions as mayors, which with the passage of the laws on decentralization, carried substantially greater power. The International Election Observation Mission concluded that the first round of the municipal elections were in line with most OSCE and Council of Europe standards, but failed to meet key commitments guaranteeing universal and equal suffrage and the secrecy of the ballot. A second round was held March 27.



A voter casts her ballot at a polling station in Skopje during municipal elections on March 13, 2005. OSCE.

Continued on next page

Domestic politics in Macedonia, Continued

VMRO-DPMNE wins majority in 2006 parliamentary elections

Reversing the 2004 election results, VMRO-DPMNE won an absolute majority in the July 2006 parliamentary elections, winning 65 out of 120 seats.

VMRO-DPMNE leader Nikola Gruevski became prime minister. The SDSM setback led to the election of Radmilla Sekerinska as the new leader of the SDSM. Gruevski chose to select the DPA as his party's ethnic Albanian political party partner despite the fact that the DUI won the majority of the ethnic Albanian vote. Despite DUI complaints of its exclusion from the governing coalition, the threat of political turmoil has been reduced by EU demands for political stability as a precondition for EU membership.

The ethnic Albanian DUI and its PDP partner announced in January 2007 that they were boycotting parliament, explaining that they did not want to take part in the institution's activities because it was undermining the Ohrid Accords. More to the point, the DUI was angered that the SDSM has opted to form a coalition with the smaller DPA, calling this a betrayal of the Albanian vote.

Government resigns and early elections called

Prime Minister Gruevski called early parliamentary elections. He said the early vote was necessary to implement reforms that had been stalled. He also related his step to NATO's decision not to invite Macedonia to join the alliance, following Greece's veto due to their name dispute.

Gruevski's government had also been buffeted by threats made by its Albanian coalition partner DPA threatening to bolt if its demands were not met.

Continued on next page

Domestic politics in Macedonia, Continued

VMRO-DPMNE decisively wins 2008 parliamentary elections

Gruevski's VMRO-DPMNE decisively won a majority in the June 1, 2008 elections, validating his decision to call early elections. VMRO-DPMNE won 64 seats in the 120-seat parliament, with the Social-Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM) coming in second with 28 seats, and the ethnic Albanian Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) each winning 13 seats.

Election day was marred by gun violence that left one person dead and several injured. There were also pre-election day clashes between the rival DUI and DPA parties, including attacks on DUI offices and members, a reported assassination attempt on its leader, and a fatal stabbing of a DPA member. The DUI accused the DPA with fraud and intimidation, skewing the outcome of the vote in Albanian areas. Meanwhile, SDSM Radmilla Sekerinska stepped down as a result of her party's disappointing showing in the election.



DIHR Director Ambassador Christian Strohal fills in an observation form at a polling station in Skopje during the 1 June 2008 parliamentary elections in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (OSCE/Jens Eschenbaecher)

The International Election Observation Mission, (IEOM) a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, reported that key OSCE and COE commitments were not met. Although the elections were well administered procedurally, violent acts in ethnic Albanian areas were not prevented, and enforcement of laws was selective and limited. Organized efforts to violent disrupt the process early on election day made it impossible for voters in many places to freely express themselves. Voting in most of the country was assessed by the IEOM as generally well conducted, aside from the ethnic Albanian areas. In addition, the assessment of vote counting was bad or very bad in fifteen per cent of the country.

Macedonian culture

Old and new

Skopje, the country's capital, is home to perhaps a third of the country's total population. In between its modern high rises one can still see a more practical economy at work: sheep and horses grazing on patches of green, people fishing in the river. These are reminders that the influx of international personnel and business has not altered everyone's lives.



The view of Skopje from the building of the national public broadcaster Macedonian Radio and Television, 6 November 2006. (OSCE/Maria Dotsenko)

Workday

A shift is underway from the traditional 7am - 3pm working day, with some adopting a more "westernized" 9-5. But for most families, the main meal of the day remains *ruchak*, a (late) lunch eaten around 3pm. This fits with a pattern of taking a short rest from around 5-7 in the afternoon, which then allows for socializing in the evening.

Social

Different generations go out at different times: so the main square in Skopje in the afternoon will be full of pensioners, at around 8 pm young families, and later at night, teenagers. Different parts of the city are popular with different sets: after the tensions of recent years, Macedonians tend to favor cafes and bars in more homogenous shopping centers like those of Karposh. Even during hard or tense times, people continue to value sociability.

Continued on next page

Macedonian culture, Continued

Traditional way of life

Outside the capital and large cities like Tetovo, you can feel like you are entering a different world. Some mountain villages, where stone houses are closely clustered on the hillsides, can be reached only with four-wheel drive vehicles. Often only the elderly remain, as younger generations have left for Skopje or, increasingly after the end of Yugoslavia, and in line with earlier practice, to seek their fortunes abroad.

But in the plains of the west people still live by agriculture and work the fields-- tobacco is a major crop (smoking is very much a part of social life), as are peppers, beans and onions. Goats and sheep graze in the hills. Some of the remote villages are very poor-- often water supplies are erratic, and school facilities for children run-down or absent.

Continued on next page

Macedonian culture, Continued

Families

In the very hot months of the summer, Skopje slows down, and towns and villages may appear busier, as people seek refuge from the heat in weekend homes, or vikendici, in the hills around Skopje, or in their familial village or town. Most people in Skopje still have relatives outside the city, and communities remain close and tight-knit. Families are generally close, and people often also identify closely with their graduating high school class. Gender divisions remain strong, especially in household labor.

Relaxation and entertainment

The summer also sees the resort towns on Lake Ohrid booming, as Skopje empties out. People find it expensive to vacation abroad. Internet cafés are commonplace in Skopje and are spreading into other communities, especially serving teenagers who almost all study English now, and thirst for contact with the wider world. But the pace of life remains relaxed, and most people still value "home-made" entertainment over mass-produced substitutes.

Food and hospitality

Hospitality remains an ideal: the "traditional" offering of some kind of sweet, or slatko, and water, is still commonplace, followed by either alcohol or Turkish coffee, which can be served sweet, medium, or bitter.

There is a certain pride in having homemade brandy to offer a guest: and people generally prefer home-cooked food, especially regional specialties like the red pepper relish, or ajvar, and oven-baked beans. So people shop regularly for fresh produce, and the Bit Pazar, the city's largest market, is a feast for the senses, where one can also buy household goods for the best prices in the city. Now, though, supermarkets like the Greek-owned Vero are increasingly popular, especially for young, two-career families.

One dish people go out for is burek: pastry filled with cheese, meat or spinach, and eaten late at night or as breakfast, usually with yogurt. Sit-down restaurants' main domestic trade comes from weddings, which are often lavish affairs.

Celebrations

The religious calendar remains important. New Year's Eve, Easter for Orthodox Christians, and Bajram for Muslims are major celebrations. Christians also celebrate name days (that is, the feast of the saint who bears their name). Birthdays are also celebrated, especially for children. It is a sign of things to come, perhaps, that one of the favorite locations for children's birthday parties is the downtown McDonalds.

Prospects and challenges

Narod

Like other former republics, Macedonia continues to struggle with the Yugoslav legacy, which shapes current debates over human rights.

For Albanian and Macedonian political parties, the distinction between majority and minority remains more critical than the issue of individual human rights. Other viewpoints, whether from Macedonia's other smaller ethnic groups which mostly support the government, or from the women's movement, which points to lack of education and opportunity, especially among the rural population, have been marginalized.

Judicial reform, commenced under the 2004-2006 SDSM government, and police reform, under the July 2006 VRMO-DPMNE government, have increased public confidence in state protection of minority rights.

Impact of developments in Kosovo

The fate of Kosovo is relevant to Macedonia., Many ethnic Albanian Macedonians have links in Kosovo. The NLA had close links with the KLA, including personnel and leaders in common

One unresolved question is that of the Macedonia-Kosovo border, which has remained undemarcated due to Kosovo's undefined status. The village of Tanusevci, where the 2001 armed conflict broke out, is just about on the border. Some Albanians talk about separating from Macedonia and joining Kosovo. The Macedonian government would like the status of such border communities to be clearly resolved once and for all.

Kosovo-Macedonia border demarcation

Macedonia and Kosovo started border demarcation talks on March 1, 2008. Serbia asserted that the demarcation should not be carried out unless it is involved. Macedonia rejected this and proceeded with the talks with Kosovo. Representatives of the International Civilian Representative have played a role in the border demarcation talks. The demarcation process is expected to take a year.

Active international role

The international presence in and commitment to Macedonia continues to play an important role in supporting implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, and the [OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje](#), present since 1992, is an active component.

Problem of the grey economy

The economy remains a key site of tension: the fragility of the formal sector has undoubtedly contributed to the growth of a significant illegal economy. Beyond tax avoidance and smuggling are more overt corruption and

criminality, which the state is unable to police effectively. The violence of 2001 was often interpreted as ethnic, but some argue that it was largely driven by disputes over the control of cross-border traffic in drugs, weapons and people, including women for prostitution. Sporadic violence against individuals and property, including symbols of the state, continues to be a problem, especially in western Macedonia, and accusations of corruption and nepotism continue to be traded by politicians, and widely believed by citizens.

Yet, the post-2004 period has been characterized by significant progress in the reform of the public administration system, especially in the judicial and police sectors, and both the SDSM and the VRMO-DPMNE governments have targeted corruption. Moreover, the July 2006 VRMO-DPMNE government has actively reformed the property rights regime in order to court foreign direct investment.

Continued on next page

Prospects and challenges, Continued

Fallout from 2001 conflict

Several cases of alleged crimes committed by Albanian guerillas during the 2001 conflict being handled by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia were returned to the Macedonian judiciary in March 2008 after the ICTY decided not to proceed with them. A Macedonian decision to proceed with these cases has been criticized by the ethnic Albanian political parties. They assert that opening these files violates the amnesty provision of the Ohrid Agreement.

Continued on next page

Prospects and challenges, Continued

EU accession and NATO membership

The campaign for Macedonia's accession to the EU, a goal shared widely by political parties and citizens, took a decisive step forward on December 13, 2005, when Macedonia was granted candidate status. The European Commission's March 2008 Western Balkans initiative seems likely to accelerate Macedonia's prospects for EU membership. Indeed, European Enlargement Commissioner Rehn said at the same time that membership talks could begin in 2008. The European Commission is expected to make a decision in the fall on whether to begin membership talks,

Macedonia is currently a member of NATO's Membership Action Plan, designed to help aspiring partner countries meet NATO standards, and prepare for possible future membership. Macedonia's bid to join NATO at the March 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit was blocked by Greece over their name dispute. The Summit did, however, agree that an invitation to join the alliance once a mutually acceptable solution to the name dispute is reached.

Macedonia nonetheless continues to seek to demonstrate that it identifies with the EU and NATO and is making practical contributions. Just before the fall of the government in April 2008, parliament approved the dispatch of Macedonian troops to join EUFOR in Bosnia, as well as to join coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The U.S and Macedonia subsequently signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership and Cooperation in May 2008 to strengthen bilateral ties and cooperation in security, economy and social affairs.

Mini-quiz

Multiple choice

The Ohrid Framework Agreement sought to:

- prevent the "spillover" of conflict into FYROM
 - resolve differences between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo
 - establish a mutually satisfactory relationship between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in the FYROM
 - build a new relationship between the FYROM and Serbia (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)
-

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Overview

At a glance

The following table provides geographic and demographic information for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

| Item | Description |
|--------------------|--|
| Size | 19,740 square miles. Internally divided between the joint Bosniak/Croat Federation (about 51% of the territory) and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (about 49% of the territory). |
| Capital | Sarajevo |
| Population | The distribution of this population is disputed, partly because of the number of refugees and internally displaced persons. Republika Srpska is home to between 20% and 33% of the total. In 1991: 4.30 million In 2008: 4.59 million (estimated) |
| Main ethnic groups | The Federation remains ethnically diverse, but exact figures are hard to produce due to the number of refugees and IDPs. Estimates from 2000 were: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Bosniak 48%,• Serb 37.1%• Croat 14.3%• Others 0.5%. Republika Srpska in 2001 was 95% Serb. In 1991 Bosnia-Herzegovina was: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Muslim (now Bosniak) 44%• Serb 31%• Croat 17%• Yugoslav 5.5%. |

Continued on next page

Overview, Continued

At a glance (continued)

| Item | Description |
|---------------------------|--|
| Main Religious groups | <p>Estimated in 2008 :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Muslim 40%• Orthodox 31%• Roman Catholic 15%• Others 14% <p>Many Bosnians are atheists or agnostics.</p> |
| Leading Political Parties | <p>Party for Democratic Action, or SDA Muslim-led, dominant in Republic and Federation politics. Led by Sulejman Tihic.</p> <p>Party for Bosnia Herzegovina, or SBH Founded by former SDA Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic in 1996.</p> <p>Social Democratic Party, or SDP Created in 1998 from existing social democratic parties in the Federation; support for the party has slumped in last few elections. Headed by Zlatko Lagumdajia.</p> <p>Croatian Democratic Community, or HDZ in BiH Dominant in Herzegovina and other Croat-majority areas. In government 1990-2000 and 2002-2006. Led by Barisa Colak.</p> <p>Independent Social Democratic Party, or SNSD Founded in Banja Luka, 1992. Leading party in Republika Srpska. Headed by Milorad Dodik.</p> <p>Serbian Democratic Party, or SDS Lost dominant role in Republika Srpska in 2006. Headed by Mladen Bosic.</p> |

Continued on next page

Overview, Continued

At a glance (**continued**)

| Item | Description |
|----------------------|---|
| System of government | <p>The 1995 Dayton Agreement created a joint multi-ethnic government. This government -- based on proportional representation -- is charged with conducting foreign, economic, and fiscal policy.</p> <p>A second tier of government is comprised of two entities-- a joint Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska (RS).</p> <p>The 1995 Dayton Agreements also created the Office of the High Representative (OHR), held by an international administrator with far-reaching powers.</p> |
| Standard of Living | <p>The estimated per capita GDP (purchasing power parity) was \$6,600 in 2007.</p> |

Continued on next page

Overview, Continued

At a glance (**continued**)

| Item | Description |
|-------------------|---|
| Other information | <p data-bbox="677 449 1404 600">Currency The Konvertible Mark (KM) is fixed at the rate of the Euro and is used throughout BiH. The current exchange rate is 1.25 Bosnian Mark to 1 US dollar.</p> <p data-bbox="677 613 932 831">Languages</p> <ul data-bbox="727 659 932 831" style="list-style-type: none">• Serbo-Croat• Bosnian• Serbian• Croatian <p data-bbox="677 844 1360 1024">The three main peoples used to all speak dialects of a single language called Serbo-Croat, but language has been politicized and now three languages, Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian exist, all largely mutually intelligible.</p> <p data-bbox="677 1037 1409 1293">Culture Sarajevo produced much of Yugoslavia's best-loved rock music in the 1970s, featuring bands like Bijelo Dugme (White Button). Bosnia-Herzegovina was also the birthplace of 1961 Nobel Laureate for Literature Ivo Andric, whose best know work is the 1945 Bridge on the Drina.</p> <p data-bbox="677 1306 1393 1411">Danis Tanovic became a national hero when he won the 2002 Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film for his anti-war film No Man's Land.</p> <p data-bbox="677 1423 1354 1495">Bosnians prided themselves also on brewing the best Turkish coffee in the former Yugoslavia.</p> |

Continued on next page

Overview, Continued

Map The following graphic is a map of Bosnia-Herzegovina.



Historical background of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Unique among Yugoslavia's republics in not having a *narod*

Bosnia, with its population of Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosniaks, was unique among Yugoslavia's republics in not having a single dominant majority people, or *narod*. Muslims were only recognized as a *narod* in the 1974 constitution: used as a national category, the term did not necessarily denote strong religious conviction.

Multiparty elections in November 1990

In multiparty elections in November 1990, ethnically based parties won 86% of the Bosnian Assembly's 240 seats. The two largest parties were the primarily Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA) with 86 seats, and the Serbian Democratic Party SDS, with 72 seats.

SDA had two prominent leaders: Fikret Abdic, a successful businessman who had strong regional support around Bihac, and the Sarajevan Alija Izetbegovic, who had served a prison sentence for promoting Islamic views in the 1980s. Izetbegovic won the presidency.

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Historical background of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Continued

Serbian and Croatian planning to divide up the Republic

Many Serbs and Croats appealed to their co-nationals in Bosnia, with the goal of dividing up the Republic. Responding to the threat, Izetbegovic supported an internationally brokered model of "cantonization" which was to satisfy the overlapping claims to self-determination made by the republic's different populations. Many parts of the country, though, were already under the control of the Yugoslav National Army, and many Bosnian Serbs resisted the creation of an international frontier between themselves and Serbia.

Referenda held in Serbian areas between November 1991 and January 1992 expressed a majority desire to be excluded from a sovereign, independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. As that outcome drew nearer, given the massive support expressed by Bosniaks and Croats in a referendum in February 1992, Bosnian Serb political leaders, among whom Radovan Karadzic was prominent, declared their own constitution.

Escalating violent incidents came to a head on April 6, 1992, when the European Community recognized Bosnia, and Serbian gunmen killed participants in a peace demonstration in Sarajevo.

The Bosnian war: 1992-1995

Over 97,000 people killed, Over 2.7 million refugees and internally displaced

According to the Sarajevo-based non-governmental Research and Documentation Center, a minimum of 97,000 civilians and soldiers were killed during the war. In addition, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated over 2.7 million refugees, internally displaced and war-affected persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The levels of savagery, which included rape as a weapon and the murder of civilians or surrendered enemies, generated enormous hate, fear and mistrust.

Territory

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was over territory, and went through several phases. The Bosnian government, in which Muslims, Serbs and Croats participated, originally fought a largely defensive battle to try and retain enough land to make a viable state. They had considerable support in cities, where the multi-ethnic ideal was strongest.

Bosnian Serb militants under Karadzic

The Bosnian Serb militants under Karadzic, with considerable support from the Yugoslav National Army, sought to establish complete control in areas where they were in the majority, as well as a large part of the countryside. Their two political centers were Pale and Banja Luka. They also laid siege to urban centers that supported the government, including Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Tuzla.

Serb forces sought to secure communications between Serb areas in Bosnia

Serb forces also sought to secure communications between Serbia and enclaves in the Krajina, which is why the town of Brcko was so important to them, as a corridor between the two Serb-dominated areas in Bosnia. Serbs were also the local majority in the extreme South of the country, around the city of Trebinje.

Many Croats aligned to Zagreb

While many Bosnian Croats supported the Bosnian government, others saw their futures with Croatia. The latter were particularly strong in western Herzegovina, under the leadership of Mate Boban, where their goal was control of the city of Mostar and eventual inclusion in "Greater Croatia."

Continued on next page

The Bosnian war: 1992-1995, Continued

Separatist Croats and Serbs count on help from neighboring countries

Separatist Croats and Serbs could initially count on logistic help from neighboring countries: the Bosnian government was isolated, and militarily at a disadvantage. Its main asset was the continuing support of many Bosnians of all ethnic groups, and international recognition.

Bosnian government hoped for an internationally enforced peace settlement

In the first months of the war, the Bosnian government pinned its hopes on surviving until an internationally enforced peace settlement was reached.

In the region of Bihac, Fikret Abdic pursued a different policy of accommodation with Croat and Serb forces, eventually declaring regional autonomy and signing a separate peace in 1992.

Disunity of international community

International Peacekeeping Failed to End Violence

During 1992-1995, international forces were deployed under the auspices of United Nations peacekeeping, but under a mandate that restricted soldiers' capacity to deter violence.

Bosnian separatists saw no compelling reason to cease military action

The result was that Bosnian Serb and Croatian nationalist militants each saw no compelling reason to cease successful military action. In July 1992, Boban followed the Serbian lead by declaring autonomy in Herceg-Bosnia. By early 1993, Croat and Bosnian government forces were in direct conflict.

Bosnian-Croatian Federation

International intervention stepped up after February 6, 1994, when a mortar shell killed 68 civilians and wounded 200 in Sarajevo's marketplace, prompting action to enforce the removal of Bosnian Serb artillery from around Sarajevo. In a determined and internationally driven effort to equalize military capacity, a Bosnian-Croatian Federation was formed.

The Bosnian Army launched successful attacks in central Bosnia against the Serbs. Its priority, though, was to re-establish control over Abdic's Bihac Bosniak fiefdom, which was achieved in August 1994. Abdic and over 20,000 Bosniak supporters fled to Croatia.

Bosnian Serb military seeks to eliminate UN-supported "safe havens"

Recognition that the tide had turned prompted the Bosnian Serb military to launch a new assault in 1995 to eliminate the UN-supported "safe havens" in Bosnia. Among these was Srebrenica, where UN peacekeeping troops failed to prevent Serb forces led by General Mladic from killing over 8,000 Bosniak civilians on July 11-12, 1995 after the fall of the town.

Continued on next page

Disunity of international community, Continued

Srebrenica sparks international action

Together with renewed Serb paramilitary "ethnic cleansing" in Western Bosnia, the outrage in Srebrenica sparked more resolute international action.

Shift in military dominance leads to negotiated end to the war

NATO air strikes against Serbian artillery and command structures began in August, and a broad Bosnian Army offensive in Western Bosnia recaptured significant territory and reached a position within 12 kilometers of Banja Luka, the Bosnian Serb capital. The shift in military dominance compelled the Serb leadership to seek a negotiated end to the war, to avoid losing even more of the territory it had seized.

The Dayton Peace Accords, 1995

Dayton Agreement signed in 1995

Representatives of the three sides in the conflict met in Dayton, Ohio and initialed the Dayton Agreement on November 21, 1995. The agreement was formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.

Under UN war crimes indictment, Bosnian Serb leaders Mladic and Karadzic could not participate, and so Yugoslav leader Milosevic represented the Bosnian Serbs, while Tudjman represented the Bosnian Croats, and Izetbegovic the Muslim-led Bosnian government. Richard Holbrooke, an Assistant Secretary of State and former U.S. ambassador, and Carl Bildt, a former Swedish Prime Minister, representing the EU, were co-chairs.

Bosnian state composed of the Federation and Republika Srpska

The agreement created a Bosnian state composed of two distinct entities: the Federation and the Republika Srpska. By creating three different electorates along ethnic lines-- Serb, Croat, and Bosniak -- the constitution aimed to protect each group against domination by the others, or by central government. Yet in so doing it created a system in which political success depends on appealing to one's "own" ethnic group and thus continuation of the power of the ethnically based parties that began the war.

The terms of the agreement included insistence on the right of return of refugees, but did not institute mechanisms for their return. Instead, the constitution created separate armed forces, and a two-tier system of government with multiple checks and balances that provide easy ways to block the business of government.

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The Dayton Peace Accords, 1995, Continued

System of transitional administration

Overlaid on this was a system of transitional administration in which an Office of the High Representative, or OHR, has sweeping powers in a virtual protectorate. The Office issues regular press releases at <http://www.ohr.int/>.

NATO forces led a stabilization force, or SFOR. It was originally called IFOR, or Intervention Force. NATO handed over its military role in Bosnia to the EU in December 2004. The current EU deployment is 6,000 troops.

The [OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina](#) has a broad mandate to monitor elections, assist in the building of democratic institutions and political parties, and in coordination with the UN, supervise refugee returns. Career U.S. diplomat Douglas Davidson took up his duties as Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in September 2004.

The [UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina](#) focused on reforming the various police forces organized on an ethnic war-time footing, into smaller professional multi-ethnic forces, each with human rights training, working in accountable structures, with modern police equipment. The Mission also coordinated the work of the various UN organizations in country. The UN Mission's mandate ended December 31, 2002, and the European Union Police Mission took on its police-monitoring role.

Dayton Accords

The Dayton Accords ended the war, but also established a structure of government with significant flaws:

- The stress given to the ethnic collectivities as electoral and political units weakens central government.
- Foreign rule and international economic support have narrowed people's horizons further, reducing incentive and opportunity to build political and business ties with other groups.
- Local officials and populations often obstruct the return of refugees.

OHR actions to try and "fix" problems, which has included the removal from politics of elected leaders categorized as extremists or as uncooperative, have only increased local feelings of disempowerment. Rather than building a common state, many have preferred to focus on their own ethnic enclave.

Politics after Dayton

Victories for ethnic nationalists

This pattern was set in the first post-Dayton elections of September 1996, which represented victories for the ethnic nationalist parties: SDS in the Republika Srpska, SDA among Bosniaks, and HDZ among Croats in the Federation. Social Democratic opposition parties were again fragmented in elections in September 1998. Additionally, in the Republika Srpska's election for president a hard-line nationalist, Nikola Poplashen, was elected.

International efforts shape the political landscape

In January 1999, with considerable international support, a single Social Democratic Party (SDP) was formed. In March, the High Representative fired Poplashen.

Political shift among Bosniaks temporary

In municipal elections in April 2000, and general elections in September 2000, the new SDP won around the same share of the vote as the SDA in the Federation. In the new government, SDP leader Lagumdzija became Foreign Minister, and in July, Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When SDA leader Izetbegovic stepped down from the presidency in October 2000, international observers considered that the political climate among Bosniaks shifted from nationalism back to a multicultural vision. However, 2002 general elections saw the SDA regain its leading position among Bosniak voters. Turnout was low, and the SDA was able to capitalize on popular dissatisfaction with the incumbent SDP's attempts at reform.

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Politics after Dayton, Continued

Among Bosnia's Croat and Serb populations nationalism still exists

Nationalist parties have flourished Among Bosnia's Croats and Serbs. Political figures have also emerged, however, who oppose narrow nationalism, and were prepared to lead the implementation of Dayton. The most prominent have been Milorad Dodik, leader of the independent Social Democrats in the Republika Srpska, and Kresimir Zubak, who in 1998 left HDZ to found a pro-Dayton party, the HCI. Dodik was prime minister in the Republika Srpska from 1998-2001 at the head of an anti-SDS coalition.

In elections in 2000, though, SDS returned to power, and Dodik's bid for the presidency failed. Among Croats, Zubak's HCI was comprehensively defeated by HDZ, under the leadership of presidency member Ante Jelavic. In both populations, opposition to Dayton ran high. HDZ organized a referendum on Croat status in the Federation, in spite of UN warnings that this was illegal. In March 2001, pursuing the same policy one step further, Jelavic convened a Croat assembly in Mostar and declared regional autonomy. The High Representative immediately dismissed him from office.

2002 first locally run elections

The SDS and HDZ outpolled their non-nationalist rivals in the 2002 general elections. These elections, while showing the persistent electoral power of divisive nationalism, were the first post-Dayton election organized and run locally, rather than by the OSCE. Despite the low turnout, the election process was considered free, fair and successful.

2004 elections

Local elections in October 2004 were also organized and run locally, with a 45% turnout that confirmed the hold of nationalist parties in Bosnian politics. Out of 122 municipalities, 99 were won by one of the three main nationalist parties.

2006 elections

The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) emerged as the most powerful political party in Republika Srpska, while the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SzBiH) emerged as the winner within the Federation. The main nationalist parties – the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Croat Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH) and the mostly Bosnian Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA) – saw their electoral support decline.

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Politics after Dayton, Continued

Refugee return and reintegration

Refugee return and reintegration have remained explosive issues, especially in the Republika Srpska. In May 2001, initiatives to rebuild historic mosques in Trebinje and Banja Luka were met with violent street protests from Serb residents in which, among others, Foreign Minister Lagumdžija was injured. By June 2007, though, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had reported that rates of return had increased. Over a million refugees and internally displaced persons had also returned, and of this number 466,000 minority refugees and internally displaced persons had returned to their places of origin in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Continued on next page

Politics after Dayton, Continued

COE

Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Council of Europe in April 2002.

EU

In November 2005 BiH and the EU began talks on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).

U.S.-hosted talks with Bosnian leaders in Washington in May 2007 failed to achieve agreement on constitutional reform and unification of Bosnia's police forces. The U.S. pushed for reduction of regional powers to gain Bosniak agreement, but Bosnian Serb leaders rejected any change in existing constitutional arrangements.

In April 2008, Bosnia's Parliament adopted police reform legislation that satisfied watered-down EU conditions for signing the SAA. The EU accepted in place of a merger, reforms involving more effectiveness, financing from a joint budget, and less political influence.

BiH and the EU are expected to sign the SAA in June 2008.

NATO

Bosnia became a signatory to NATO's Partnership for Peace in 2006.

The March 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit welcomed BiH's decision to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan and invited it to begin an intensified dialogue on the range of issues relating to membership.

ICJ Ruling on BiH complaint of genocide

The International Court of Justice ruled in 2007 that Serbia (as the successor to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) had not committed genocide during the Bosnia war, responding to the charges first made by Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993. The ICJ did find that Serbia did violate its obligation to prevent genocide at Srebrenica. Serbia also violated its obligation to transfer Mladic to the ICTFY at the Hague. The Court found that Serbia should therefore transfer wanted individuals to the ICTFY. The Court also found that its findings constituted appropriate satisfaction, and did not provide for any compensation to BiH.

Challenges and pressures

Bosnia fatigue The international mandate continues, but "Bosnia fatigue" is very much a reality. NATO is seen as having relaxed its conditions for BiH's entry into PFP; the capture of Mladic and Karadic was no longer the price. EU reservations on enlargement may have diminished its leverage.

Backdrop of failing economy and public disillusion Meanwhile, Bosnia's reform of state institutions has stalled. This has occurred against the backdrop of a failing economy and public disillusion. According to international estimates, unemployment is at 40-50%, and property claims created by war and displacement will take years to process. Over a quarter of a million Bosnians are still refugees abroad, and over half a million registered as internally displaced people (IDPs).

Violent crime and illicit business Crime and illicit business continue to threaten institution building. Smuggling networks created during the war continue to function, and their leaders and members are prepared to use extreme means to defend their livelihoods. One example was the car bomb assassination of HDZ member and Federation deputy minister Jozo Leutar in Sarajevo in March 1999. An ongoing investigation has narrowed in on former Croatian paramilitaries with ties to important institutions and individuals in Herzegovina.

Politician profiteering, cronyism, and graft At the level of society there remains a profound lack of trust, not only between people of different ethnic backgrounds, but between people and political elites. Politicians are widely believed to have amassed personal fortunes from profiteering, cronyism, and graft.

Illustrating this problem, High Representative Ashdown fired senior Croat official Dragan Covic from the Bosnian Presidency in March 2005 for refusing to step down after state prosecutors indicted him and others for customs evasion, corruption and abuse of office charges.

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Challenges and pressures, Continued

International presence a source of income and resentment

The ongoing international presence in the country is both a source of income and resentment. The High Representative's interference in the democratic process, by which laws are implemented and elected officials are removed from office if their views and policies contravene international expectations, is perceived by some as subverting the democratic process, and unintentionally, giving local politicians the freedom to engage in irresponsible rhetoric. Conversely, those politicians that cooperate with the international community find themselves vulnerable to charges of treason or subjection.

The Office of the High Representative was to have been phased out in 2007, replaced with a less powerful EU Special Representative. But developments in the region as well as in BiH – Montenegro's independence, developments regarding Kosovo's status, and calls by Bosnian Serb leaders for self-determination – led the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board in February 2007 to delay closing the OHR until at least June 2008. Meanwhile, the EU reduced its EUFOR military forces in BiH to 2,500 in 2007.

Current High Representative

Slovakian diplomat Miroslav Lajcak became High Representative and EU Special Representative in July 2007. He demonstrated that he planned to play an activist role when within two weeks of taking office he fired the Republika Serbska deputy chief of police and 35 Bosnian Serb police officers, as well as ordered the seizure of travel documents of over a hundred Bosnian Serbs under investigation for war crimes or for helping suspected war criminals evade arrest.



High Representative and EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajcak

Mini-quiz

Multiple choice Bosnia's ability to recover from the war and develop into a stable, democratic state is undercut by:

- the absence of a robust international military stabilization force
 - the lack of a permanent status agreement
 - a political structure that depends on appealing to one's own ethnic group
 - too many multi-ethnic parties
-

Serbia, including Vojvodina

Overview

At a glance

The following table describes geographic and demographic information for Serbia, including Vojvodina.

| Item | Description |
|--------------|---|
| Introduction | Serbia was the largest single republic of the former Yugoslavia, and included two provinces that received autonomy in 1974, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Yugoslavia broke up violently over ethnic lines in 1991, with Serbia unsuccessfully waging wars during the 1990s to bring territories with ethnic Serbs until its control. Kosovo came under international administration after the 1999 war. |
| Size | Total for Serbia: 34,100 square miles <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Serbia proper: 21,600 square miles (Roughly equal to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia)• Vojvodina: 8,300 square miles• Kosovo: 4,200 square miles |
| Capital | Belgrade |
| Population | Total for Serbia: 10.159 million (est.2008) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Serbia, including Vojvodina - 8.59million• Kosovo - 2 million |

Continued on next page

Overview, Continued

At a glance (**continued**)

| Item | Description |
|---|---|
| Main Ethnic groups | <p>Serbia, including Vojvodina (2002)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• 82.9% Serb• Hungarian 3.9%• Others.13.2% <p>Kosovo (Est. 2006)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• 5% Serb• 95% Albanian |
| Internal displacement and flight overseas | <p>Internal displacement and flight overseas have had major impacts since 1991.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Kosovo's Albanian population was temporarily displaced in 1999; has for over a decade had relied on labor migration to Western Europe.• Most Kosovo Serbs fled the province after the 1999 war.• Serbs driven out of Krajina in Croatia by Operation Storm in 1995 found refuge in Serbia.• Vojvodina received Hungarian and Serb refugees from Western Croatia. <p>An estimated 300,000-600,000 young professionals emigrated in the 1990s, in search of opportunities abroad. All these movements, as well as the direct impact of war, poverty and uncertainty on death rates and birthrates make current estimates of population unreliable.</p> |

Continued on next page

Overview, Continued

At a glance (continued)

| Item | Description |
|------------------------|---|
| Main Political Parties | <p>Democratic Party (DS) Founded January 1990. Headed by Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic until his assassination in 2003. Currently led by Serbian President Boris Tadic. Largest pro-democracy party in parliament.</p> <p>Serbian Radical Party (SRS) A radical nationalist party founded in 1990. Formerly headed by Vojislav Seselj, now on trial by the ICTY in the Hague. Now led by Tomislav Nikolic, it enjoys the greatest level of popular support among Serbian voters.</p> <p>Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) Headed by Former President (now Prime Minister) Vojislav Kostunica. Party's popularity has dropped sharply among voters.</p> <p>New Serbia Small conservative party led by Velimir Ilic. Ran in coalition with DSS in the 2007 election.</p> <p>G17 Plus Formerly an economic think-tank, this group of professionals and scholars, which played a key role in the DOS coalition, became a political party in 2002. Currently headed by Mladjan Dinkic.</p> <p>Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) Led various government coalitions and headed by Milosevic until he was arrested in 2000 and extradited to the Hague for trial by the ICTY. Currently headed by Ivica Dacic.</p> |

Continued on next page

Overview, Continued

At a glance (continued)

| Item | Description |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Main Political Parties (cont) | <p>Liberal Democratic Party Formed in 2005 by a Democratic Party faction after its leader, former Deputy Prime Minister Cedomir Jovanovic, was expelled from the party.</p> <p>Power of Strength Party (PSS) Businessman Bogoljub Karic ran in the 2004 presidential elections and then established the PSS. After running into legal difficulties involving financial irregularities, his wife Milanka Mara Karic ran in the 2008 presidential elections in place of her husband.</p> |
| System of government | <p>The Republic of Serbia has a President and National Assembly.</p> <p>The province of Vojvodina also has an assembly of 120 seats. Since 1988 it has had little power, but has seen increased activism to restore greater autonomy since the fall of Milosevic.</p> |
| Head of state | Boris Tadic was reelected President of Serbia in 2008. |
| Standard of Living | The estimated per capita GDP (purchasing power parity) was \$7,700 in 2007. |
| Main religious groups | <p>According to 2002 Census:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Orthodox 85%• Catholic 5.5%• Muslim 3.2%• Others 6.3% |

Continued on next page

Overview, Continued

At a glance (**continued**)

| Part | Function |
|-------------------|--|
| Other Information | <p>Currency The currency is the Dinar. The current rate is about 5 Dinars to the US Dollar. The Euro is widely accepted, though not everywhere.</p> <p>Language Serbian is the main language spoken.</p> <p>Culture There is a strong rural-urban, and generational divide. In the course of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, Serbs saw themselves demonized, and this contributed to a sense of victimhood, also promoted by the bombing of the country in 1999 by NATO. The bombing, and other forms of foreign intervention, also played into the self-stereotype of “inat”-- translatable as something between stubbornness, pride, and spite. The prospect of Serbia’s loss of Kosovo has irritated many otherwise Western- and democracy-oriented Serbs.</p> <p>Among Serbia’s best-known fictional works are the political satires of Danilo Kis and the magical realism of Milorad Pavic. Serbia won the 2007 Eurovision song contest with the ballad "Molitva" sung by 23-year-old Marija Šerifović.</p> |

Continued on next page

Overview, Continued

Map The following graphic is a map of Serbia.



Contemporary Serbia

World War II Serbia was devastated during World War II. A Federal Republic was established under Tito's communist rule in 1945. Macedonians and Montenegrins were recognized as distinct nations. While Serbs still constituted the largest single national group, they were divided between republics, with around 2 million living in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Serbian nationalism was kept in check, as was nationalism in other Republics, by communist authorities.

1974-1986 As regional autonomy grew in the Yugoslav system, especially after the 1974 constitution, Serbian leaders and intellectuals identified two grievances.

- First, it appeared that Kosovo and Vojvodina were approaching de facto Republic status, thus threatening to rob Serbia of nearly 30% of its territory.
- Second, the moves toward greater autonomy for existing Republics put the rights of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, in particular, at risk.

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Contemporary Serbia, Continued

Milosevic

More than any other Republic, Serbia's story in the 1990s was seen as that of its leader. Milosevic is now categorized as a nationalist, but his long political career was more characterized by opportunism. By the end of his time in power, though, the dreams of Serb nationalists in the mid-1980s, of either a "Greater Serbia" which united all Serbs in one state, or of control over the symbolic heartland of Kosovo, were both in tatters. Additionally, the country's economy had been crippled, and its international status reduced to that of pariah.

Milosevic's rise

How did Milosevic remain so powerful for so long?

When he became Serbian Communist Party head in 1987, other leaders believed he would be easily controlled. Many consider that his visit to the Kosovo Polje in 1989 on the six hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo was a turning point, when he recognized the potential power of Serbian national sentiment. His party won the first Serbian multi-party elections with less than 50% of the popular vote, but benefited from an electoral system which gave them 194 of 250 seats.

In the face of demonstrations in Belgrade in 1991 protesting state control of the media, Milosevic called in the Yugoslav Army. In elections in December 1992, his party received less than 30% of the vote, and only 101 seats. He retained domestic power by forming an alliance with Vojislav Seselj, whose nationalist SRS had profited from Serbian perceptions of threat from Croatia and Bosnia, and who actively aided the military campaigns of Serbs in both Republics. Milosevic himself became President of Serbia, a position he occupied until 1997.

Serbia and Montenegro under sanctions

For their involvement in the fighting, Serbia and Montenegro were placed under sanctions by the international community

Domestic resistance and state oppression

Sanctions ended

If in 1992-3 Western leaders wanted to oust Milosevic, by 1994 they appeared invested in his survival. Milosevic was seen as the figure that could deliver peace by controlling Serbian leaders in Bosnia and Croatia and in 1995, at Dayton, he did just that. Sanctions against Serbia were ended in December 1995.

Opposition parties

Opposition parties nonetheless continued to gain support, and before municipal elections in 1996 three major democratic parties forged the Zajedno, or unity coalition.

The opposition movement was the political expression of wider disillusion with the policies of Milosevic, that had also generated other forms of anti-regime protest, in the form of alternative media like the newsmagazine Vreme and the radio station B92, anti-war groups like Women in Black, and widespread draft-avoidance. As well as struggling against the powerful state apparatus, the opposition had to overcome public apathy, withdrawal and hopelessness. They were also hampered by the boycotting of Serbian elections by Kosovo Albanians, which immediately yielded seats either to the SPS or more extremist nationalist parties elected by Kosovo's Serbs.

Continued on next page

Domestic resistance and state oppression, Continued

Municipal elections in 1996

The opposition outpolled Milosevic's Socialist Party in several large urban centers, including Belgrade, and claimed victory in the local elections. Milosevic blocked confirmation of the results, prompting three months of peaceful protest before he gave way, and opposition parties took control of fourteen cities. Zoran Djindjic, head of the Democratic Party, became Mayor of Belgrade.

Continued on next page

Domestic resistance and state oppression, Continued

Presidential and parliamentary elections in 1997

In the run up to Presidential and parliamentary elections in 1997, the opposition coalition came apart. Milosevic, having served two terms as President of Serbia, could not stand again, and was selected as President of Yugoslavia -- previously a position with little power. One result was increased Montenegrin nervousness over Serbian domination of the Yugoslav federation. The other was rivalry between prominent opposition figures over the race for the Presidency.

Vuk Draskovic and Zoran Djindjic could not reach agreement, and when Draskovic insisted on running, Djindjic called for Democratic Party voters to boycott the elections altogether.

In the campaign for the Serbian presidency, the other "opposition" candidate, Vojslav Seselj outpolled Draskovic, only to be defeated in the final round by Milan Milutinovic, of the SPS. In the assembly, SPS and a leftist coalition, JUL, headed by Milosevic's wife Mira Markovic, won 110 seats: Seselj's SRS 82, and Draskovic's SPO 45. Eventually, a government was formed which again united the forces of socialism and nationalism, as SPS formed a coalition with Seselj's SRS.

Consequences of Kosovo

Electoral success of SRS due to Kosovo situation

Part of the electoral success of SRS in the late 1990s was related to the deteriorating Kosovo situation, where since 1996 Albanian resistance to Serb rule had taken a violent turn with the first actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA. Fears of Albanian secession in Kosovo and stories of the victimization of Serbs there had been central to the first-wave of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s. In the 1990s after Dayton, it appeared to many Serbs, with access only to state-controlled media, that those fears were being realized.

Milosevic refused to accept the Rambouillet Conference treaty's terms

The conflict in Kosovo escalated in 1998, and a last effort to defuse the situation was made at the Rambouillet Conference of January 1999. Milosevic refused to accept the proposed agreement's terms, which would have placed NATO troops on the ground in Kosovo. Outrage at Serbian state-sanctioned violence against Albanians in Kosovo eventually prompted NATO to launch an air campaign against Serbia and Montenegro on March 24, 1999.

Milosevic's downfall and its aftermath

Milosevic struggles to hold on to power

The return to "outcast" status led the Milosevic régime to increase pressure on its enemies, and also contributed to the increasing criminalization of the state and public life. Radio stations and media outlets like B92 had always been subject to attempts at control, now those attempts intensified. In April 1999, a prominent opposition journalist was murdered in a ritual-style killing and an attempt was made on Vuk Draskovic's life in October. Former allies of the regime were also killed, including the general secretary of JUL and the paramilitary leader Arkan in January 2000. Some of the killings served to eliminate potential witnesses to Milosevic's past actions.

After the war

The Kosovo war ended with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and paramilitaries from the province, and over two hundred thousand Serbian civilians also leaving.

Serbia's pariah status continued as long as Milosevic was in power. International financial support for free media and the political opposition continued to reach Serbia, along with the promise that further aid for reconstruction and recovery would be allocated for any new democratically elected government.

October 2000 election for Federal Presidency

In the meantime, the atmosphere in Serbia became more violent than ever, as mafia-type killings and assassinations became almost commonplace. A new opposition coalition was formed, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia: this time, they agreed on a single candidate for the Federal Presidency, which Milosevic was seeking for a second term.

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Milosevic's downfall and its aftermath, Continued

Kostunica wins Milosevic's opponent, Vojislav Kostunica, was a lawyer and a nationalist, generally recognized as free of the corruption that had become such a feature of Serbian politics. Drawing on support from the coalition and from OTPOR, an anti-Milosevic student-led organization, Kostunica won in the first round in the October 2000 election. As he had done earlier in his political career, Milosevic disputed the results. This time, though, opposition protests were organized and widespread, and the security forces did not resort to force to quell them. Milosevic conceded defeat. Some of the deals struck that day between reformists and erstwhile supporters of Milosevic -- including that between Djindjic and security forces leader Milorad Ulemek "Legija"--came back to haunt the country later.

DOS wins parliamentary elections In Serbian parliamentary elections in December 2000 the DOS won a convincing majority, taking 176 of 250 seats, and Djindjic became Prime Minister of Serbia. The Socialist Party of Serbia kept 37 seats, Seselj's SRS 23, and Arkan's old party, the Party of Serbian Unity, 14.

Continued on next page

Milosevic's downfall and its aftermath, Continued

Milosevic extradited to The Hague

On 28 June 2001, the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Milosevic was extradited to the Hague to face trial. Immediately afterwards, an international donor's conference pledged over a billion dollars to Serbian reconstruction, and Yugoslavia was readmitted to international organizations. Subsequently, Serbian police filed charges against Milosevic in connection with the murder of his former mentor, Ivan Stambolic, in 2000.

Milosevic would die in the Hague in March 2006 in the course of his drawn-out trial on war crimes charges.

Anti-Milosevic coalition splinters

The decision to send Milosevic to the Hague divided the Serbian public - and the government coalition. Infighting between Kostunica's and Djindjic's parties worsened. In June 2002, Kostunica's DSS withdrew from the Serbian government and parliament after the Djindjic-led DOS replaced 21 DSS members for boycotting assembly meetings.

Kostunica's position was further weakened by the new constitution of Serbia-Montenegro, which eliminated his position. He sought election as President of Serbia in October 2002. Although he won a majority of the votes cast, a low turnout resulted in the vote being declared invalid. The same non-result was reached in December 2002, and in March 2003 Kostunica stepped down from office, and became a private citizen.

Djindjic's career was tragically ended the same month, assassinated in Belgrade by a group headed by the commander of the Special Operations Unit of the Serbian Security Service Milorad Ulemek Legija and others from the unit. (Ulemek was eventually captured in 2004 and, after convictions for the murders of former President Stambolic and activists from Vuk Draskov's party, was convicted of the murder of Djindjic.) A state of emergency was declared after the murder and security forces conducted widespread arrests, especially of members of organized crime gangs, who were believed to have been involved in the assassination.) Djindjic's successor, Zoran Zivkovic, vowed to continue his predecessor's policy of pursuing integration with Europe.

After Djindjic's death, the Serbian government faced additional problems. Miroljub Labus, who had contested presidential elections against Kostunica, and his G17 Plus party left the DOS coalition in July 2003, accusing the government of playing politics in its removal of the G17 Plus Vice President Mladjan Dinkic from his post of Governor of the National Bank.

Struggle for Serbia's political direction

2003-2004 Serbian elections

Serbian presidential elections held in November 2003 again failed to attract the necessary minimum 50% of registered voters going to the polls. The 39% of the registered voters who did cast ballots gave Tomislav Nikolovic of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party 46.9% of the vote, more than the 36% share won by Dragoljub Micunovic of the fragmenting DOS coalition.

Parliamentary elections scheduled for 2004 were brought forward to December 2003. In those elections, the Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Seselj, won the plurality of votes in a low turnout to win 82 seats. Vojislav Kostunica's DSS won 53 seats, G17 plus 34, and the largest former Democratic party, DS, 37. With the 22 votes of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) and New Serbia, reform-oriented parties could command a majority in the 250-seat house: however, the rancor of the breakup of DOS, and the personal rivalries between Labus (G17 plus), Kostunica, and DS's own divided leadership made a large coalition difficult.

Kostunica eventually formed a minority coalition without the participation of DS or SRS, but including G17 plus, SRM-New Serbia, and Milosevic's Socialist Party.

In the June 2004 Presidential elections, Boris Tadic, of the DS, won in a run-off against SRS candidate Tomislav Nikolic, taking 54% of the vote to Nikolic's 45%. Nikolic took the first round, when a number of reformist candidates stood: in the second round, all transferred their support to Tadic, as did Kostunica, thus temporarily suspending the infighting between DSS and DS.

Local elections in September 2004 were marked by low turnout (35%) and mostly two-party struggles between Tadic's DS and Nikolic's SRS. The elections confirmed the further decline of Kostunica's DSS, and the short-lived rise of Bogoljub Karic, former Milosevic ally, Presidential candidate in 2004, and head of the Serbian Strength Movement, as a new potential "third force" in Serbian politics. Karic fled to Russia in 2006 after being charged with embezzling Serbian state funds.

2006 constitutional referendum

Low turnout in the 2006 referendum for the new constitution, with only 54% of registered voters participating, showed continued public disillusionment with politics. The constitution was supported by 52.3% of registered voters. The new constitution asserted continued Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, intended to preclude any Serbian government from recognizing an independent Kosovo.

Continued on next page

Struggle for Serbia's political direction, Continued

2007 parliamentary election

Nikolic's Serb Radical Party came in first with 28.32% of the vote, Tadic's Democratic Party in second place with 22.67%, and Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia in coalition with New Serbia won third place with 16.38%. Other parties passing the 5% threshold were G17 Plus with 6.79%, the Socialist Party with 5.64%. Liberal Democrats coalition with 5.33% led by former Democratic Party leader and Deputy Prime Minister Cedomir Jovanovic, and several small ethnic parties. Voter turnout was 60%, somewhat greater than recent elections. Neither Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement nor Karic's Serbian Strength Movement passed the threshold. The OSCE termed the elections free and fair, and in line with OSCE commitments and Council of Europe standards.

Democratic bloc government short-lived

After months of squabbling, DS and DSS-NS finally reached agreement in May 2007 on the formation of a government, together with G17. Kostunica stayed prime minister, with compromises on control of the security-related portfolios. President Tadic become president of a national security council empowered to coordinate the work of all the security agencies. DSS retained the Interior ministry, and DS and DSS agreed to joint administration of the State Security Agency (BIA). DS held a majority of portfolios in the government, including a vice president for European integration, foreign affairs, and defense. DSS gained a new ministry for Kosovo and Metohija.

The government's coalition agreement rested on five principles:

- Kosovo as an integral and inalienable part of Serbia
- Serbia with Kosovo as an inalienable part entry into the EU
- Completing cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
- Socio-economic policies to reduce poverty and employment, improve living standards, continue investments in strategic infrastructure, complete privatization, attract new investment, and strengthen economic links in the region
- Continue the fight against organized crime and corruption

Continued on next page

Struggle for Serbia's political direction, Continued

2008 presidential elections

The Radicals Tomislav Nikolic and incumbent President Boris Tadic of DS won 39.99% and 35.39 % of the vote respectively in a first round in January, but neither won the necessary absolute majority of votes cast. Tadic won the run-off held in February with 51.61 % of the vote. Kostunica's DSS supported NS leader Velimir Illic who came in third with 7.43 % of the vote. DSS' failure to support Tadic in the presidential agreement as had reportedly been agreed further damaged the DSS-DS relationship and their ability to work together in the government.

Democratic bloc coalition collapses

By March 2008, following Kosovo's declaration of independence, the tension between Serbia's Kosovo policy and movement towards EU integration was the last straw for the coalition. The DSS wanted to condition movement toward European integration on EU acceptance of Kosovo as part of Serbia, while DS and G17 insisted on keeping the issues of Kosovo and EU integration separate. G17 leader and Minister of Economy Dinkic's proposal to stop paying Kosovo's debt and Kostunica's disagreement also could not be resolved. The governing parties could no longer finesse their differences and agreed to hold new parliamentary elections together with provincial and local elections.

Continued on next page

Struggle for Serbia's political direction, Continued

Tadic's DS coalition comes in first in 2008 parliamentary elections

The Democrat's (DS)-led coalition came in first in the May 11 parliamentary elections winning 102 seats with 38.44% of the vote, followed by the Serb Radical Party (SRS) winning 78 seats with 29.36%, Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) – New Serbia (NS) winning 30 seats with 11.59%, the Socialist's (SPS) – led coalition winning 20 seats with 7.60%, and the Liberal Democrats (LDP) winning 13 seats with 5.74%. Hungarian, Bosniak and Albanian ethnic minority coalitions won the remaining seven seats.



A young woman casts her ballot during the parliamentary elections in Serbia, Belgrade, 11 May 2008. (OSCE/Milan Obradovic)

Neither Tadic's Democrats nor the Radicals had won enough seats to form a parliamentary majority without building a coalition. The SPS, the party once led by Milosovic but now seeking to define itself as a modern European socialist party, had become the kingmaker.

The International Election Observation Mission fielded by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reported that these elections were overall in line with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments for democratic elections, although they were overshadowed, in part, by some negative aspects of the campaign (threats made to senior officials and posters that could be interpreted as suggesting assassination). The elections were administered professionally and in an atmosphere of confidence in the process. They provided a genuine opportunity for the citizens of Serbia to choose from a range of political parties and coalitions, which vigorously competed in an open and overall calm campaign environment.

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Serbia's future

Serbia's identity

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was formed in 1992 by Serbia and Montenegro in the wake of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Although not internationally recognized as its legitimate successor, the FRY took the same name and had the same capital, Belgrade.

In turn, the Yugoslav Parliament formed the State of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003 to replace the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Montenegro voters decided on Montenegro's independence and separation from Serbia in a referendum in May 2006, and reopened for Serbia yet again the question of its identity and direction.

Kosovo remains a defining issue

Kosovo continues to be a defining issue for Serbia's politics. The Liberal Democrats are the only major party that publicly accepted the inevitability of Kosovo's independence from Serbia.

Following a state-backed rally by 200,000 Serbs protesting Kosovo's February 17, 2008 declaration of Independence, rioters burned part of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. Riot police were not present when the attack began, but eventually dispersed the mob. The U.S. protested the lack of security provided by Serbian authorities. There were also lesser attacks on other diplomatic missions.

Continued on next page

Struggle for Serbia's political direction, Continued

European integration

A majority of Serbia's population supports EU accession, and most Serbian leaders say they want to be integrated in Europe. Serbia's failure to apprehend Mladic led to suspension of Stabilization and Association (SAA) Talks with the EU in 2006. The European Commission resumed negotiations with Serbia in June 2007, one day after its arrest and delivery to the Hague Tribunal of wanted wartime Bosnian Serb General Tolimir. The SAA was initialed in November 2007, with signing apparently dependent on further arrests.

Nevertheless, the EU agreed to sign the SAA on April 29, 2008 as a signal to the Serbian people that the EU wanted closer relations with Serbia (and that Serbian interests were with the election of those that would bring Serbia into the EU). President Tadic, Deputy Prime Minister Delic and Foreign Minister Jeremic, all DS, represented Serbia at the signing. They noted that the outgoing government had initialed the agreement and had authorized Delic to sign it. Coming at the height of the parliamentary election campaign, Prime Minister Kostunica and DSS/NS, opposed the signing, claiming that it was essentially recognized Kosovo's independence.

The European Council emphasized that implementation of the SAA would occur as soon as it decided that Serbia was fully cooperating with the Hague Tribunal. Some EU members, especially the Netherlands, had insisted on this linkage.

NATO

Public support for joining NATO is not strong, which is not surprising given the damage inflicted during NATO's 1999 campaign against Serbia.

NATO invited Serbia to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in November 2006. Serbia quickly agreed to join these NATO frameworks and this was accepted by Serbian public opinion. A [NATO Military Liaison Office](#) was set up in the Ministry of Defense in Belgrade. Serbia joined the PfP Planning and Review Process in 2007. NATO also completed a PfP trust fund project that removed 1.41 million anti-personnel mines from Serbian territory. NATO was also apparently willing to offer an individual Partnership Action Plan to Serbia, but differences within the Serbian government limited further engagement with the alliance.

Kostunica and other DSS have taken a public line over the last year that the West's Kosovo policy has been to detach it from Serbia to turn it into a "NATO state." This has likely further soured Serbian attitudes toward NATO.

Continued on next page

Struggle for Serbia's political direction, Continued

Russia

Kosovo's independence has tightened the relationship between Serbia and Russia, which remains its most steadfast supporter. Underlining the deepening of ties, Serbia and Russia signed a major energy deal in January 2008. Russia's GAZPROM received a 51% holding in the Serbian Oil Industry (NIS), in return for 400 million Euros and a commitment to invest a further 500 million Euros by 2012. In addition, the South Stream pipeline is to be built in Serbia to convey a minimum of 10 billion cubic meters of GAZPROM gas per year. After the fall of the government in March, however, the agreement was not ratified as a result of differences between DS and DSS-NS.

Crime and corruption

Violence, crime and politics still appear to intersect in Serbia.

The investigation of financial irregularities at Mobtel, headed by members of the Karic family closely associated with the "Power of Serbia" Party, captured headlines in 2006.

South Serbia

Ethnic Albanians make up a majority of the 120,000 residents of the three municipalities of Presovo, Bujanovac and Medvedja in south Serbia. Albanians launched an armed insurgency from November 2000 to May 2001 when a ceasefire was reached. The government established a Coordination Body for South Serbia to coordinate the work of the central government and local self-governing bodies. South Serbia is challenged by lack of economic opportunities, while ethnic Albanians and Roma continue to complain of discrimination and lack of inclusion in state institutions. The increase in Serbian rhetoric over Kosovo has impacted on Albanian sensitivities in south Serbia.

Numerous international organizations and NGOs, as well as embassies accredited to Belgrade, have been active in playing a helpful mediating role as well as providing development and other assistance in the area.

Continued on next page

Struggle for Serbia's political direction, Continued

OSCE

The OSCE reestablished a mission in Belgrade in 2001, renamed the [OSCE Mission to Serbia](#) in 2006, with a focus on democratization, protection of human rights and minorities, media and development.



Zarko Velickovic (right) receives his prize for best cartoon from the Head of the Mission to Serbia's Rule of Law Department, Ruth Van Rhijn, at the awards ceremony for an anti-corruption art competition, Lebane, 26 March 2008. (OSCE, Milan Obradovic)

Serbian culture

Belgrade

As the former capital of a country of almost 30 million people, Belgrade has the feel of a major European city. Home to the former Yugoslavia's most prestigious university, its students contribute to a vibrant cultural and intellectual life that endured the years of war. Students were also at the forefront of political opposition to the Milosevic regime.

Cultural Notes

The city nonetheless bears the scars of war. NATO air strikes against the city had a profound material and broader psychological effect, increasing hostility towards the international community. This does not generally extend to the level of individual interaction.

The inequalities in wealth that were driven here by communism and war profiteering, are striking still: while regular incomes have shrunk significantly in real terms, the scope for fast profit through illegal trading was considerable in the years of sanctions. Many resorted to this grey or black economy for bare survival. It also created a class of newly wealthy people, who ostentatiously display their good fortune in their clothes, accessories and behavior.

One of the cultural forms created in the last few years is music known as turbo-folk, which combines traditional folk with rock, rap and Communist nostalgia.

Rich agricultural resources

The country survived in part from its rich agricultural resources: south of Belgrade and in the northern province of Vojvodina the soil is fertile. As elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, dairy products are often exceptional, including kajmak, a thick creamy buttery spread. Other foods, like the grilled meats available on the streets of Belgrade, also show the Turkish influence.

Mini-quiz

Multiple choice Serbia's current problems include:

- accepting the new status of Kosovo
 - tackling organized crime and political corruption
 - maintaining reforms
 - all of the above
-

Montenegro

Montenegro at a glance

At a glance

The following table describes geographic and demographic information for Montenegro.

| Item | Description |
|---------------------------|--|
| Size | 5,400 square miles. |
| Population | 678,000 (2008 estimated) Since 1991 refugees from other parts of Yugoslavia have found temporary haven in Montenegro. In 1992 their numbers reportedly reached 63,000, or almost 10% of the population. Numbers peaked again during the war in Kosovo in 199. |
| Main ethnic groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Montenegrin 43% • Serbian 32% • Bosniak 8% • Albanian 5% • Others (Muslims, Croats, Roma) 12% |
| Main religious groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Orthodox (split between Montenegrin and Serbian Church) Over 70% • Muslim Over 15% |
| Leading political parties | <p>Coalition for European Montenegro (DPS-SDP), includes</p> <p>Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) Founded 1991 from the old League of Communists. Lead advocate of Montenegro's independence from Serbia and Euro-Atlantic integration. Led by Milo Dukanovic,</p> <p>Social Democratic Party (SDP) led by Ranko Krivokapic.</p> <p>Serb List Main opposition party. Wants to be spokesman of all Serbs in Montenegro. Supports strong ties with Belgrade and opposes Montenegrin membership in NATO. Led by Andrija Mardic.</p> <p>Movement for Changes Founded 2002 and modeled after Serbia's G17 Plus.</p> |

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| | <p>Market-oriented focus, favors adopting “European standards” and closer ties with the EU. Led by Nebojsa Medojevic.</p> <p>Socialist People's Party (SNP)</p> <p>Formed 1997, after a split in the DPS. Since its poor showing in the 2006 parliamentary elections, has transformed itself into a pro-EU European-style social democratic party focused on social reform and welfare. Led by Srdan Milic.</p> |
| System of government | The President of Montenegro and the 77-seat Assembly are elected for four-year terms. |

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Montenegro at a glance, Continued

At a glance (**continued**)

| Item | Description |
|-------------------|---|
| Head of state | Filip Vujanovic was reelected president in 2008. |
| GDP | The estimated per capita GDP (purchasing power parity) was \$3,800 in 2005. |
| Other information | <p>Currency The Euro is used in Montenegro.</p> <p>Languages Serbian is the main language.</p> <p>Terrain The country is mountainous, and travel difficult.</p> <p>Culture Montenegrin society was historically organized in clans and relied on a pastoral economy. Blood feuds were commonplace, as in Northern Albania. This is part of the reason for the commonly held view that Montenegrin men are prone to violence, and the society remains patriarchal. Montenegro was the birthplace of one of Tito's most famous aides, Milovan Djilas, who became a dissident. He describes his Montenegrin childhood and family history in <i>Land Without Justice</i>.</p> |

Contemporary Montenegro

World War II and after

During World War II, Montenegrins played a major role in the Partisan forces, and were afterwards well represented among the new Yugoslavia's élite. Montenegro was recognized as a republic, and Montenegrins as one of the constituent peoples in the federation. Underdeveloped before the war, Montenegro received major investment during the Yugoslav period. For the most part, like inhabitants of the other poorer, smaller republics, Montenegrins supported the Yugoslav ideal.

Politics in Montenegro

Multiparty elections of 1990

In the multiparty elections of 1990, the League of Communists won a two-thirds majority in the Republican parliament, and its head, Momir Bulatovic, a 76% share of the vote for President. The new prime minister was Milo Djukanovic. The League was renamed the Democratic Party of Socialists, or DPS, in June 1991.

After Croatia and Slovenia seceded, to be followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, the Montenegrin electorate supported Montenegro's participation in the new federal Yugoslavia, as a partner of Serbia.

Montenegro aligned with Serbia during 1991-95 wars

In Presidential elections in November 1992, DPS head Bulatovic defeated Nikola Kostic, who had formerly represented Montenegro on the Yugoslav eight-member presidency. DPS also won 46 seats in the national assembly, and Djukanovic returned as prime minister. DPS was closely aligned with the regime of Milosevic during the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Montenegrin forces took part in the war in Croatia, participating in attacks on the southern Dalmatian coast, including Dubrovnik. Montenegro also served as a refuge for Serbian refugees from Croatia.

Continued on next page

Politics in Montenegro, Continued

Milo Djukanovic

In the mid-1990s, as Serbia and Yugoslavia became international pariahs, Djukanovic pursued a new policy, to distance himself from Milosevic. Among other gestures towards the West, he floated the idea of allowing international use of the Montenegrin ports for support of operations in Bosnia. In mid-1997 he ousted Bulatovic as the party head, and stood in the presidential election as the party candidate. In a contested election result he narrowly defeated Bulatovic, who ran as an independent candidate, by the margin of 51% to 49%.

DPS agenda greater autonomy from Serbia

In March 1998, Bulatovic created the new Socialist People's Party. Parliamentary elections revealed his continuing support, as Djukanovic's DPS won 30 seats while Bulatovic's SNP won 29. DPS formed a government coalition with other smaller parties, including social democrats and liberals, as Djukanovic pursued an agenda of greater financial autonomy from Serbia while avoiding direct confrontation with Milosevic. In May 1998, Bulatovic became Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, expressing again his own and his party's commitment to continuing the close Serbia-Montenegro relationship.

In late 1999, Djukanovic made increasingly bold moves, introducing the German Mark as legal tender alongside the Yugoslav Dinar to combat inflation, and declaring exclusive Montenegrin control of airports.

Continued on next page

Politics in Montenegro, Continued

Pathway to independence not clear

In the April 2001 parliamentary elections, the pro-independence coalition "Victory for Montenegro" won 36 seats, while their opposition, "United For Yugoslavia" won 33 seats. The Liberal Party got six seats and two Albanian parties got one seat each in the 77-seat parliament.

2002 elections

The Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and its coalition partners made gains in the May 2002 municipal elections, and were seen as supportive of the political line of President Djukanovic. The OSCE termed the elections as generally in line with OSCE standards. The subsequent parliamentary elections in October 2002 gave Djukanovic's party an outright majority, and he stepped down as President to become Prime Minister. After two elections to replace him were declared invalid because of low turnout, the law was changed, and subsequently Filip Vujanovic, a Djukanovic supporter, was elected President.

"Serbia and Montenegro" Agreement

In 2003, the Yugoslav Federal Parliament adopted the Constitutional Charter for the new State of Serbia and Montenegro. The agreement forestalled an independence referendum for three years.

As the three-year moratorium approached its end, President Vujanovic and PM Djukanovic pushed for a Montenegrin referendum on independence.

2006 Montenegro decides for independence

Montenegro voters opted for independence 55.6% to 44.4% in the May 2006 referendum; 86.5% of Montenegro's registered voters participated in the referendum. The pro-independence campaign barely crossed the 55 percent threshold that was mandated as the cutoff point. The OSCE stated that the referendum was conducted in accordance with international standards.

Djukanovic steps down as prime minister in 2006 and back in 2008

Towards the end of 2006 Djukanovic left the government, while remaining leader of the Democratic Party of Socialists. Zeljko Sturanovic succeeded him as prime minister. Djukanovic returned as prime minister in February 2008 after Sturanovic resigned due to illness.

Continued on next page

Politics in Montenegro, Continued

2008 presidential elections

Incumbent President Vucanovic of the Democratic Party of Socialists won reelection in the first round with 51.4% of the vote. Runners-up Andrija Mandic of the Serb List won 20.4%, Nebojsa Medojevic of the Movement for Changes won 15.7%, and Srdjan Milic of the Socialist People's Party won 12.8%.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) assessed that nearly all aspects of Montenegro's first post-independence presidential election were in line with international standards. Areas for improvement were the continued blurring of state and party structures, and financial transparency.

EU, COE, NATO

Montenegro signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in March 2007, and joined the Council of Europe in May 2007.

The March 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit welcomed Montenegro's decision to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan and invited it to begin an intensified dialogue on the range of issues relating to membership.

OSCE

The OSCE established a [Mission to Montenegro](#) in 2006.



The first of 61 surplus tanks is cut up to mark the start of the Montenegro Demilitarization Program, a joint project between the country's Ministry of Defense, the OSCE and the UNDP, Podgorica, 3 July 2007. (Dragan Mijatovic)

Montenegrin culture

Montenegro retained an openness

Montenegrins have a reputation for their stature, bravery, and quick tempers. Yet the Republic has successfully avoided the direct effects of war, coming under attack only during NATO's air campaign in 1999. Montenegro has retained an openness that others have not. Media operated more freely there than under Milosevic in Serbia, and many refugees from Kosovo took refuge there.

Building for the future

The capital Podgorica (formerly Titograd) is changing with new building programs. Several old sections of town, however, survived the destructive socialist urban renewal during the Tito period.

Popular coastal areas

Montenegro's old capital, Cetinje, and the tomb of the country's famous poet, Njegos, can be reached by road through dramatic mountain scenery, which continues virtually to the coast.

Other issues

Unresolved issues from the 1991-95 War

Bosnia-Herzegovina brought a lawsuit at the International Court of Justice in 1993 against the now defunct Yugoslavia (and then Serbia-Montenegro) for aggression and genocide for the Bosnian war.

Feelings also run high in Croatia concerning Montenegrin involvement in hostilities in Croatia, especially the shelling of Dubrovnik in 1991. Some major Montenegrin political personalities from that period are still active.

Montenegro and Croatia agreed in March 2008 to have the International Court of Justice arbitrate the status of the Prevlaka Peninsula.

Corruption and crime

There is widespread suspicion that major political figures have amassed personal fortunes through criminal activities or corruption. Among others, former President and Prime Minister Djukanovic has been accused of personal and political ties to mafia groups involved in widespread tobacco smuggling. Warrants for his arrest have been issued in Italy. In March 2008, Djukanovic made a low profile visit to the prosecutor's office in Bari, Italy to address the accusations against him.

On May 27, 2004, a prominent journalist, Dusko Jovanovic, was murdered. An editor of the opposition newspaper *Dan* and a deputy in parliament for the opposition Socialist People's Party, he took stands against Montenegrin independence, and wrote investigative reports on smuggling in the Republic. There was immediate speculation that senior political figures were implicated in the crime, although this was never proven. At the end of 2006, a Podgorica Court cleared the only suspect in the case following a lengthy trial. The murder remains unsolved, underlining the concern of many that violence and fear are continuing components of Montenegrin politics.

Terrorism

Eighteen Albanians from the Malesija area, a predominantly Albanian region near Podgorica, were arrested in September 2006 and charged with setting up a group to launch an armed separatist rebellion. Police stated that they found weapons and explosives hidden near the town of Tuzi, in Malesija. The plot allegedly was launched with help from groups in Kosovo and in the U.S.

Ethnic Albanians make up about 6 percent of the population of Montenegro.

Mini-quiz

Multiple choice A key issue facing Montenegro is:

- ethnic tensions
 - language divisions
 - deployment of international peacekeepers on its territory
 - corruption
-

Kosovo

Overview

At a glance

The following table describes geographic and demographic information for Kosovo.

| Item | Description |
|-----------------------|--|
| Size | 4,200 square miles |
| Population | <p>OSCE's 2001 population estimate for Kosovo was 2.40 million.</p> <p>Over half of Kosovo's population is under 20. Average household size is large (six to seven members) and the demographic growth rate, at twenty per thousand, is the highest in Europe.</p> <p>In the 1990s, many Kosovo Albanians immigrated to Western Europe, their number reaching an estimated 400,000 by 1996. A majority live in Switzerland and Germany.</p> |
| Main Ethnic Groups | <p>Fewer than 100,000 Serbs remain in Kosovo, mostly in the northern municipalities and in the northern part of the city of Mitrovica. The majority fled to Serbia after the 1999 war. Smaller minorities, including Roma and Gorani have also left.</p> <p>According to the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study in 2001, current ethnic distribution is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Albanians 88 %• Serbs 7 %• Bosniacs 1.9 %• Roma 1.7 %• Turks 1.0 % |
| Main Religious Groups | <p>Most Kosovo Albanians are Muslim. Despite secularism during the Yugoslav period, religious sentiment remained powerful, especially for Bektashi, a version of Islam.</p> <p>Most Kosovo Serbs are Orthodox.</p> |

Continued on next page

Overview, Continued

At a glance (continued)

| Item | Description |
|---------------------------|---|
| Leading Political parties | <p>Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) Also known as Democratic Alliance of Kosovo or DAK. Founded in 1989 by the late Ibrahim Rugova. Fatmir Sejdiu, the current Kosovo president, now heads the LDK.</p> <p>Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) Formerly Party for a Progressive and Democratic Kosovo, or PPDK. Established after the demilitarization of the KLA, led by Hashim Thaci. He became prime minister in January 2008.</p> <p>Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) Established after the demilitarization of the KLA by Ramush Haradinaj. Bajram Kosumi led the party after Haradinaj went to the Hague for trial on war crimes in March 2005, but was pushed by his party to resign as prime minister in March 2006. Former Kosovo Protection Corps Commander Agim Ceku was then named prime minister until January 2008.</p> <p>The Democratic League of Dardania Founded in 2007 by Nexhat Daci following his unsuccessful effort to become LDK leader.</p> <p>New Kosovo Alliance (AKR) Founded in 2006 by businessman Behgjet Pacolli.</p> <p>Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (PShDK) Advocates christian democratic principles, even though not all members are Catholics. Formerly close to LDK, ran in coalition with the Democratic League of Dardania in the 2007 Assembly elections. Headed by Mark Krasniqi</p> |

Continued on next page

Overview, Continued

At a glance (continued)

| Item | Description |
|----------------------|---|
| System of Government | <p>Kosovo declared its independence February 17, 2008.</p> <p>The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) established a constitutional framework and the provisional institutions of self-government in 2001. The UN Security Council had established UNMIK in Resolution 1244 in 1999.</p> <p>Since 1999, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been responsible for security.</p> <p>The International Civilian Office/EU Special Representative and the EU Rule of Law Mission EULEX in Kosovo were transitioning into their new roles in early 2008.</p> <p>Local elections were held in October 2000 in Kosovo's thirty municipalities. The LDK won 58% of the popular vote. The province elected a 120-seat Assembly in November 2001 in which the LDK was the big winner with 47 seats.</p> <p>In March 2002, the Assembly elected Rugova President of Kosovo, and approved the creation of a coalition government with 10 ministries, to include ministers from the LDK, PDK, AAK, and KP.</p> <p>Local elections were held again in October 2002. LDK outpolled its opponents, but by a reduced margin, and firmly controlled only 11 of the province's 30 municipalities. 28.5% of representatives elected were women.</p> <p>In the October 2004 Assembly elections, the LDK emerged with 45% of the vote, and formed a coalition with the AAK.</p> <p>In the November 2007 Assembly elections, the PDK won 34.3% of the vote, and formed a coalition with the LDK and the New Kosovo Alliance.</p> |
| Head of State | Fatmir Sejdiu was elected President in 2006. |
| Cultural Information | Although Serbo-Croat was taught in schools and used in government until the 1990s, the main language is now Albanian, in its Geg variant. Albanians call the province Kosova, with the stress on the second syllable, arguing |

| | |
|--|---|
| | <p>that Kosovo was its Slavic name.</p> <p>The province is studded with medieval Serbian Orthodox churches, but also contains symbolic sites for Albanian history, including the town of Prizren.</p> |
|--|---|

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Overview, Continued

Map

The following graphic is a map of Kosovo.



Historical background of Kosovo

An anomaly in the Yugoslav system

Kosovo (or, in Albanian, Kosova) and its majority Albanian population always constituted an anomaly in the Yugoslav system. More numerous as a people than Macedonians, Montenegrins and Slovenians, Albanians were categorized as a nationality or *narodnost*. The rationale was that unlike the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, Albanians constituted the majority in a neighboring nation-state, Albania. Thus they already "had" a state of their own. Instead of being grouped into a single Republic, then, Yugoslavia's Albanian population was divided between three Republics (Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia) and constituted a linguistic and cultural minority in all three. The largest number lived in Kosovo, where they constituted a local majority, and where Albanian cultural and political activism was concentrated.

Constitution of 1974 granted Kosovo status close to that of a Republic

Tito's government policy of addressing underdevelopment brought federal funding to Kosovo, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Much of it was spent on modern public buildings and housing in Pristina, the capital. The city's University was opened in 1970 and attracted Albanian students and intellectuals from elsewhere in Yugoslavia. The new constitution of 1974 granted Kosovo status close to that of a Republic, with a government, constitution, control of legal and educational systems, and representation in the presidency of Yugoslavia.

Kosovo did not have right to secede

As an "autonomous province" of Serbia, Kosovo resembled republics in every respect save one: it did not have the constitutional right to secede. Additionally, Albanians were not recognized as a "narod" or constituent people of Yugoslavia, with a right to secede. Gaining Republic status remained part of the agenda of Kosovo's Albanian leaders.

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Historical background of Kosovo, Continued

Tensions between Serbs and Albanians

Police repression continued throughout the 1980s against Albanians. At the same time, Serbian emigration from the province increased, as did Serbian media assertions of atrocities committed by Albanians against Serbs. Tensions between Serbs and Albanians continued to rise, and came to a head after Milosevic's accession to power in Serbia in 1987.

Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy, staging a vote by the province's parliament, effectively to dissolve itself. Protests over specific grievances, including a hunger strike by Albanian miners at the Trepca lead and zinc mines, changed into massive demonstrations, prompting violent reprisals by police as had occurred in 1981.

Organized non-violence

Parallel administration

Milosevic's regime set about eliminating state institutions of Albanian employees, including schools, hospitals, factories, and public administration. Kosovo's Albanian political leaders continued to resist. In December 1989, Ibrahim Rugova founded the LDK, and in July 1990, with wide support, declared Kosovo a republic. This initiated a "parallel administration" in Kosovo.

Rugova's parallel administration organized an underground referendum in September 1991, which indicated overwhelming support for independence, and then held elections, in which the LDK dominated the new parliament, and Rugova became president. The "shadow state" offered employment and services to Kosovo's Albanians who had lost their jobs and who were increasingly treated as second-class citizens by the Serbian authorities.

Kosovo's Albanian population reacted with non-violence

Under Rugova's leadership, Kosovo's Albanian population preached and practiced non-violence. The violent break-up of Yugoslavia, and the future status of Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, meanwhile, diverted the attention of the Belgrade leadership. The two sectors of Kosovo -- a Serb-dominated official administration, and a rival Albanian society -- did not clash often, and so little violence occurred.

A clear message from the first Bush Administration to Milosevic also served to temporarily curb potential Serbian repression by making clear that such actions would be met by U.S. intervention.

After Dayton

Uneasy impasse The uneasy impasse, though, was brought to an end after the Dayton Accords in 1995. The U.S. brokered peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not address the situation in Kosovo, and Serbian military resources shifted for action in Kosovo.

Kosovo Liberation Army

In the meantime, a new force had appeared in Kosovo, calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA (in Albanian, UCK) and targeting the Serbian presence in the province.

One of its spokesmen was Adem Demaci, who continued to advocate unification with Albania. A younger generation of militant leaders had also developed, of whom the most prominent was Hashim Thaci.

By early 1998, violent clashes between the KLA and Serbian police were widespread, and Rugova's place as leader of Kosovo's Albanians in question. Rugova was re-elected as president by Kosovo Albanians, but in response to demands from within his electorate, called for outright independence.

The international community, led by the U.S., tried to persuade both sides to moderate their positions. But violence continued to escalate as Serbian forces sought to destroy the KLA and regain control of the province.

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After Dayton, Continued

Peace conference in Rambouillet

The fighting internally displaced over half a million people, which culminated in major successes for the security forces in September 1998. The threat of NATO air strikes in October finally forced Milosevic to cease all-out offensives, withdraw some forces, and permit international observers.

The OSCE was to send in a force of approximately 2,000 civilians to aid in conflict management in the tense situation, referred to as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). Its mandate called for the KVM to verify the agreement brokered by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke of the United States in October 1998. However, since the OSCE did not have a roster of civilians to be recruited for the KVM, the force was slow to be filled. It had only reached about 1,400 persons when the decision was made to withdraw in February 1999 as violence continued to escalate.

Military activity nonetheless continued on both sides. A turning point was reached when in mid-January 1999; international observers reported that Serbian security forces killed over 40 Albanian civilians in the village of Racak. Again, air strikes were threatened to force the Belgrade government to attend a peace conference held in Rambouillet in February and March. The Albanian delegation included Rugova and Thaci, but not Demaci. Albanian delegates signed an agreement that called for almost 30,000 NATO soldiers to enter Kosovo to ensure compliance: the Serb delegation refused, and the Serbian parliament confirmed its decision.

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After Dayton, Continued

Evidence of mass killings

In the face of enormous ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians by Serbian security forces, and amid international determination not to permit mass murder of civilians as had occurred in Bosnia, a NATO air campaign was launched against Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999 and continued for almost three months.

After the air campaign began, the scale of Yugoslav military operations against the Albanian civilian population increased, and Serbian paramilitaries also began to operate in the province. Mass killings of at least 2,000 Kosovo Albanians occurred in the province, and hundreds of thousands of people were forced from their homes. Fearing for their own safety from government forces and the paramilitaries, over half of Kosovo's Albanian population sought refuge outside Yugoslavia, either in Albania or Macedonia. Family or friends sheltered a majority of the refugees privately; others were housed in camps. The KLA, meanwhile, continued to fight against Yugoslav forces.

UNMIK established

**NATO military
and UN civilian
presence was
established**

As soon as Milosevic agreed to the withdrawal of Serbian military and paramilitary forces from the province in June 1999, Kosovo Albanian refugees began to return, and Serbs and others began to leave. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 authorized a military NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and civilian UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to oversee post-war rebuilding. NGOs also mushroomed in Pristina and elsewhere, to provide services and assist in the rebuilding of civil society.

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UNMIK established, Continued

Postwar instability

There was an initial spurt of "revenge" killings of Serbs and perceived collaborators, which also hastened the departure of those who considered themselves targets.

UNMIK worked to reestablish law and order. International civilian police were deployed. The [OSCE Mission in Kosovo](#) organized the training of local police, in addition to playing a wider role in institution building, conducting elections, human rights monitoring and support of a democratic media.

The KLA was demilitarized and members formed or joined various political parties. In addition, several thousand KLA members became the nucleus of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), having an emergency disaster response mission. Some former KLA members, however, retained arms and continue to use them for political and private purposes.

Serbs continue to be targets for attacks. In June 2003, three Serbs were hacked to death in their sleep in the town of Obilic. In August 2003, gunmen attacked Serbian teenagers swimming in a river in western Kosovo, leaving two dead and four severely injured. Major violence broke out in March 2004, after an incident in which three Albanian boys were drowned after claims (apparently false) that Serbs chased them with a dog. In widespread anti-Serb rioting and organized attacks by Kosovo Albanians, 28 people died and over 500 houses were destroyed before order was restored. UN personnel and vehicles were also targets for attack. In June 2004, 270 people were arrested for their part in the riots.

Deadly violence has been used in political struggles among Albanians. The October 2000 municipal elections were preceded and followed by assassinations of political leaders. One of Rugova's closest aides was killed within days of the LDK victory, and this was followed by the violent deaths of several former KLA leaders. The mayor of Suhareka, Uke Bytyqi, was shot to death in 2002. In 2003, former Kosovo military leader Tahir Zemaj was killed in broad daylight in Peja/Pec, together with his son and nephew. Zemaj was one of several witnesses killed after testifying in the war crimes trial that convicted a group of ex- KLA members (including Ramush Haradinaj's brother Daut Haradinaj). In March 2005 a bomb unsuccessfully targeted President Rugova's motorcade in Pristina. The following month another brother of Ramush Haradinaj was ambushed and killed.

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UNMIK established, Continued

Self-government

Elections at the municipal level in October 2000 and for a Kosovo-wide assembly in November 2001 established the basis for democratic self-government in Kosovo. A government with limited powers under the authority of UNMIK was formed in March 2002. The major Albanian parties and the Serb Povratak Party held portfolios in the new government. LDK had 47 seats, PDK 26, and the Serbian Povratak (representing only 11% of the popular vote) 22 seats in the Kosovo Assembly. The Assembly elected LDK leader Rugova as President of Kosovo.

The Assembly elections of October 2004 resulted in the LDK winning 45%, the PDK 28%, and the AAK 8% of the vote. Kosovo's Serbs boycotted the elections, embracing the position of their own hardliners, Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica's government and the Serbian Orthodox Church, and rejecting the pro-vote urging of Serbian President Tadic and Serbian-Montenegro Foreign Minister Draskovic. The LDK and AAK formed a government, with AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj as prime minister. Haradinaj resigned after his indictment for war crimes (he would be acquitted by the Hague Court in April 2008), and Bajram Kosumi became prime minister in March 2005. Agim Ceku replaced Kosumi as prime minister on March 10, 2006.

Death of Rugova

President Rugova died in January 2006. The Assembly elected LDK Secretary General Fatmir Sejdiu President on February 10.

2007 Assembly elections

The PDK led with 34.3% in the November 17 Assembly elections, followed by the LDK with 22.6%, the New Kosovo Alliance with 12.3%, the Democratic League of Dardania-Albanian Christian democratic Party of Kosovo with 10%, and the AAK with 9.6%. The Reformist ORA with 4.1% failed to cross the 5% threshold to win a seat. Kosovo Serbs again boycotted the elections at the urging of the Serbian Government. Hashim Thaci was elected prime minister January 9, 2008, based on a coalition of his PDK, the LDK and the New Kosovo Alliance.

Kosovo's status

Kosovo under 1244

UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which provided for the withdrawal of Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces and the establishment of KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo, did not define the province's final status.

Kosovo's Albanians insisted on independence, while Belgrade and Kosovo's Serb minority insisted on its remaining within Serbia.

"Standards before status"

UNMIK announced a "standards before status" policy in 2002, followed by a [Standards Implementation Plan](#) a year later that was endorsed by the UN Security Council. The plan specified the standards that should be achieved for a multi-ethnic, stable and democratic Kosovo that is approaching European standards. The Security Council as well as the Contact Group reviewed progress towards the attainment of the standards.

Moving toward final status

In June 2005, the UN Secretary General named Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide as his Special Envoy for Kosovo to undertake a comprehensive review of progress achieved on standards with the goal of preparing for final status discussions.

In November 2005, former Finnish president and diplomat Martti Ahtisaari was appointed UN Special Envoy to broker discussions on final status.

Joachim Rücker of Germany was appointed the sixth UN Secretary General's Special Representative and Head of UNMIK in September 2006. He is expected to depart his position in June 2008.



Joachim Rücker

Continued on next page

Kosovo's status, Continued

Ahtisaari proposal

UN Envoy Ahtisaari presented his Kosovo Status Settlement Proposal to Belgrade and Pristina in February 2007. The comprehensive proposal addressed Kosovo's future constitutional arrangements, ways to protect its communities and their rights, decentralization, the role of an international civilian and military presence, protection of religious and cultural heritage, and economic and property issues. A timetable was set for implementation once the settlement came into force. There was no reference to independence in the document, although it did specify that Kosovo would have its own national symbols, the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, and the right to seek membership in international organizations. A new Kosovo Security Force would also be established, as well as a domestic security (intelligence) agency. Subsequently, Belgrade and Pristina officials held several rounds of fruitless talks in Vienna. Ahtisaari thereupon delivered his [final report and comprehensive proposal on Kosovo's status](#) to the UN Secretary General, who sent them to the members of the Security Council on March 26, 2007.

Action shifts to contact group

The UN Security Council's initial efforts to reach agreement on a resolution on Kosovo's status stalled when Russia insisted that any decision had to be accepted by Belgrade and Pristina. The Russian position backed Belgrade's rejection of independence for Kosovo, including the Ahtissari proposals for supervised independence. Meanwhile, Pristina rejected any outcome that did not involve independence.

The UN Secretary General shifted action to the Contact Group in August 2007, asking a U. S. -EU-Russia troika to undertake "active engagement" with Serbia and the Kosovo Albanian authorities to reach an agreement on status, with these efforts to last no later than December 10, 2007.

Serbian and Albanian positions proved irreconcilable. Security Council consultations December 20 on the troika effort ended without conclusions. Russia called for continued negotiations, while the U.S. and EU argued that the potential for negotiations had been exhausted and more talks would not make any difference.

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Kosovo's status, Continued

New international actors

As Russia split with the other Contact Group members over Kosovo; the U.S. and key European states formed an International Steering Group (ISG) for Kosovo in February 2008 to help guide its democratic development. These states saw formation of the ISG as envisioned in the Ahtisaari Plan and consistent with the objectives of UN Security Council resolution 1244. The ISG focus would be on good governance, multi-ethnicity and the rule of law.

The ISG approved Dutch international diplomat Pieter Feith as the International Civilian Representative (ICO) for Kosovo. The Office of the ICO/EU is expected to reach a total staff of 270. Prior to that, the EU had designated Feith as the EU Special Representative for Kosovo, and established a EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo. EULEX is expected to reach a total of 1,900 international and 1,100 national staff.

Continued on next page

Kosovo's status, Continued

Independence

The Kosovo Assembly adopted a [declaration of independence](#) on February 17, 2008. The declaration accepted the Ahtisaari proposal, an international civilian presence to supervise its implementation, a European Union-led rule of law mission, and NATO's continuing security role. The U.S., over 17 EU members including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy, as well as other states recognized Kosovo's independence. Serbia backed by Russia considered the declaration illegal.

There were incidents in the first weeks after the declaration. Serbs burned border posts in north Kosovo. Kosovo Serbs pulled out of the Kosovo Police Service and Kosovo institutions at the instigation of Belgrade. Serbs occupied the UNMIK courthouse in Mitrovica North, which led to a violent confrontation with UNMIK and KFOR on March 17 leading to the death of an UNMIK policeman and numerous injuries. There have not been, however, departures of Kosovo Serbs from enclaves in south Kosovo.

Subsequently as explained by the UNMIK spokesman, the UN Office in Belgrade has held talks with the Serbian government to seek solutions to Serbia's constant undermining of UNMIK's mandate. Serbian authorities have been seeking ways to extend its governance in areas of Kosovo inhabited primarily by Serbs, especially in the north. Serbia sponsored local elections together with parliamentary elections in ethnic Serb majority areas of Kosovo in May 2008 to establish local Serb institutions that would be tied to Belgrade.

Kosovo's new constitution, verified by International Civilian Representative Feith, takes effect June 15. The EULEX Rule of Law Mission and the ICO are to begin functioning after June 15, once agreement is reached on the future of UNMIK and the responsibilities and prerogatives of these new international actors.

Kosovo realities

**Ancestral home
to Serbs and
homeland to
Albanians**

The very name of the province reveals its double character, seen as ancestral home by Serbs and homeland by Albanians. Serbs call it Kosovo, and Albanians Kosova.



Memorial at Gazimestan, dedicated to the Serbian knights killed at the 1389 battle at the Field of Blackbirds, outside Pristina. (USIP/Ted Feifer)

Continued on next page

Kosovo realities, Continued

International presence

Kosovo has had a NATO-led foreign military presence KFOR (Kosovo Force) since 1999. KFOR has dropped from an initial high of 50,000 to less than 16,000 troops today. France, Germany, the U.S. and Italy are the largest troop contributors, together with 20 other NATO and 10 non-NATO states.

UNMIK has provided the international administration, now transitioning to an International Civilian Office/EU Special Representative and EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). UNMIK police have served an executive role, supporting the establishment of the Kosovo Police Service. At the insistence of the international community, Kosovo has accepted a continued international presence after its declaration of independence.

A vocal Kosovo Albanian group, Movement for Self-Determination has actively criticized the limitations on Kosovo sovereignty before and after independence.

Continued on next page

Kosovo realities, Continued

Infrastructure problems

In the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, humanitarian relief efforts fuelled a building boom, led by the domestic sector. Unevenness remains a feature of the province, however, despite the efforts of volunteer and governmental agencies from abroad, and many of Kosovo's people. In Pristina, property-owners can make high rents by letting out property to the large numbers of international organizations and non-governmental organizations now operating there.



Prizren, 2003. (USIP/Ted Feifer)

But infrastructure of various kinds still poses major constraints: electricity and heat supply problems continue, especially in the winter. High-technology solutions remain vulnerable; computer viruses are especially a problem for large organizations. Low-technology power production results in smog and air pollution, at least in Pristina, where grim socialist architecture left its mark. Other smaller urban centers, like Prizren, offer more of a glimpse of older patterns of life.

Demarcating borders

Kosovo and Macedonia began border demarcation talks March 1, 2008, mediated by the Office of the International Civilian Representative. The formation of a joint committee to demarcate the border was envisaged in the Ahtisaari Plan. The process is likely to take a year.

Continued on next page

Kosovo realities, Continued

Violence

Crime statistics from Kosovo may be down from the high after the war but ongoing sporadic violence continues against Serbs and Roma, by segments of the Albanian majority, and between Albanian political factions. Extremist Serbs in the divided city of Mitrovica also have resorted to violence to maintain control.

Hidden arms are a reality. The UN Development Program estimated in 2003 that there were 330,000-460,000 small arms held by civilians in Kosovo. Illegal weapons caches are periodically seized by KFOR and UNMIK.

Lack of Prospects

Many of Kosovo's large young population, as elsewhere in the Balkans, still see their best employment hopes abroad, due to the lack of opportunities and the depressed economic situation.

Mini-quiz

- Multiple choice** Which of the following has not taken place in Kosovo?
- Elections at the municipal and Kosovo-wide levels
 - Economic prosperity
 - Establishment of a Kosovo Police Service
 - Declaration of independence with an accepted international presence
-

Albania

Overview

At a glance

The following table describes geographic and demographic information for Albania.

| Item | Description |
|---------------------------|---|
| Size | 11,100 square miles |
| Capital | Tirana |
| Population | 3.6 million (2008 estimated) |
| Main Ethnic groups | <p>Albania has small minorities of Roma and Macedonians that are officially denied. The numbers of all minorities are contested.</p> <p>In 1989:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Albanian 95%• Greeks 3%.• Other 2% (Vlachs, Serbs, Gypsies, and Bulgarians) |
| Main Religious Groups | <p>In 1989:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Muslim 70%• Albanian Orthodox 20%• Roman Catholic 10% |
| Leading political parties | <p>Albanian Socialist Party (SP) Formerly the Albanian Workers Party, and before that the Communist Party of Albania. In government 1991 and 1997- 2005. Led by Edi Rama.</p> <p>Democratic Party (DP) Center-right. In government 1992-1997, and since 2005. Headed by Sali Berisha.</p> |

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Overview, Continued

At a glance (**continued**)

| Item | Description |
|----------------------|--|
| System of Government | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Elected parliament with 140 seats, members have a four-year term.• Parliament elects the President, who serves a five-year term.• Government ministries work across twelve prefectures.• The 1998 constitution aimed to introduce local government at this level, and replace existing 36 districts composed of municipalities and communes. |
| Head of state | Bamir Topi has been President since 2007. |
| Standard of Living | The estimated per capita GDP (purchasing power parity) was \$5,500 in 2007. |
| Other Information | <p>Currency</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The currency is the Lek. The current exchange rate is about 93 to the U.S. Dollar.• Foreign currency is also widely used. <p>Language</p> <p>The Albanian language has two principal dialects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Geg (Northern)• Tosk (Southern) <p>Culture</p> <p>Albanian literature boasts a Nobel prize winner, Ismail Kadare, whose work uses Albanian history and tradition to criticize the excesses of communism.</p> |

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Overview, Continued

Map

The following graphic is a map of Albania.



Historical background of Albania

End of communist rule gradual

The end of the Cold War was not marked by revolution in Albania. President Ramiz Alia, who was Hoxha's anointed successor, continued as president, and under popular pressure pushed through gradualist reform. In 1990 religious expression, banned since 1967, was permitted again, and the first opposition party formed.

In elections in Spring 1991, the Socialist Party won 67% of the vote, and the reformer Fatos Nano was confirmed as prime minister. He was replaced when the opposition Democratic Party joined a government of national salvation, as economic hardships increased and thousands tried to flee the country.

A law permitting private ownership was passed in August 1991, which included land. In December, the Democratic Party withdrew from government, forcing new elections in March 1992. The Democratic Party swept to victory, and Alia resigned as President, to be replaced by Sali Berisha.



Albanian President Sali Berisha

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Historical background of Albania, Continued

Facing foreign and domestic issues

The new government faced considerable foreign and domestic issues. As Yugoslavia broke up, Albania denounced Serbian aggression against Kosovo Albanians. Tensions also rose with Greece over the Greek minority in Albania, and the large numbers of illegal labor migrants from Albania in Greece.

At home, unemployment continued to rise. The new government also expended considerable energy in prosecuting former leaders, among them Hoxha's widow, and former President Alia, for crimes against the state and the Albanian people committed during socialist rule. Many were jailed, including Fatos Nano, for corruption.

The activities of Berisha's government at this time fueled impressions of a north-south, Geg-Tosk divide. Berisha's power base was in the North, while Nano's was in the South. On Kosovo in particular, where a majority of Albanians are Gëgs, Berisha had been more strident in asserting Albania's interests there than his rivals.

Continued on next page

Historical background of Albania, Continued

Pyramid schemes collapse

Berisha's Democratic Party won the elections again in 1996, despite international concerns over voting procedures. The party had overseen the rapid introduction of a free-market economy. Pyramid schemes of investment, which promised large and swift returns on capital investment by private individuals, were numerous.

In early 1997, a number of these schemes collapsed (as they were bound to), enriching some at the expense of many other, smaller investors, who reportedly lost over a billion dollars. This prompted a virtual insurrection against the state in the Tosk-occupied south of the country, which spread later to Tirana and the north. Huge quantities of weapons were looted from barracks and armories. Berisha's government lost control of the southern third of the country, and Berisha himself was the target of an assassination attempt.

It is estimated that over 2,000 people were killed in the course of the unrest.

Assigned blame by many, and unable to campaign in southern Albania, Berisha's Democratic Party was soundly defeated by the Socialist Party and its allies, which took a total of 117 seats in the 155-seat assembly in the internationally supervised election in June and July 1997.

OSCE presence

Responding to the breakdown of law and order, the OSCE Permanent Council deployed an OSCE "Presence" in Albania in April 1997.

The OSCE Presence worked with a multinational protection force (established under UN Security Council Resolution 1101, under Italian command, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance) and other international organizations and NGOs to help stabilize the country. This effort helped put Albania back on the path toward stability and democratization.

The OSCE, working with the Council of Europe, assisted Albanian authorities in preparing and in monitoring new parliamentary elections. The OSCE Presence continues to focus on democratization, promotion of human rights, and preparation of elections.

[OSCE Presence in Albania.](#)

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Historical background of Albania, Continued

Hostility between rival parties escalates

Rexhep Mejdani replaced Berisha as Albania's president. Fatos Nano returned as prime minister. Democratic Party members continued to protest the election process. Hostility between the rival parties escalated after Democratic Party MP Azem Hajdari was shot and killed in Tirana in September 1998. In response, Democratic Party supporters stormed government offices, and more peaceful demonstrations continued for the rest of the year. Fatos Nano stepped down as prime minister.

Kosovo Albanian refugees enter Albania

Albania's domestic trials were overshadowed by the Kosovo crisis in the Spring of 1999 when up to half a million Kosovo Albanians crossed the border to find refuge. Two-thirds of the refugees were accommodated with host families, a further 20% in tent camps and 13% in collective centers. During this time, the OSCE Presence played a border-monitoring role, as well as helped coordinate responses to the refugee crisis.

Humanitarian aid helped Albanians deal with the pressure on already stretched resources. NATO action allowed most Kosovo Albanians to return home by the end of the year.

Employment outside the country

Since 1990, about 20% of Albania's working population has been consistently employed outside the country, as legal or illegal labor migrants. Their remittances are conservatively estimated at \$1million per day -- some place the figure as high as \$700 million a year -- which constitutes more than a quarter of Albania's GDP.

Referendum to change the constitution

In late 1998, a referendum to change the country's constitution provoked further political conflict. Cracks had by now developed within the two main parties as well as between them.

Continued on next page

Historical background of Albania, Continued

**Meta's
government
had
international
support**

The old alignments, though, remained critical in general elections in June and July 2001. The Socialist Party won 73 seats in the 140-member legislature, and Ilir Meta was made Prime Minister for another term, fighting off a challenger backed by Nano. The Union for Victory (UFV) coalition, led by the Democratic Party, won 46 seats. They denied the legality of the process, but Meta's government retained international support, largely due to its policy of preserving or restoring good neighborly relations, and urging Kosovo and Macedonian Albanians to use dialogue rather than violence to achieve political aims.

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Historical background of Albania, Continued

Moisiu elected president

Parliament elected ex-general Alfred Moisiu President in 2002, replacing Rexhep Meidani. The 72-year old Moisiu was elected due to his acceptability to the major political parties and his image of having good contacts with the West. His election was viewed as a hopeful sign of cooperation between rivals Nano and Berisha, who cooperated for the first time in a decade. Moisiu selected Nano as Prime Minister - his third time holding that office.

In 2003 Meta quit the government after calling on Nano to speed reform and stamp out corruption. Subsequently, Meta's faction blocked the appointment of a foreign minister. The rift between Meta and Nano weakened the Socialist Party, pitting a younger generation of reformists against more experienced political actors, and also serving to strengthen Berisha's position.

In 2004, Berisha orchestrated large-scale street demonstrations against Nano in Tirana. International support remained behind Nano, who after Meta's resignation negotiated with smaller parties to keep the government functioning. Although Nano attracted accusations of corruption and insider dealing (his wife was a leading businesswoman in Albania), Albanian citizens also resented Berisha's attempts to stir up disorder.

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Historical background of Albania, Continued

2005 parliamentary elections

Berisha's Democratic Party bested Nano's Socialist Party in the 2005 parliamentary elections, with another 10 parties also taking seats thanks to proportional representation. The Socialist Party split prior to the election, with Meta forming his own Socialist Movement for Integration.

The OSCE Election Observation Mission assessed that the conduct of the elections complied only partially with international standards for democratic elections. While there were competitive elections and the media provided a diversity of electoral information, there were numerous technical and administrative problems with the potential for electoral abuse.



People look for their names on the voter list during parliamentary elections in Albania, 3 July 2005 (OSCE)

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Historical background of Albania, Continued

2007 local elections

Disagreement between the governing Democratic and opposition Socialist Parties over voting procedures delayed elections from January to February 2007. Prime Minister Berisha and Socialist Party leader and Tirana Mayor Edi Rama finally reached an agreement on voting lists that registered people in more than one place and the type of voter identification voters would need.

The Socialists were the decisive victors in the elections, winning the majority of offices contested in 384 urban and rural communities, including almost all the major cities. The International Election Observation Mission noted that while the elections provided for a competitive contest, they were a missed opportunity to conduct elections fully in accordance with international standards. Although election day was calm overall, voting was marred by procedural shortcomings and in some places by tensions.



Ink is applied to the hand of a voter in the Albanian local elections, 18 February 2007. The International Election Observation Mission report noted that the ink was controversial, with opposition parties claiming it could be easily removed. (OSCE/Urdur Gunnarsdottir)

Nano's political decline

Fatos Nano resigned his leadership of the Socialist Party after it lost its majority in the 2005 parliamentary elections. He also failed to win the support of his party or the opposition in the 2007 presidential elections. In September 2007 he announced the formation of a new party, the Movement for Solidarity.

Continued on next page

Historical background of Albania, Continued

Topi elected in 2007 presidential elections

The Assembly held several rounds of indirect elections over June and July 2007. An opposition boycott first prevented any candidate from winning the necessary three-fifths. Finally, Bamir Topi of the Democratic Party of Albania won with 85 out of 100 votes, thanks to five opposition members who voted for him.



President Bamir Topi (Albanian Official Site)

Prospects

Little enthusiasm for Greater Albania

The concept of Greater Albania -- uniting ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania in one state -- has not featured largely in domestic politics, other than strong support for Kosovo's Albanians. It appears that there is little enthusiasm for ethnic union among Albania's younger elites.

Euro-Atlantic Integration

Albania is eager to join Western Institutions like the EU and NATO.

Albania signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in June 2006, and a Visa Facilitation Agreement in January 2008. The European Commission informed Albania in May 2008, however, that it needed to implement further reforms before it would be ready for EU candidate status.

The March 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit invited Albania to join the Alliance. Albania has deployed small military units to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Islam

Some commentators in Albania point to possible competition within Albania's largely Muslim population between a less radical form, as practiced in the Balkans over centuries, and a stricter interpretation of the Koran, as advanced by well-funded Islamic organizations from Saudi Arabia and other foreign donors.

Albanian culture

One of the poorest countries in the region

Tirana's active café and restaurant-filled "Block," the enclave of the former communist ruling elite, can make one forget that Albania remains one of the poorest countries in the region. It is also the youngest in terms of its population.



Tirana street scene, 2007 (USIP/Ted Feifer)

The legacy of its communist isolation is still visible in the bunkers that dot the countryside. Like other countries where public servants have seen the real value of wages drop, and where everything but time appears as a scarce resource, its bureaucracy can be oppressive.

Wild capitalism

The opening up of the country led to an extreme form of "wild capitalism" in which bribery and corruption played a major part, and "money talks." This money is generated outside the country. Seasonal labor migration keeps people alive, and Albanians drawn to working opportunities in Greece, in particular, heavily travel the border between Albania and Greece. Criminal networks have also developed. The "pyramid" investment schemes of the early 1990s were a sophisticated form of crime that ultimately robbed many ordinary Albanian families of hard-won earnings from abroad, and further eroded people's capacity to trust others.

Continued on next page

Albanian culture, Continued

Organized Crime

Corruption and organized crime continue to be pervasive problems. Police forces across Western Europe contend that Albanian mafia-type organizations control drugs and prostitution in many cities, including London and Milan.

Kanun: traditional code of honor

The traditional code of honor in Albania's northern mountains was based on a code of law called the *Kanun*. Among the key concepts on which it rests is that of *Besa*, which can be translated as honor, pledge, or alliance -- somewhat similar to the idea that one's word is one's bond. These ideas are now being reinvigorated all across the country: old feuds, which arise when *Besa* is violated, are said to lie behind much of contemporary politics. *Kanun* drives sharp distinctions between men and women, and tends to exclude women from public life.

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Albanian culture, Continued

Food

Many rely on local fresh produce, and shop regularly in open-air markets. Meat is seen as a necessary component in celebrations, but remains hard for people to afford.

Noteworthy: Among Albania's agricultural produce are walnuts, featured in distinctive sweets and main dishes, and citrus fruits.

Transportation

Many of the roads outside the capital are in poor repair, though more investments in infrastructure are now being made, especially to link ports to highways in neighboring countries. Public transportation remains difficult, but there are now plenty of private taxis for hire by visitors.

Mini-quiz

Multiple choice The OSCE "Presence" in Albania

- began with the establishment of a mission of long duration at the end of the Cold War
 - was authorized by UNSC Resolution 1101
 - includes chairing the local Friends of Albania Group
 - was withdrawn during the 1999 Kosovo crisis
-

Challenges Facing Southeastern Europe

Minorities across the Balkans

The Roma

The origins of the Romany people, often referred to as Roma or Gypsies, remain a subject of speculation. There is a general consensus that these people, who practice various religions, have ties to a migrant movement from India to Europe in the Middle Ages. Their numbers are disputed, as they have been historically subjected to persecution and assimilation from European states. Hitler's Nazi regime killed over half a million Gypsies between 1941 and 1945: since the end of the Cold War, they have been new targets of racist attacks and discrimination across Eastern Europe, notably in Romania and Hungary, where they are the most numerous and visible minority.



More than half of the Roma communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina still live in informal settlements. OSCE.

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Minorities across the Balkans, Continued

Roma economically and politically marginalized

Official statistics put the total number of Roma in the Balkans at around 200,000, 70% of which are in Serbia. Advocacy NGOs claim a more realistic figure is around 800,000, with around 50% in Serbia, 30% in Macedonia, 10% in Albania, and smaller numbers in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

What is generally agreed is that they have been economically and politically marginalized. In Serbia and Macedonia, where they are most numerous, they have formed political parties, and appear to enjoy better relations with the Slavic majority than with the large Albanian minorities. Most of the Roma from Kosovo left in the wake of the war and Albanian assertion of dominance.

Humanitarian organizations are working to improve educational and health services, but Roma nonetheless continue to face significant challenges.

Conflicting interpretations of the past

Conflicting interpretations of the past play an important role in contemporary politics

In Southeastern Europe, conflicting interpretations of the past and its influence on the present play an important role in contemporary politics. Challenges to accepted historical truth are not mounted only by marginal groups, but divide large national groups.

Similarly, it is common for politicians and others to insist that those living today have a direct connection with, and bear responsibility for evil committed in the past. Current political debates often center on the linked issues of blame, responsibility and justice. When trying to assess rival arguments what is often noticeable is the difference in time-scales that different sides invoke, and the intensity of perceptions of injustice.

Also striking is the concern to claim extended and continuous national and, where feasible, state roots in current or expanded territories.

Bosnia

Serbian accounts of the past highlight that Ottoman Turks conquered the Balkans from outside the region.

During the Bosnian war and in post-Dayton Bosnia, it permits extreme Serbian nationalists to present Bosniaks as the descendants either of invaders of the region, or of natives who betrayed their "true" faith by adopting Islam under Ottoman occupation.

Both arguments turn Bosniaks into "foreigners" in their home republic, and justify Bosnian Serb attempts to reclaim territory for themselves.

Kosovo

In Kosovo, site of the Ottoman victory of 1389, Serbian association of predominantly Muslim Albanians with the Ottoman Turks again serves as justification for a view that they are not the true owners of the land. The complex fact that Albanians fought alongside Serbs in the battle, and also that some Serbs fought on the Turkish side is discounted in favor of a simplistic version of the past, populated only with aggressors and victims.

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Conflicting interpretations of the past, Continued

Croatia

In Croatia, at least under the leadership of Tudjman, nationalist enthusiasm for state tradition highlighted the autonomous state of Croatia between 1941 and 1944. The fact that the ruling regime of that time, the Ustase, was a fascist movement, influenced and funded by Mussolini's Italy in the 1930s for his own political purposes, was ignored-- as was the regime's participation in the murder of Jews, Gypsies and Serbs in collaboration with Nazis. The use of symbols from the Ustashe period in Tudjman's Croatia sent a frightening signal to Croatia's Serbs. This has diminished in the post-Tudjman period.

Historical assignment of blame, responsibility and justice

These different ways of viewing the past clearly impact on people's interpretations of the most recent round of violence in the region. When challenged over the justice of their actions, or the actions of their compatriots, some people immediately seek refuge in historical parallels. Current aggression is presented as legitimate revenge to past victimization.

Recently, a number of scholarly initiatives have sought to reconcile different versions of the past. These include projects at the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in South-Eastern Europe, at <http://www.cdsee.org/>, and the Scholars' Initiative, at <http://www.cla.purdue.edu/academic/history/facstaff/Ingrao/si/scholars.htm>

Regional issues

Global politics and their impact

Albania and all the countries of the former Yugoslavia save Slovenia, face daunting economic challenges. Humanitarian and development assistance reached high levels in the late 1990s, but international attention has moved away from the region. Accession to the EU remains a goal for these countries. Croatia and Macedonia have made progress towards EU membership, but it remains unclear on what timetable the other countries in the region might follow. Serbia could become stuck on how to respond to Kosovo's independence and European integration at the same time. In addition, Russian support for Serbia on the Kosovo issue has added an additional "East-West" complexity to the issue

Criminal economies

As long as many states in the region continue to be weak and faced with ethnic conflict, grey and black economies will continue to flourish. This has been recognized by the OSCE as a regional problem calling for regional cooperation, and police and customs in the different countries are coordinating their efforts.

The Balkan states face a tough challenge in dealing with transnational organized crime, which has long roots in the region, and was further bolstered by the wars and instability of the 1990s.

The area continues to remain vulnerable to instability due to enduring links between business, politics and organized crime, according to a report on Crime and its Impact on the Balkans released by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in June 2008.
