Module 5.

Southeastern Europe

This module introduces you to southeastern Europe and the OSCE’s work in:

- Croatia (The OSCE Office in Zagreb was closed in 2012)
- Macedonia
- Bosnia-Herzegovina
- Serbia
- Kosovo
- Montenegro
- Albania
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CHAPTER 1

Overview

Basic information follows on the region’s:

• Geography
  • People
Geography

Mountains and Rivers
Southeastern Europe is marked by topographical contrasts defined by its mountain ranges and river valleys. Historically, the movement of peoples and armies has been shaped by the realities of the landscape. These factors have also had an impact on the development of strong central authorities and their ability to retain control over territory. Mountains and rivers have also served as the boundary markers between states and empires.

Map of southeastern Europe (c) USIP

Key topography
There are some key differences between the regions of southeastern Europe.

- Across Montenegro, Northern Albania, Northwestern Macedonia and Western Bosnia, the terrain is mountainous, with many peaks over 2000 meters.
- On the western side, the mountains drop to the sea in some places; in others, they yield to a coastal plain.
- Inland, the landscape softens, most markedly in the north. The city of Zagreb is low-lying on the river Sava, which flows through Sisak and Brcko in eastern Bosnia before joining the Danube in Belgrade.
- The Danube flows south and east through rich farmland, past the Croatian town of Vukovar before reaching Novi Sad, the capital of Vojvodina, and then Belgrade.
• Southwards from Belgrade, the main road and rail links follow the south Morava River to Vranje and then go on to Skopje.

• From Macedonia's capital, the Vardar river valley provides a route to the rich lowlands around Thessaloniki in Greece.
People

Slavs came to the area in the 6th or 7th century AD, although they did not penetrate the strongholds of Northern Albania. When Ottoman armies expanded into Europe in the late 14th century, cities like Belgrade and Skopje lay directly in their path as they drove northward. The inhabitants of these cities and the plains around them were directly affected by Ottoman occupation and rule. Western Macedonia, Northern Albania and Montenegro were harder to enter and of smaller strategic and economic significance for the empire, so local leaders and groups were able to preserve greater autonomy.

The Croats are believed to be a Slavic people who migrated from Ukraine and settled in present-day Croatia during the 6th century. After a period of self-rule and the establishment of an independent kingdom, Croatians agreed to the Pacta Conventa in 1091, submitting themselves to Hungarian authority. By the mid-1400s, concerns over Ottoman expansion led the Croatian Assembly to invite the Habsburgs, under Archduke Ferdinand, to assume control over Croatia. Habsburg rule proved successful in thwarting the Ottomans, and by the 18th century, much of Croatia was free of Turkish control.

Early history of southeastern Europe

From 326 until its fall in 1453, Byzantium (or the Eastern Roman Empire) was a leading influence in the southern Balkans. Under Byzantine rule, the demography of the Balkans significantly changed, as major groups of peoples made their way there from the north and the east:

The Slav migrations of the sixth and seventh centuries brought people south from the territory of modern Russia. They settled in lands that were thinly populated.

In the second half of the seventh century the Bulgars, a people related to the Tatars, swept into the region from central Asia.

Religious, cultural and political forces vie for supremacy

A major religious schism developed between the Latin Christian church in the north and west of the Balkans, and the Greek Christian Church in the south and east.

Different Slavic-speaking kingdoms emerged, to be absorbed or overcome by neighboring powers. These included:

- A Bulgar kingdom, reaching its height in the ninth and tenth centuries under King Simeon before its defeat by Byzantium.
- A Croatian kingdom that fell under Hungarian control after the death of King Zvonimir in 1089.
- A Serbian kingdom established by Stefan Nemanja in the thirteenth century, while his brother, St. Sava, became head of an autonomous Serbian Church. The kingdom reached its height in the mid-fourteenth century under Stefan Dushan, who made his capital in Prizren. Many of the monasteries and churches in Kosovo were built during this period.

In the territory of modern Albania, a tribal system of interlinked clans persisted in the northern
mountains. A similar system also survived in Montenegro, and in both places clan loyalty was more significant than religious affiliation.

Along the coast and in the south cities and towns pledged religious alliance to either the Latin or Greek church. Different Serbian kingdoms nominally occupied these areas, but these occupations were generally of short duration and left little trace.

By the twelfth century the Seljuk Turks had thrust deep into the Byzantine heartland of Asia Minor. Byzantium looked to the Crusades, launched from the West to reclaim the Holy Land, for assistance. But Byzantine hopes were betrayed when in 1204 the Fourth Crusade sacked Byzantium, destroying its capacity to resist the Turks.

**Ottoman hegemony and legacy**

The armies of the Ottoman Empire continued their advance, reducing the Byzantine Empire to the size of one city, Constantinople, and sweeping on into the Balkans. Key dates in its advance were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1389</td>
<td>Defeat of an alliance of Christian Serbs and Albanians in the battle of Kosovo field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1453</td>
<td>Capture of Constantinople, or Byzantium, and establishment of rule over southern Balkans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1529</td>
<td>First siege of Vienna by Ottomans turned back by Habsburg Austria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1571</td>
<td>Defeat of Ottoman fleet by the Holy League (Spain, Venice, Genoa and the Papal States) at Lepanto, preventing westward advance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1683</td>
<td>Second Ottoman assault on Vienna failed, marking high-water mark of Ottoman expansion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1690-99</td>
<td>Austrian, Russian and Venetian counterattacks, including the temporary recapture of Belgrade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1699</td>
<td>Treaty of Karlowitz, where Ottomans surrendered control of inland Croatia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Resistance on its frontiers**

In Albania, George Kastrioti, or Skanderbeg, established a kingdom that kept the Ottoman armies at bay for fifteen years until his death in 1468.

In mountainous Montenegro and in northern Albania, the inhabitants maintained a degree of local autonomy. In Montenegro, the bishop-princes of Cetinje provided leadership.

Serbian religious leaders supported the Austrian offensive in the 1680s. When Ottoman forces recaptured Belgrade, the Serb patriarch led almost a quarter of a million Serbs into exile in
Habsburg territory, where they settled in the Krajina, in modern Croatia.

Religion and order
The empire permitted the practice of religions other than Islam and relied on the cooperation of religious leaders to maintain order. Individuals were nonetheless encouraged or coerced to convert. One example was the devshirmе, or child-tax, by which young Christian boys were recruited into the Ottoman army or civil service. More voluntary widespread conversion to Islam occurred only among the Northern Albanians after the defeat of Skanderbeg, and the Slav-speaking population of Bosnia, where neither Catholic nor Orthodox churches had acquired a firm hold.

Ottoman decline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td>Greek war of independence. Greek sovereignty formalized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>A united autonomous Romanian state is established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877-1878</td>
<td>Russo-Turkish war. Treaty of San Stefano recognizes Romanian and Serbian independence, and establishment of autonomous Bulgarian principality under nominal Ottoman protection. Austria-Hungary occupies Bosnia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Eastern Rumelia comes under Bulgarian jurisdiction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Bulgaria gains full independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nationalism and the fall of Empires
The concerted efforts of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro in the First Balkan War of 1912 ended Ottoman rule in the Balkans.

The allies fell out over the division of the spoils, precipitating a Second Balkan War, in which Bulgaria was defeated by Greece, Serbia and Romania. In 1913 the international community stepped in to draw new borders across the old territory of Turkey-in-Europe:

- An Albanian state was created
- Montenegro grew
- Greece and Serbia each took significant swathes of territory
- Bulgaria lost territory to Romania in its north, and gained a thin slice of territory in Macedonia, site of its most central ambition.
CHAPTER 2

Former Yugoslavia

A basic understanding of the former Yugoslavia is key to understanding southeastern Europe. This section briefly describes the history of Yugoslavia from WWI to its collapse in 2001.
World War I

World War I saw the final dissolution of the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires. A new south Slavic state called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed in 1918.

The new state was established as a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system, headed by King Alexander of the Serbian royal family, and included Serbia, Montenegro, and parts of the former Austrian Empire. Delegations from Macedonia, who sought autonomy or union with Bulgaria on ethnic grounds, were ignored. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s support, however, did preserve Albania from dismemberment, which was desired by Italy, Greece and Serbia.

Serbs and Croats

The great internal conflict of the first Yugoslavia was over the degree of central control. Serbs were the largest national group in the country (39%) and the victors of the First World War. Many Serbs and their leaders considered the new Slavic state as “theirs.” The Kingdom was administered as one unit with 33 provinces ruled from Belgrade.

The second largest national group, the Croats (24%) sought greater decentralization, and even autonomy. Serb hegemony also encountered resistance in Kosovo and Macedonia.

In 1929 King Alexander abolished the constitution and established a personal dictatorship.

Political violence was a fact of life in inter-war Yugoslavia. For example, A Serb member of parliament murdered the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Stjepan Radic, and killed or wounded several other Croat representatives on the floor of parliament in 1928. King Alexander was himself assassinated in 1934 while on a visit to France.

In August 1939, Croatian political leaders persuaded the central government to grant Croatia autonomy. Slovene and Muslim demands quickly followed, reducing Yugoslavia’s capacity to operate as an effective state.
World War II

Italy invaded Albania in April 1939, overran the country within a week, forcing its king into exile and making it a part of the Italian Empire. In April 1941, Nazi Germany attacked Greece and Yugoslavia, assisted by Bulgarian forces in the latter case.

German forces occupied Serbia, which was tightly controlled, and set up a puppet-state in Croatia under Ante Pavelić, leader of the extreme nationalist Ustaša movement. This pseudo-independent state included much of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of Slovenia was annexed by Germany, while Italy assumed control of Montenegro, the Dalmatian coast, and parts of Bosnia. Macedonia was partitioned between Bulgaria and Albania. Kosovo also became part of Italian-occupied Albania, while eastern Vojvodina was absorbed by Hungary.

Serbian resistance: Chetnik

Different resistance groups developed. In Serbia, General Draža Mihailović led the Chetniks or armed forces loyal to the old régime. When their initial actions prompted massive German retaliation against civilians, they scaled down their efforts. Later, many Chetniks collaborated with the Germans to fight Tito’s Partisans.

Yugoslav resistance: Partisans

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito led an extensive resistance effort. After Germany attacked Russia, this movement grew in strength, drawing support from different national groups in Yugoslavia. In 1942, Tito declared from his headquarters in the Bosnian town of Bihac, that the national rights of all the peoples of Yugoslavia would be recognized. By mid-1943 his forces, known as Partisans, numbered over 20,000. With the collapse of Italy in September 1943, those numbers increased substantially. Their rapid growth was fueled in part by Allied commitment of support to them alone, as the most active anti-German force in the country. Tito announced the formation of a new federal organization of Yugoslavia in Jacje, November 29, 1943.

War crimes

Duplicating Nazi crimes, the Ustaša regime in Croatia established concentration camps, at Jasenovac, Stara Gradiska and elsewhere, where hundreds of thousands of Jews, Gypsies, communists, anti-fascist Croats, and Serbs were murdered. Chetnik bands also murdered Muslims in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina. The total number of deaths from anti-Muslim attacks during January and February 1943 is estimated at 10,000.

Albanian resistance

In Albania, too, there were different resistance groups: one that could be described as nationalist, a second communist, and a third more diffuse. It was the communists, though, under the leadership of Enver Hoxha, who operated most widely. Although different groups formed a united front in 1942, Hoxha persuaded the Allies that they should only support his Partisan forces, and ultimately succeeded, as Tito did in Yugoslavia. This allowed Hoxha to defeat rivals after the collapse of Italy in 1943.
Tito takes control

In Serbia, while Tito's Partisans battled the Germans, they also fought the Chetniks. The Partisans defeated the Chetniks in the core battleground of Serbia, which positioned them to take power in Yugoslavia at the end of the war.
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia

Post-war Yugoslavia’s external borders were slightly larger than they had been in 1941. Yugoslavia was renamed the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, with Tito as the prime minister. In keeping with pledges made during the war, the administrative boundaries were redrawn and the new country consisted of six republics:

- Slovenia
- Croatia
- Bosnia-Herzegovina
- Serbia
- Montenegro
- Macedonia

and two autonomous provinces:

- Kosovo and Metohija
- Vojvodina

Tito breaks with Stalin

Tito rejected absolute control by Moscow and broke with Stalin in 1948. The independent communist state attracted significant Western economic and at times political support.

Western support and Tito’s ability to control ethnic tensions proved crucial to the survival of communist Yugoslavia. Tito’s use of repression and the ideology of “Brotherhood and Unity” prevented any one ethnic group from political dominance. The régime also experimented with the constitution. There were major changes in 1953, 1963 and 1974. The last involved significant decentralization, in response to internal unrest, especially in Croatia and Kosovo.

Tito President for Life

The 1974 constitution made Tito President for Life. The six republics were given more autonomy and a similar status was awarded to the two autonomous provinces within Serbia: Kosovo, a largely ethnic Albanian populated region and Vojvodina, a region with large numbers of ethnic minorities, such as Hungarians, living among a majority Serb population.
Post-Tito

Tito did not nominate a successor. After his death in 1980, an eight-member Presidency was formed with representatives from the six republics and the two autonomous provinces. The Presidency was rotational, with a new representative from each republic taking on the leadership role each year. The forces of centralism and fragmentation increasingly confronted each other in this forum.

Ethnic tensions rose following Tito’s death, and the Yugoslav federation began to unravel.

Economic meltdown

Economic conditions worsened, partly due to by austerity measures introduced under international pressure. Strikes became more frequent (there were 900 in 1987) and large-scale enterprises, which had run on “false” credit, collapsed. Such crises prompted calls for further changes in the country's constitution and economy, which fell into two broad trends:

- Greater decentralization and more republic financial and political autonomy, particularly in the wealthier republics of Croatia and Slovenia.
- Greater central management and the redistribution of resources, to help out the poorer regions, particularly in Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

By 1982, Yugoslavia had $20 billion in foreign debt. Unemployment was up, real wages down and inflation rising sharply. International Monetary Fund intervention was directed through the federal government, restoring some of the power ceded in the 1974 constitution.

Milošević

There was fierce infighting within the communist parties of the Republics, and in 1987 Slobodan Milošević became the party head in Serbia, with his mission to re-centralize Serbia. The autonomy of Vojvodina was quickly rescinded, and Milošević then turned his attention to Kosovo: with loyal allies in Montenegro and with Macedonia largely dependent upon Serbia, he controlled half of the Presidency's eight seats, and thus had the power to push constitutional recentralization.

In Kosovo, Milošević's bid to control the local party led to overt resistance from Kosovo's Albanians—from intellectuals to miners. Military rule was again imposed, and in 1989 Milošević delivered his infamous "Kosovo Polje" speech, on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, where he integrated Serbian nationalism into his communist-style centralism. Slovenian and Croatian leaders expressed solidarity with the Kosovo Albanian stand, and denounced Serbia's actions as illegal. Milošević nonetheless installed a virtual puppet regime in Kosovo.

Countdown to war

In multiparty elections in 1990, former communists won only in Serbia and Montenegro. The moderate pan-Yugoslav Reform party founded by Yugoslavia Prime Minister Ante Marković, had limited success and was eventually marginalized by the nationalists and communists everywhere except Macedonia.

The eight-member presidency continued to meet, with Milošević firmly controlling four votes. In
May 1991 he mobilized that block vote to prevent the Croatian representative, Stipe Mesić, from heading the presidency.

This was the last straw for Croatia and Slovenia; both declared independence on June 25, 1991. The war in Slovenia started two days later.

Macedonia voted for independence in September 1991 and successfully negotiated the peaceful withdrawal of Yugoslav army from its territory.
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was proclaimed on 27 April 1992 consisting of the two remaining former Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. The FRY continued to exist until 2003, when it was renamed as the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. This union lasted until 5 June 2006 when Montenegro proclaimed independence.
CHAPTER 3

Croatia

Croatia is a former republic of Yugoslavia. This chapter contains the following sections on Croatia:

- Key information
- Historical background
- Domestic politics
Key information

Geography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>21,830 square miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>Oil, bauxite, low-grade iron ore, calcium, natural asphalt, mica, clays, salt, and hydropower.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

People

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>4.476 million (est. 2013). Between 1991-1998, 130,000 Croat refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and 30,000 from Vojvodina arrived in Croatia. Some 280,000 Croatian Serbs left, especially after 1995. About 125,000 young educated people are also believed to have emigrated since 1991.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
<td>In 2001 (census): Croat 89.6%, Serb 4.5%, Others 5.9%. The 2001 figures showed a two-thirds drop in the percentage of Serbs and Orthodox Christians (as well as in all minorities) compared to 1991. This reflects the exodus of many Serbs and other minority group members, as well as the choice of many young people of mixed marriages to declare themselves as Croats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>In 2001 (census): Roman Catholic 87.8%, Orthodox 4.4%, Muslim 1.3%, Other Christian .4%, Other .9%, None 5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Mainly Croatian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Zagreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System of government</td>
<td>Parliamentary democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of state</td>
<td>Ivo Josipović</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>Kuna (HRK)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Historical background

This section describes the historical background of Croatia:

• During Tito
• After Tito
• War of independence
During Tito

In the late 1960s, intellectuals in Zagreb called for the recognition of the Croatian language, and engaged in symbolic protests. This was followed by young activist leaders in the Croatian League of Communists, who demanded greater economic autonomy and control over hard currency revenues from tourism. This period, known as the "Croatian Spring," was also marked by an upsurge in revisionist histories of Croatian nationalism: among the best-known was the denial of Ustaša-sponsored murders of Serbs during World War II, written by a former Partisan general, Franjo Tudjman. Tito cracked down on the movement in 1972 purging the party and jailing many dissidents including Tudjman.
After Tito

In the first multiparty elections held in 1990, the ruling League of Communists was solidly defeated. The HDZ (Croatian Democratic Community) won the largest share of the vote. HDZ received 42% of the popular vote, but took 58% of the seats in parliament which set the stage for Stipe Mesic to become prime minister. Tudjman, who was leader of the HDZ became president. Under his leadership, Croatia's constitution was amended, street names and state symbols were changed, and in December 1990 the status of Serbs was changed from "constituent nation" to "national minority."

Moderate Serb parties were weakened, and those Serbs that wished to remain part of Yugoslavia and viewed Belgrade as their protector gained influence within the Serb community. The Serb populations in the Krajina region—descendants of those who had left the Ottoman Empire in 1690—declared their autonomy, labeling the new Zagreb regime as Ustaša. From Knin the center of the autonomy movement expanded to include almost one fifth of Croatian territory, though less than 5% of its population. The goal of its leaders was to remain part of a state in which Serbs were a majority—whether it was to be Yugoslavia, "Greater Serbia" or as a last resort, their own republic. Croats were to be expelled or murdered.

Serbs boycott Croatian referendum

When Croatia held a referendum on independence, Krajina Serbs boycotted the process and held their own referendum, thus reaffirming their commitment to Yugoslavia. Similar sentiments were expressed in Slavonia, Croatia's right bank territory on the Danube River that forms its border with Serbia.

In May 1991, in Borovo Selo, a community close to the Danube and the border city of Vukovar, a major firefight between Serbian irregulars and Croatian police left at least fifteen people dead.
War of independence
The Croatian war of independence or Homeland War was fought from 1991 - 1995, largely between Croatian police forces and the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA).

Initial siege
Until late 1991, Yugoslav Army, Serbian, and Montenegrin forces challenged the Croatian secession. It was in this period that the high-profile sieges of Vukovar took place on the Danube, and in Dubrovnik on the Dalmatian coast close to the Montenegrin and Bosnian borders.

While the damage to Dubrovnik attracted international attention, Vukovar was systematically leveled by Yugoslav forces, and finally fell after six months of fighting; several hundred of its defenders were murdered. Massacres perpetrated by the Yugoslav army and Serb paramilitary groups also occurred in Baći, Bruška, Dalj, Gospić, Lovas, and Škabrnja.

Under international pressure, a ceasefire was signed in January 1992, and soon afterwards Croatia was formally recognized. This left almost a third of Croatia’s territory in Serb hands. UN monitors were positioned at the front lines between Croatian forces and breakaway Serb elements, but by that time the focus of fighting had shifted to Bosnia.

Operation Storm
By 1995, the overall military situation in Bosnia was turning against the Serbs. The Croatian military launched a major military offensive (“Operation Storm”) in the summer of 1995, overrunning the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina. During this period, over 200,000 Croatian Serbs fled to other Serb-controlled parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. (The International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague Court would later try Croatian military leaders for war crimes committed during this period against Serbs.)

Croatian sovereignty was restored over the whole territory except a thin slice along the Danube. Vukovar and Borovo Selo, where the violence had begun, were restored to Croatia in an UN-mediated hand-over that began in November 1995 and concluded in 1998.

Aftermath
Croatia was devastated with up to 25% of its economy destroyed, $37 billion in damaged infrastructure, lost output, and refugee-related costs. The total number of deaths on both sides was around 20,000, and among the living were large numbers of refugees and displaced persons from each ethnic community.

OSCE involvement
The OSCE Mission to Croatia was established in 1996 to support the Croatian government in dealing with the consequences of the war, reintegration of the former Serb-controlled areas, and reconciliation.

The Mission played a role in the following issues until its closure in 2007:
- Protection of human rights and the rights of minorities
- Deployment of civilian police monitors
• Building of democratic institutions and civil society
• Return of refugees and internally displaced persons was one of the mission’s highest priorities. The 1991-95 war in Croatia resulted in more than 300,000 ethnic Serb refugees; less than half returned to Croatia.

The OSCE Office in Zagreb replaced the OSCE Mission to Croatia in 2008. The office monitored war crimes proceedings, and implementation of housing programs for refugees and displaced persons. The office was officially closed in 2012.

*The OSCE flag is lowered in the Croatian capital, marking the formal closure of the OSCE’s office, Zagreb, 17 January 2012. (Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia/Marija Kundek)*
Domestic politics

Throughout Croatia's perceived "Patriotic War," Tudjman and his HDZ party remained dominant, and supported the creation and expansion of "Herceg-Bosna" in areas of Western Bosnia with Croat majorities.

Although many Bosnian Croats supported the Bosnian government in its fight against the Yugoslav National Army, violent Croat-Bosnian fighting also took place in 1993, especially around the city of Mostar, on the Neretva River. In November 1993, Croatian bombardment destroyed the Ottoman bridge at Mostar, dating from the sixteenth century. Fighting accompanied by atrocities continued until February 1994 when an internationally brokered ceasefire and agreement was made to form a Bosniak-Croat Federation.

Tudjman and his allies nonetheless continued to extend support to the Croatian statelet of Herceg-Bosna, challenging Bosnian sovereignty and independence. Tudjman's nationalist policies led Stipe Meslić to leave the HDZ and found the HND (Croatian Independent Democrats) in 1994.

2000 parliamentary elections - Opposition wins

Public dissatisfaction with HDZ cronyism and Tudjman's death in December 1999 contributed to the Social Democrats (SDP) winning 44 seats, the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) winning 24, and the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) winning 16 in the 151-seat assembly. The HDZ won 40 seats, including seats allotted to Croats abroad, coming largely from Croats in Bosnia who favored the expansionist ideals of the HDZ. SDP leader Ivica Račan became prime minister. His coalition partner Dražen Budiša stood for election as president, but was defeated by Stipe Meslić.

Ivica Račan (Croatia government website)
Inter-party disputes and reorganized coalitions

Prime Minister Račan and President Mesić advocated joining the European Union, and breaking with Croatia’s nationalist past. Their pragmatic policies and willing cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague upset some political allies as well as opponents. Dražen Budiša, HSLS’ leader, resigned in 2001 when the government agreed to extradite two Croat generals, Ante Gotovina and Rahim Ademi, who had been indicted by the ICTY.

Budiša returned to lead HSLS a year later, but in 2002 the SDP and HSLS coalition collapsed over foreign policy disputes concerning Slovenia. Račan resigned as prime minister. Mesić reappointed him, and Račan formed a new coalition which included SDP and a number of smaller parties, one of which was the Croatian People’s Party – Liberal Democrats (LIBRA), which had been formed by several former HSLS former ministers in government. Budiša again resigned as HSLS leader. Squabbles with Slovenia continued, including a high profile dispute over control of territorial waters.
2003 parliamentary elections

The HDZ made a comeback under the new leadership of Ivo Sanader, who formed a coalition with the Croatian Peasant Party and won the majority (66 seats) after the SDP. Sanader, a moderate, made symbolic gestures of reconciliation towards Croatia's Serbs and pledged to cooperate with the ICTY. He also identified judicial reform as a priority.
2005 presidential election
Mesić’s Croatian People’s Party (HNS) won re-election in the second round of the presidential elections. His 66% victory was a sharp defeat for the HDZ and indirectly for Prime Minister Sanader.

2007 parliamentary elections
Sanader’s HDZ again won a parliamentary majority, (66 seats) followed by the SDP (56 seats). SDP leader Raćan died from cancer and was replaced by Zoran Milanović.

An OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission reported that the elections were administered transparently, professionally and represented further progress in fully meeting OSCE commitments for democratic elections.
2009-2010 presidential elections

The first round of the fifth presidential election in Croatia was held with twelve candidates participating. The second round included first-round winner Ivo Josipović and runner-up Zagreb Mayor Milan Bandić. Josipović won a landslide victory with 60.3% of the vote, becoming the first elected president from the Social Democrats (SDP).
Ivo Josipović (by permission of Roberta F.)
2011 parliamentary elections
These elections were a resounding loss for the governing parties. HDZ and the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) received the lowest number of seats and the lowest share of the vote in their histories. HDZ lost 21 seats, losing all but two electoral districts in the country. HSS dropped to a sixth of its previous membership, with two sitting ministers losing their seats. The Social Democrat-led center-left coalition of four parties that contested the election won an absolute majority of 81 seats. This was the first time since Croatia’s independence that the HDZ was not the strongest party in parliament.

Goal to join NATO and EU
The post-Tudjman government of 1999-2003 pursued good relations with the international community and sought to join the EU and NATO.
Croatia became a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 2000, deployed troops to
Afghanistan, and modernized its military. The 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit invited Croatia to join the Alliance, and it participated as a full-fledged member at NATO's 2009 Summit.

The EU postponed accession negotiations with Croatia in March 2005, asserting that Croatia was not cooperating fully with the Hague Tribunal. In October 2005, however, the EU reversed itself and decided to open membership talks with Croatia. This decision boosted popular support for the HDZ. However, the first annual report by the European Commission on Croatia's progress in meeting the requirements for EU membership was a cautious one, highlighting that membership by 2010 depended on institutional changes in the EU and on continued reform in Croatia.

Delays in Croatia's accession to the EU
Some EU countries made cooperation with ICTY a condition for accession. Croatia was seen as uncooperative due to its delay in arresting and transferring war criminals to the Tribunal. The arrest of General Ante Gotovina in Spain in December 2005, and his extradition to the Hague Tribunal put Croatia's EU accession back on track. Gotovina was sentenced in 2011 to 24 years imprisonment for his role in expelling the Krajina Serbs from Croatia in 1995. This sentence was widely seen as unjust by the Croatian public. (Gotovina and Gen. Mladen Markac were later acquitted on appeal to the Hague Court in November 2012.)

Another barrier was removed in 2006, when Croatian law limiting land ownership to its own citizens was amended to allow citizens in EU countries to own land in Croatia.

Slovenia blocked Croatia's progress toward EU membership in 2008 over their border dispute. In 2010, Slovenia accepted the ruling of international arbitrators on the dispute, removing this obstacle.

Looking ahead
Croatia Joins EU in 2013
Croatia became the 28th member state of the European Union in July 2013. Its products gained
access to new markets, and will benefit from EU funding programs for agriculture, internal polices, and administration. Croatia will, however, have to improve its competitiveness to compete in the EU market and be able to maximize the opportunities for absorbing EU structural funds. Half of Croatia's trade is with the Euro area, as is three-fourths of its foreign direct investment. Croatia has a high concentration of banks whose ownership indirectly opens them to the Euro-area crisis. Meanwhile, unemployment is currently above 12%, with youth unemployment at 40%.

**Fighting organized crime and corruption**

Fighting organized crime and corruption remains a challenge for Croatian authorities. A bombing in Zagreb in 2008 killed two Croatian journalists, including Ivo Pukanić, the editor and owner of the weekly Nacional known for his exposés on corruption and human rights abuses.

In 2011, the **Croatian Bureau for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK)** issued indictments against 11 people, including HDZ as a legal entity, for siphoning more than 6 million Euros into a party fund.

**Regional reconciliation**

President Josipović has publicly expressed regret for Croatia's involvement in efforts to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990's. In 2010 he visited Bosnia and stated that he recognized that Croatia's actions resulted in the Croat-Bosniak war, which caused great suffering for many people. Josipović also met with Bosnian Croat Catholic Archbishop Cardinal Vinko Puljić and the head of the Islamic Community, the Grand Mufti Mustafa Cerić. The three made a joint visit to the sites of Ahmići massacre and Križančevoselo killings, and paid respect to the victims.

**Genocide suit against Serbia at ICJ**

Foreign Minister Vesna Pusic said in January 2014 that Croatia was prepared to drop its genocide complaint against Serbia at the International Court of Justice, filed in 1999, if Belgrade would provide information on Croats who went missing during the 1991-95 war. Serbia filed a counter-complaint in 2010, and insists on a mutual withdrawal of complaints. As of March 2014, Croatia's complaint was being heard at the ICJ, with Serbia's counter-complaint to follow.
President Ivo Josipović laying a wreath for the Bosniak civilians murdered by Croatian forces during the war. (daily.tportal.hr)
CHAPTER 4

Macedonia

Macedonia is a former republic of Yugoslavia. This chapter contains the following sections on Macedonia:

- Key information
- Historical background
- Domestic politics
- Prospects and challenges
Key information

Geography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>9,780 square miles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>Low-grade iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, chromate, manganese, nickel, tungsten, gold, silver, asbestos, gypsum, timber, arable land</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ohrid

The Ohrid region, shared by Macedonia and Albania, has been listed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for its cultural and natural world heritage sites.

Lake Ohrid straddles the mountainous border between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, 14 April 2006.(OSCE/Maria Dotsenko)

People

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>2.082 million (July 2012 est.):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
<td>In 2002, the population was: Macedonian 64.18%, Albanian 25.17%, Turkish 3.85%, Roma 2.66%, Serb 1.78%, other 2.4%.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<pre><code>                       | In 2011 Macedonia's Parliament stopped the census from proceeding.          |
</code></pre>
The action followed the resignation of the State Census Commission, which had asserted that the census would not be applied equally in the field. The suggestion was that Albanian numbers would be inflated, as some had suggested occurred during the 2002 census. Albanians claim censuses have consistently under-represented their numbers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>According to the 2002 Census: Macedonian Orthodox 64.7%, Muslim 33.3%, Others 2%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>The official language is Macedonian, a Slavic language, as well as any other language (e.g. Albanian) spoken by at least 25% of the population. Albanian is used extensively, especially in the northern and western areas of the country.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Skopje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System of government</td>
<td>Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. It has a directly elected president, serving a five-year term: and an Assembly, whose members serve a four-year term. They are elected by a mixed system of direct election from voting districts, and proportional representation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of state</td>
<td>Gjorge Ivanov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>The unit of currency is the Denar (MKD).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Historical background

This section provides historical background on Macedonia:

- 19th and early 20th centuries
- World War II
- The Communist period
- Since independence
19th and early 20th centuries

The Macedonian question
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the "Macedonian question" was a major problem for European diplomats. Bulgarian territorial claims on Ottoman Turkish-held Macedonia were based on ethnic and linguistic arguments, while Greece appealed to classical history.

Following Russia's military victory over the Turkish Empire, the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano created a "Greater Bulgaria" which included most of "Greater" Macedonia as well as much of modern Albania. The other great powers overturned this treaty, leaving Macedonia under Ottoman rule for another thirty-five years, during which time Serbia and Greece also made claims on its territory.

Balkan wars
In 1912, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro pooled their military resources and launched the First Balkan War, during which they defeated Ottoman forces on every front.

Afterwards, Bulgaria asked that Serbia transfer territory to it, as the alliance had agreed. Serbia, however, refused and kept the area around Ohrid, Bitola, and Skopje as compensation for the Albanian territory it had been forced to give up. This resulted from decisions made by the six Great Powers of the time (Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy) at the London Conference of 1912-1913, which included granting independence to Albania.

A year later, Bulgaria, dissatisfied with what it had gotten out of the war, launched the Second Balkan War against its former allies. The Treaty of Bucharest (1913) divided Macedonia among Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria. Today, Macedonia consists of the area taken by Serbia.

World War II
The struggle over Macedonia drove Balkan alliances in World War II, as it had before and during World War I. Bulgaria allied itself to Germany both times in return for the promise of Macedonian territory.

Bulgaria occupied Macedonia from 1941 to 1944. Bulgarian forces deported Macedonia's Jews to Nazi death camps in 1943, although Bulgarian authorities refused to deport Bulgarian Jews from Bulgaria itself. (A museum dedicated to the Jewish victims of Nazism opened in Skopje in 2011.)

After the war, Macedonia received the status of a constituent republic in the new Yugoslav federal state established by Tito. This was the first time Macedonia was recognized as a nation.
Holocaust Memorial Center for the Jews of Macedonia in Skopje (by permission of Raso)
During Tito

Symbolic nationalism was encouraged during the Tito period despite the commitment to federalism. The Macedonian language was codified, and the Macedonian Orthodox Church was restored in 1967.

Tito also used the Macedonian issue as a weapon of foreign policy when needed, contrasting the "free" expression of Macedonian identity in Yugoslavia with its denial in Bulgaria and Greece.

Macedonia dependent on Yugoslavia and Serbia

Within federal Yugoslavia, Macedonians fared well, though the republic was seen as a backwater. In economic and cultural terms, it was dependent on its large neighbor, Serbia. A common concern of the two was a growing Albanian minority, where Macedonia's western areas resembled Serbia's Kosovo.

Between 1951 and 1981, Albanian cultural rights in Macedonia steadily improved. After demonstrations in Pristina (Kosovo) in 1981, the Macedonian authorities followed the Serbian lead in taking repressive measures against the Albanian minority. As elsewhere, adversity strengthened the will and resolve of Macedonia's Albanians, many of whose leaders had been educated in Pristina.

Divisions in Macedonian politics

The 1990 elections were won by a new nationalist coalition headed by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), (named after the 1893 revolutionary organization), which took 37 seats. The former League of Communists (KPM) won 30 seats, while a pro-Yugoslav coalition around Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic's Union of Reform Forces won 17 seats.

Macedonia's Albanians largely voted for Albanian ethnic parties, the largest being the Party for Democratic Prosperity, which won 24 seats.

Parliament chose Kiro Gligorov, a prominent figure from the League of Communists, as President. As Yugoslavia approached collapse, Gligorov worked with other Republic presidents to find a solution in the form of an asymmetrical federation.

Macedonia's representative to the collective presidency, Vasil Tupurkovski, also followed the same agenda, trying to produce a compromise.
CHAPTER 4  Macedonia

Kiro Gligorov (daily.tportal.hz)

Vasil Tupurkovski (personal website)
Independence

The Republic of Macedonia declared independence in 1991 after passing a referendum boycotted by Albanians. Macedonia immediately applied for recognition from the European Community's Badinter Commission, a panel of experts created to guide EC policy on recognition of Yugoslavia's Republics as independent states.

FYROM

While the Badinter Commission recommended recognition of Macedonian independence, the EC did not follow its recommendation. Greece objected, fearing that a future state named Macedonia might claim northern Greece, a region populated by ethnic Macedonians and the heart of so-called "historical Macedonia."

Macedonia entered a twilight zone of unrecognized independence. President Gligorov negotiated the departure of Yugoslav National Army forces, avoiding involvement in the Yugoslav wars of succession. In 1993 he arranged the stationing of UN forces in Macedonia, known as UNPROFOR initially, then as UNPREDEP, as a check on any Serbian aggression and the spillover of conflict into Macedonia. The country was admitted to the United Nations under the name “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” Financially, however, Macedonia was devastated. Cut off from its old markets and connections in Serbia and beyond by international sanctions, it was unable to create new ones until its status was resolved.

Accord between FYROM and Greece

Skopje and Athens signed an agreement in 1995 that normalized relations between the two states, and lifted the Greek blockade, despite Athens' continued objections to what it considered Skopje's use of a Hellenic name and symbols. The agreement facilitated Macedonian recognition and entry into some international institutions. Nonetheless, the name issue has not been resolved and Greece continues to block Macedonia's entry into NATO and the EU.
Domestic politics

Ethnic challenges
Ethnic conflict poses a continuing challenge to Macedonia’s stability. Albanians living mostly in the northwestern part of the country make up 25% of the total population of the country. Violent clashes occurred between Albanians and security forces on several occasions: in Tetovo in 1995, when an Albanian-language university was opened, and in Gostivar two years later over the display of Turkish and Albanian flags at a local government office. The most significant clashes were in 2001, when Macedonian Albanians demanded greater rights for their community. About 80 people died in the conflict before it ended with the Ohrid Agreement, which met some of their demands.

Ethnic tensions between Albanians and Macedonians reignited in April 2012 when hundreds of angry Macedonians marched in Skopje to protest the killings of five Macedonian fishermen. They chanted nationalist slogans and blamed ethnic Albanians for the deaths. Riot police clashed with the stone-throwing demonstrators and prevented them from marching across a bridge to a mainly Albanian neighborhood in the capital. The police action won praise from the OSCE. Ethnic riots again broke out in Skopje in March 2013 and May 2014. Albanians rioted in Skopje in July 2014 after six ethnic Albanians were sentenced to life in prison for the murder of the five ethnic Macedonians in April 2012.

The challenge of organized crime
The period after 1994 saw the further development of an illegal economy in Macedonia. War profiteers benefited from smuggling during the years of international sanctions against Belgrade. Later, organized crime diversified their activities. President Gligorov was the target of a car bomb in 1995. He survived, though he lost an eye. Public discontent grew as stories of insider buy-outs of state assets became widely known, and other scandals broke, including the collapse of a pyramid savings bank in 1997.

1998 parliamentary elections
VMRO-DPMNE spent this period consolidating its support base at the local level, redefining itself from nationalist to center-right.

In the run-up to the 1998 parliamentary elections, VMRO-DPMNE allied itself to the Democratic Alternative (DA), a new party founded by Vasil Tupurkovski, who had spent most of the period since 1990 in the USA. Tupurkovski pledged economic recovery through foreign investment. VMRO-DPMNE, meanwhile, mobilized the strong power base it had built across the country. The VMRO/DA coalition took 59 seats: the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) took 29. Arben Xhaferi’s Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) surprisingly announced that it would join the VMRO/DA governing coalition.
The Taiwan Flap

Soon after his victory, Tupurkovski announced that to fulfill his pre-election commitment, he had secured major support from Taiwan, and that Macedonia would extend diplomatic recognition to Taiwan.

The extension of UNPREDEP in the Republic was then blocked by China: with the escalation of tensions in Kosovo, NATO forces deployed under a UN mandate stayed in place, but as a NATO force. The Taiwan deal collapsed, and Tupurkovski was widely discredited. (Tupurkovski was later tried and convicted of embezzlement and misuse of public funds, and sentenced to three years in jail in April 2009. The decision was reversed on appeal in December 2009.)
1998 presidential elections
The governing coalition split over making Tupurkovski their common candidate for president to succeed Gligorov, when his term ended in 1998. All three coalition partners put forward their own candidates, as did other parties. Tupurkovski was eliminated in the first round, and in the second round Boris Trajkovski, the VMRO candidate, defeated Tito Petkovski, from SDSM.

The elections were marked by virulent anti-Albanian rhetoric from SDSM candidate Petkovski, and afterwards by opposition accusations of vote fraud, especially in areas with majority Albanian populations, where Trajkovski outpolled Petkovski by a massive margin.
Deepening mistrust between Macedonians and Albanians

Meanwhile, at the government level, cooperation between Albanian and Macedonian parties continued, including agreement on a university in Tetovo and progress toward greater decentralization. Relations with Bulgaria, Albania and Greece improved, and the international community welcomed the new government's pragmatism.

The government coped with the 1999 Kosovo crisis, when over 250,000 Kosovo Albanians found refuge in the country, and NATO's presence in Macedonia expanded considerably.

Mistrust between Macedonians and Albanians nonetheless continued to rise. The war in Kosovo and post-war conditions there were widely taken as signs that NATO, and especially the USA, were now solidly pro-Albanian.

Facing widespread unemployment as a result of state sector reform, many Macedonians believed that the new government was selling off national industry for short-term personal profit, and permitting Albanian criminal networks to evade legal oversight and operate unchecked in Western Macedonia.

For their part, Macedonia's Albanians continued to press for constitutional change and greater regional autonomy. In the wake of numerous scandals, the DA left the government, as did a splinter group of MPs from the VMRO-DPMNE. The coalition of VMRO-DPMNE and DPA however survived, with DPA assuming an ever-greater prominence.

Albanian insurgency ended by Ohrid Agreement
Attacks on Macedonian security forces by Armed Albanians began in late 2000. Soon after, in January 2001, the border village of Tanusevci was occupied by armed Albanians of the National Liberation Army, (NLA), led by Ali Ahmeti. With some assistance from KFOR troops on the border, Macedonian security forces recaptured the village. The NLA regrouped and expanded its activities to villages around Tetovo and Kumanovo, in north and northwest Macedonia, and also moved into Aracinovo, a suburb of Skopje, in the late spring.

The Macedonian media criticized Macedonian Albanian political leaders after they met with NLA leaders and signed a common platform, known as the Prizren document. EU, NATO and OSCE representatives took part in mediation efforts between Albanians and Macedonians, while sporadic fighting continued, displacing thousands of ethnic Albanians and Macedonians, and leaving at least a hundred people dead.

Human rights violations were committed by both sides. Under heavy European and U.S. pressure, representatives from VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, PDP and DPA signed peace accords called the Framework Agreement in Ohrid in August 2001. NATO troops oversaw disarmament of the insurgents, while parliament discussed proposed constitutional changes.

Since then, the primary goal of the international community in Macedonia has been to support implementation, by all Macedonian parties, of the Ohrid Agreement. In 2003, the EU took over peacekeeping duties in Macedonia from NATO. The primary mandate of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, present since 1992, is to monitor and implement decisions from the Agreement.
NATO’s Operation Essential Harvest, collected weapons voluntarily handed over by ethnic Albanian insurgents. (NATO)

2002 parliamentary election and aftermath

A coalition of Social Democrats (SDSM) led by Branko Crvenkovski, the Liberal Democratic Party under Petar Gosev, and a number of other smaller parties defeated the VMRO-DPMNE-led coalition. Crvenkovski had been Prime Minister for six years (1992-1998) following Macedonia’s independence in 1991.

The Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), led by former National Liberation Army (UCK) leader Ali Ahmeti emerged as the leading ethnic Albanian party, receiving 12% of the vote. The Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), a coalition partner of the VMRO-DPMNE, won just 4% of the vote. SDSM formed a governing coalition with DUI and a number of other smaller parties. Ali Ahmeti did not take a post in the new government.

Subsequently, the opposition VMRO-DPMNE and DPA leaders called for partition of Macedonia along ethnic lines, between Macedonian and Albanian regions. Ljupcho Georgievski resigned as VMRO-DPMNE leader, replaced by the more moderate Nikola Gruevski. Xhaferi offered his resignation as DPA leader, but party members persuaded him to remain. These two leaders then disowned the Ohrid Agreement they had signed. Nevertheless, the Macedonian government continued to work to implement its terms.

An OSCE election observation mission assessed the elections as largely in accordance with international standards. The election was peaceful, despite some incidents of violence prior to the vote.
A new President and continuation of policy

President Trajkovski was killed in an airplane crash in February 2004. The Speaker of Parliament, Ljupčo Jordanovski, became Acting President in accordance with the Constitution. Candidates from four parties (SDSM, VMRO-DPMNE, DUI and DPA) ran in the special presidential election. Branko Crvenkovski, the premier and leader of SDSM, won the first round, and then faced a
run-off battle against VMRO-DPMNE candidate Saško Kedev in April 2004. DUI, the leading Albanian party and coalition partner to SDSM, supported Crvenkovski, who won with 63% of the vote. Former banker and Interior Minister Hari Kostov became Prime Minister.

At the time of his death, Trajkovski had been about to deliver Macedonia’s application for accession to the EU. The formal delivery took place in March 2004. (The EU Council of Ministers granted Macedonia candidate status for EU membership in December 2005.)

Opposition in disarray

Within VMRO-DPMNE, progressive and pro-European leader Nikola Gruevski faced challenges from former party leader Ljubčho Georgievski after the party’s defeat in the 2004 presidential elections. After Georgievski’s move to unseat Gruevski failed, Georgievski formed a rival party, VMRO-Narodna.
2004 referendum to overturn Ohrid Agreement fails

A November referendum championed by the opposition VMRO-DPMO and smaller nationalist groups failed to overturn the decentralization package of the Ohrid Agreement. The turnout for the referendum was 26.3%, far less than the 50%, required by law to be valid. Although many ethnic Macedonians were not enthusiastic about the terms of the Ohrid Agreement, they were concerned about rejecting a deal already approved by parliament. Prime Minister Kostov resigned after the referendum, accusing coalition partners of corruption and nepotism. Vlado Bučkovski replaced him.

U.S. recognition of the Republic of Macedonia as the name of the country, as well as the EU’s strong support for the Ohrid Agreement, contributed to the defeat of the referendum. Macedonians assessed that the U.S. decision would eventually lead the EU and others to accept the country’s preferred name, despite continuing Greek opposition.
Local elections in the new (85) municipalities were held in March 2005. Competition was intense, with 379 candidates running for positions as mayors, which with the passage of the laws on decentralization, carried substantially greater power.

The International Election Observation Mission concluded that the municipal elections were in line with most OSCE and Council of Europe standards, but failed to meet key commitments guaranteeing universal and equal suffrage and the secrecy of the ballot.

VMRO-DPMNE wins majority in 2006 parliamentary elections
Reversing the 2004 election results, VMRO-DPMNE won an absolute majority in the July 2006 parliamentary elections, winning 65 out 120 seats. VMRO-DPMNE leader Nikola Gruevski became prime minister.
The SDSM setback led to the election of Radmila Šekerinska as the new leader of the SDSM. Gruevski selected the DPA as his party’s ethnic Albanian partner, even though the DUI won the majority of the ethnic Albanian vote. Despite DUI complaints of its exclusion from the governing coalition, the threat of political turmoil had been reduced by EU demands for political stability as a precondition for EU membership.

The ethnic Albanian DUI and its PDP partner boycotted parliament in 2007, asserting that they did not want to take part in the institution’s activities because it was undermining the Ohrid Accords. More to the point, the DUI was angered that the SDSM had opted to form a coalition with the smaller DPA, calling this a betrayal of the Albanian vote.
Government resigns and early elections called
Prime Minister Gruevski called early parliamentary elections in April 2008. He said the early vote was necessary to implement reforms that had been stalled. He also related his step to NATO’s decision not to invite Macedonia to join the alliance, following Greece’s veto due to their name dispute. Gruevski’s government had also been challenged by threats made by its Albanian coalition partner DPA threatening to bolt if its demands were not met.

VMRO-DPMNE decisively wins 2008 parliamentary elections
Gruevski’s VMRO-DPMNE, won a decisive majority, validating his decision to call early elections. VMRO-DPMNE won 64 seats in the 120-seat parliament, with the Social-Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM) coming in second with 28 seats, and the ethnic Albanian Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) each winning 13 seats.

The elections were marred by violence that left one dead and several injured. There were also pre-election day clashes between the rival DUI and DPA parties, including attacks on DUI offices and members, a reported assassination attempt on its leader, and a fatal stabbing of a DPA member. The DUI accused the DPA of fraud and intimidation, influencing the outcome of the vote.
in Albanian areas. Meanwhile, SDSM leader Sekerinska announced she was stepping down as a result of her party’s disappointing showing in the election.

The International Election Observation Mission, (IEOM) a joint undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, reported that key OSCE and COE commitments were not met. Although the elections were well administered procedurally, violent acts in ethnic Albanian areas were not prevented, and enforcement of laws was selective and limited. Organized efforts to violently disrupt the process on Election day made it impossible for voters in many places to freely express themselves. Voting in most of the country was assessed by the IEOM as generally well conducted, aside from the ethnic Albanian areas. In addition, the assessment of vote counting was bad or very bad in fifteen per cent of the country.

VMRO-DPMNC and DUI for new government
Gruevski returned as prime minister in July 2008 as the head of a VMRO-DPMNC/DUI coalition government.

Opposition boycotts parliament

The opposition Social Democrats continued their boycott of parliament in response to the adoption of what it considered an unacceptable parliamentary rulebook by the majority VMRO-DPMNC in July 2008. The decision followed a boycott declared a week earlier when the party’s vice president, Zoran Zaev, was publicly arrested on charges of misuse of office as mayor of the town of Strumica.

Meanwhile, the opposition Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) was also boycotting parliament, asserting that it would return when issues involving greater property rights for Albanians were properly addressed.

Both boycotts left parliament almost without any opposition representatives. President Crvenkovski pressed for an end to the boycotts. He pardoned Zaev to entice the Social Democrats, and refused to sign the new law on the use of languages until the DPA returned. He also refused sign the new laws on lobbying, employment relations, expropriation and energy, that had triggered controversy.
In the second round of voting for the presidency, VMRO-DPMNE’s Gjorge Ivanov won 63.41%, compared to the Social Democrats’ Ljubomir Frckoski’s 35.06%. Turnout was 42.86%, just above the 40% threshold. The municipal elections showed similar results.

The OSCE/ODIHR-led International Election Observation Mission for the presidential and municipal elections reported that the elections met most OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards. The elections were well administered and free of the violent incidents that clouded the 2008 parliamentary elections. Election Day was peaceful and the voting process generally well managed, although the counting process was less positive. Family voting remained a problem, but was significantly reduced in the second round. The lower voter turnout figures for the presidential election demonstrated the danger that the 40 percent turnout requirement could lead to failed elections, particularly when combined with problems with voters’ list.
Political differences lead to riot in parliament

Opposition Social Democrat (SDSM) deputies seeking to block debate and passage of what they considered an inflated state budget scuffled with pro-government deputies on December 24, 2012. Parliamentary security guards escorted Speaker Trajko Veljanovski from the plenary and moved opposition deputies out of the building, having earlier cleared it off journalists. The pro-government deputies thereupon adopted the government's budget proposal. Meanwhile, outside in the street pro- and anti-government groups were brawling with each other and with the police. Opposition SSDM leader Crvenkovski said his party would boycott parliament indefinitely and begin a campaign of civil disobedience to topple the VMRO-DPMNE/DPA government. Prime Minister Gruevski claimed that the opposition had planned the incidents to create political chaos. Daily protests continued in the streets.

The EU Mission, American Embassy and NATO Liaison Office in Skopje issued joint statements calling on the parties to resolve the political impasse through dialogue. Eventually, an EU team
led by Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuele --warning of the negative consequences for Macedonia’s European future if the crisis was not resolved--eventually succeeded in mediating a March 1 agreement between Crvenkovski and Gruevski. The deal provided for the resumption of normal political activities, the return of the SDSM to parliament, participation in the upcoming march 24 local elections, a joint commission to establish the facts on what had happened in parliament and in the streets on December 24, and possible early parliamentary elections.

Rival protests over appointment of ethnic Albanian former rebel as defense minister

Meanwhile, ethnic tensions simmered. The SDSM organized protests in Skopje in early March 2013 against the government’s appointment of Talat Xhaferi as defense minister. Xhaferi, from the ethnic Albanian Democratic Union of Integration, had been a member of the National Liberation Army during the 2001 Albanian insurgency. In response, ethnic Albanians rioted and battled with the police in Skopje.
2013 municipal elections

Gruevski coalition wins big

Prime Minister Gruevski’s VMRO-DPMNE-led “For a Better Macedonia” coalition won 57 of 78 municipalities, including Skopje, in two rounds of the April local elections. Opposition SDSM leader Crvenkovski, whose party won only four municipalities, complained that the elections were neither free nor fair. Albanian parties DUI won 11 and DPA won two municipalities.

OSCE ODIHR’s statement of preliminary findings reported that the two rounds of voting were highly competitive and well administered, but partisan media coverage and a blurring of state and party activities led to the lack of a level playing field. Candidates were generally able to campaign freely. At the same time, there were allegations of voter intimidation and misuse of state resources. The State Election Commission worked transparently and met electoral deadlines, but collegiality deteriorated during the review of complaints, with decisions largely based on party affiliation. The absence of clear procedures for handling complaints did not guarantee timely and effective remedies. Following the first round of voting, increasing concerns were raised regarding the accuracy of voter lists. Election days were calm overall, and procedures were largely followed, although instances of group voting persisted.
Supporters of Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski's party wave party and national flags while celebrating the party's victory in local elections, in downtown Skopje, Macedonia, early Monday, March 25, 2013. Macedonians voted peacefully in local elections Sunday, boosting hopes the country is turning a page and won't repeat the political and ethnic violence that has marred past voting cycles. (AP Photo/Boris Grdanoski)

A Karpouš Municipality electoral board during the second round of the municipal elections in Skopje, 7 April 2013. (OSCE/Lauren Baranowska)

Presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014
The first round of presidential elections was held April 13. Incumbent President Ivanov of the governing VMRO-DPMNE led with 51.69% of the vote, followed by Stevo Pendarovski of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) with 37.51%, Ilijaz Halimi of the Democratic Party of...
Albanians with 4.48%, and Zoran Popovski from the Citizens Option for Macedonia with 3.61%.

In the second round of the presidential election on April 27, Ivanov was re-elected with 55.28% of the vote, followed by Pendarovski with 41.14%.

The IEOM preliminary report stated that the first round of the presidential election was efficiently administered and the campaign was active. The candidate registration process was inclusive and candidates were able to campaign freely. Although fundamental freedoms were respected, bias media coverage and a blurring of state and party activities did not provide a level playing field for candidates to contest the election. The IEOM confirmed its findings in a statement following the April 27 elections.

In the parliamentary elections also held on April 27, the ruling VMRO-DPMNE came in first with 61 seats (up 5) and 42.98% of the vote, followed by the SDSM with 34 seats (down 8) and 25.34% of the vote, the DUI with 19 seats (up 4) and 13.71% of the vote, the DPA with 7 seats (down 1) and 5.92% of the vote, the new Citizens Option for Macedonia won 1 seat and 2.82% of the vote, and the National Democratic revival won 1 seat (down 1) and 1.59% of the vote.

SDSM political leader Zoran Zaev accused Gruevski and VMRO-DPMNE of abusing the state system, threatening and buying votes, and said his party would not recognize the results of the presidential or parliamentary elections.
Voters in Skopje cast their ballots during the early parliamentary and second round presidential elections in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 27 April 2014. (OSCE/Thomas Rymer)
May 2014 riots in Skopje underline ethnic tensions

Ethnic riots rocked Skopje in May 2014 following the murder of a youth by an alleged bicycle thief. The OSCE Mission to Skopje sought to play a calming role.

Gruevski forms government in June 2014

Incumbent Prime Minister Gruevski received parliamentary approval of his cabinet in June 2014, with his VMRO-DPMNE forming a coalition with the ethnic Albanian DUI (which received 9 of the 26 ministerial portfolios, including justice, economy and education). The opposition SDSM boycotted parliament and resigned their seats, claiming the April elections had been manipulated.
New Macedonian government sworn in, June 19, 2014
(Macedonian government website)
Prospects and challenges

Like other former republics, Macedonia continues to struggle with the Yugoslav legacy, which shapes current debates over human rights.

For Albanian and Macedonian political parties, the distinction between majority and minority remains more important than individual human rights. Issues such as lack of education or opportunities in rural regions are overshadowed by majority-minority polarization.

Judicial reform, commenced under the 2004-2006 SDSM government, and police reform, under the July 2006 VRMO-DPMNE government, have increased public confidence in state protection of minority rights.

Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement

Significant progress has been made in implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Agreement. The Constitution has been amended, the Albanian language recognized as an official language in communities where ethnic Albanians constitute at least 20% of the population, the principle of equitable representation introduced, electoral mechanisms put into place to safeguard the rights of minorities, decentralization, and inclusion of more ethnic Albanians in public administration. This is a continuing work in progress.

Monitoring and supporting implementation of the Ohrid Agreement remains a key OSCE priority. The OSCE Mission to Skopje works in close co-operation with the EU Delegation, the U.S. Embassy and NATO, and with local counterparts on long-term reform processes in the judiciary, police, and public administration. The Mission also works on education, decentralization, equitable representation, language, and non-discrimination.
The changing face of Skopje

Since 2010, the center of Skopje has been transformed by a massive redevelopment project. The formerly empty Macedonia Square has been filled in with statues of Macedonian heroes, including a massive statue of Alexander the Great encircled by a water fountain. The project also involves the construction of government buildings, museums, a triumphal arch, a theater, new bridges over the Vardar River, and more. Estimates of the cost of the project range from 80 to 500 million Euros.

The project has been implemented by the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party, which is underlining through the project its preferred narrative of a Macedonian identity rooted in antiquity. The project emphasizes neoclassical architecture (almost all such buildings that existed in Skopje were destroyed by the 1963 earthquake) and turns its back on the Ottoman period. Some critics of the project have suggested that it seeks to marginalize ethnic Albanians and exclude them from the Macedonian narrative.
Statue of Alexander the Great, Macedonia Square, Skopje, 2012. (USIP/Ted Feifer)
Triumphal Arch dedicated to 20 years of Macedonian independence, Skopje, 2012. (USIP/Ted Feifer)

Border demarcation

Macedonia and Kosovo reached a border agreement in 2009 that paved the way for establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Problem of the grey economy

The economy remains a key source of tension. Beyond tax avoidance and smuggling are more overt corruption and criminality, which the state is unable to police effectively. The violence of 2001 was often interpreted as ethnic, but some argue that it was largely driven by disputes over the control of cross-border traffic in drugs, weapons and people, including women for prostitution.

Yet, the post-2004 period has been characterized by significant progress in the reform of the public administration system, especially in the judicial and police sectors, and both the SDSM and the VRMO-DPMNE governments have targeted corruption. Moreover, the 2006 VRMO-DPMNE government actively reformed property rights legislation in order to court foreign direct investment.

EU accession and NATO membership

Macedonia was granted EU candidate status in 2005. The European Commission’s 2008 Western Balkans initiative seemed likely to accelerate Macedonia’s prospects for EU membership. But Macedonia’s bilateral problems with Greece and Bulgaria, as well as its own issues with its Albanian minority, provide reasons why its entry into the EU will not be as fast as it had hoped.

The European Commission’s recommendation to begin accession negotiations with Macedonia in
2009 have been blocked for five consecutive years by Greece. In its place, the EU launched a High-Level Accession Dialogue in 2012 to help move Macedonia closer to European standards and eventual membership in the EU.

Macedonia's bid to join NATO at the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit was blocked by Greece over their name dispute. The Summit did, however, agree that an invitation to join the alliance once a mutually acceptable solution to the name dispute is reached.

Macedonia continues to demonstrate that it identifies with the EU and NATO and is making practical contributions. Just before the fall of the government in April 2008, parliament approved the dispatch of Macedonian troops to join EUFOR in Bosnia, as well as to join coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq (2003-2008).

U.S. Army 2nd Lt. Dan Silver, platoon leader from Dover, N.H., of 4th Platoon, D Company, 3rd Battalion, 172nd Infantry Regiment smiles as his Macedonian counterpart Capt. Burche Turturov, the commander of the Macedonian Ranger Platoon from Skopje, Macedonia, shakes hands with an Afghan National Army soldier during a patrol, June 5. The Macedonians are embedded with the D Company Soldiers of the Vermont National Guard as part of their state Partnership for Peace Program. They are the first state partnership involved in the program to embed and run combat operations. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Whitney Hughes, Combined Joint Task Force - 82 PAO)
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH)

Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) is a former republic of Yugoslavia. This chapter contains the following sections on Bosnia-Herzegovina:

- Key information
- Historical background
## Key information

### Geography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>19,740 square miles. Internally divided between the joint Bosniak/Croat Federation (about 51% of the territory) and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (about 49% of the territory). The Brcko district, a neutral self-governing unit under BiH sovereignty, and formally a part of both BiH entities, totals 173 square miles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>Coal, iron ore, bauxite, copper, lead, zinc, chromate, cobalt, manganese, nickel, clay, gypsum, salt, sand, timber, hydropower</td>
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</table>

### People

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>3.792 million total in BiH, with 2.372 million in the Federation, 1.327 million in the Republika Srpska, and 93 thousand in the Brcko district, according to the preliminary results of the 2013 census.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
<td>Further details from the 2013 census will not be released until 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions</td>
<td>Further details from the 2013 census will not be released until 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>The three main peoples used to all speak dialects of a single language called Serbo-Croatian, but language has been politicized and now three languages, Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian exist, all largely mutually intelligible.</td>
</tr>
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### Government

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<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System of government</td>
<td>Consociational democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Presidency</td>
<td>Bakir Izetbegović, Zeljko Komsic and Nebojsa Radmanovic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>The Konvertible Mark (KM) is fixed at the rate of the Euro and is used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>throughout BiH.</td>
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Historical background

This section provides historical background on Bosnia-Herzegovina.
During the Tito era

Bosnia, with its population of Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosniaks, was unique among Yugoslavia's republics in not having a single dominant majority people, or narod. Muslims were only recognized as a narod in the 1974 constitution: used as a national category, the term did not necessarily denote strong religious conviction.

Multiparty elections 1990

In multiparty elections in November 1990, ethnically based parties won 86% of the Bosnian Assembly's 240 seats. The two largest parties were the primarily Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA) with 86 seats, and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), with 72 seats.

SDA had two prominent leaders: Fikret Abdić, a successful businessman who had strong regional support around Bihac, and the Sarajevan Alija Izetbegović, who had served a prison sentence for promoting Islamic views in the 1980s. Izetbegovic won the presidency.
Serbian and Croatian planning to divide up the Republic

Many Serbs and Croats appealed to their co-nationals in Bosnia, with the goal of dividing up the Republic. Responding to the threat, President Izetbegović supported an internationally brokered model of “cantonization” to satisfy the overlapping claims to self-determination made by the republic’s different populations. Many parts of the country, though, were already under the control of the Yugoslav National Army, and many Bosnian Serbs resisted the creation of an international frontier between themselves and Serbia.

Referenda held in Serbian areas between November 1991 and January 1992 expressed a majority preference to be excluded from a sovereign, independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. As that outcome drew nearer, given the massive support expressed by Bosniaks and Croats in a referendum in February 1992, Bosnian Serb political leaders declared their own constitution. Radovan Karadžić became the first president of the Bosnian Serb entity, Republika Srpska.

Escalating violent incidents came to a head on April 6, 1992, when the European Community recognized Bosnia, and Serbian gunmen killed participants in a peace demonstration in Sarajevo.
Bosnian Serb Leader Radovan Karadzic during the war in Bosnia Herzegovina at a press-conference in Banja Luka, Bosnia Herzegovina, September 1995. (courtesy of Theo Fruend)
The Bosnian war: 1992-1995

According to the Sarajevo-based non-governmental Research and Documentation Center, at least 97,000 civilians and soldiers were killed during the war. In addition, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated over 2.7 million refugees, internally displaced and war-affected persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The levels of savagery, which included rape as a weapon and the murder of civilians or surrendered enemies, generated enormous hate, fear and mistrust.

 Territory
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was over territory, and went through several phases. The Bosnian government, in which Muslims, Serbs and Croats participated, originally fought a largely defensive battle to try and retain enough land to make a viable state. They had considerable support in cities, where the multi-ethnic ideal was strongest.

Serb forces sought to link Serb areas in Bosnia
The Bosnian Serbs, with considerable support from the Yugoslav National Army, sought to establish complete control in areas where they were in the majority, as well as a large part of the countryside. Their two political centers were Pale and Banja Luka. They also laid siege to urban centers that supported the government, including Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Tuzla.

Serb forces also sought to secure communications between Serbia and enclaves in the Krajina, which is why the town of Brcko was so important to them, as a corridor between the two Serb-dominated areas in Bosnia. Serbs were also the local majority in the extreme South of the country, around the city of Trebinje.

Many Croats aligned with Zagreb
While many Bosnian Croats supported the Bosnian government, others saw their futures with Croatia. The latter were particularly strong in western Herzegovina, under the leadership of Mate Boban, where their goal was control of the city of Mostar and eventual inclusion in a "Greater Croatia."

Separatist Croats and Serbs count on help from neighboring countries
Separatist Croats and Serbs could count on logistic help from neighboring countries: the Bosnian government was isolated, and militarily at a disadvantage. Its main asset was the continuing support of many Bosnians of all ethnic groups, and international recognition.

Bosnian government hoped for internationally enforced peace settlement
In the first months of the war, the Bosnian government pinned its hopes on surviving until an internationally-enforced peace settlement was reached.

In the region of Bihac, Fikret Abdic pursued a policy of accommodation with Croat and Serb forces, eventually declaring regional autonomy and signing a separate peace in 1992.
Disunity of international community

During 1992-1995, a United Nations peacekeeping mission (UNPROFOR) was deployed, but under a mandate that restricted soldiers’ capacity to deter violence.

Soldiers of the British battalion monitor the movement of Bosnian Muslims at a United Nations checkpoint. 01 May 1994 Stari Vitez, Bosnia and Herzegovina (UN/John Isaac)

Bosnian separatists saw no reason to cease military action

The result was that Bosnian Serb and Croatian nationalist militants each saw no reason to cease military action. In July 1992, Boban followed the Serbian lead by declaring autonomy in Herceg-Bosna. By early 1993, Croat and Bosnian government forces were in direct conflict.

Bosnian-Croatian Federation

The Bosnian Army launched successful attacks in central Bosnia against the Serbs. Its priority, though, was to re-establish control over Abdic's Bihac fiefdom, which was achieved in August 1994. Abdic and over 20,000 Bosniak supporters fled to Croatia. International intervention stepped up after February 6, 1994, when a mortar shell killed 68 civilians and wounded 200 in Sarajevo's marketplace, prompting action to enforce the removal of Bosnian Serb artillery from around Sarajevo. In a determined and internationally driven effort to equalize military capacity, a Bosnian-Croatian Federation was formed.

Bosnian Serb military seeks to eliminate UN "safe havens"

Recognition that the tide had turned prompted the Bosnian Serb military to launch a new assault in 1995 to eliminate UN-supported "safe havens" in Bosnia. Among these was Srebrenica, where UN peacekeepers failed to prevent Serb forces led by General Mladic from killing over 8,000 Bosniak civilians, mainly men and boys, on July 11-12, 1995 after the fall of the town.
The blue dot on the map represents the Srebrenica safe area 1994.

Srebrenica sparks international action
Together with renewed Serb paramilitary "ethnic cleansing" in Western Bosnia, the outrage in Srebrenica sparked more resolute international action.

Srebrenica exhumation programme, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996,(Courtesy of the ICTY)

Shift in military situation leads to negotiated end to the war
NATO air strikes against Serbian artillery and command structures began in August, and a Bosnian Army offensive in Western Bosnia recaptured significant territory and reached within 12 kilometers of Banja Luka, the Bosnian Serb capital. The shift in the military balance compelled the Serb leadership to seek a negotiated end to the war, to avoid losing even more of the territory it had seized.
The Dayton Peace Accords, 1995

Representatives of the three sides in the conflict met in Dayton, Ohio and initialed the Dayton Agreement on November 21, 1995. The agreement was formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.

Under UN war crimes indictment, Bosnian Serb leaders Karadžić and Mladić could not participate, and so Serbian President Milosević represented the Bosnian Serbs, while Tudjman represented the Bosnian Croats, and Izetbegović the Muslim-led Bosnian government. Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. State Department Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Carl Bildt, a former Swedish Prime Minister, representing the EU, were co-chairs.

The Dayton Agreement created a Bosnian state composed of two distinct entities: the Federation and the Republika Srpska. By creating three different electorates along ethnic lines—Serb, Croat, and Bosniak—the constitution aimed to protect each group against domination by the others, or by the central government. Yet in so doing it created a system in which political success depended on appealing to one’s “own” ethnic group and thus continuation of the power of the ethnically-based parties that began the war.

The agreement included the right of return of refugees and displaced persons, but did not institute mechanisms for their return. Instead, the constitution created separate armed forces, and a two-tier system of government with multiple checks and balances that provided easy ways to block the business of government.
System of transitional administration

Overlaid on this was a system of transitional administration in which the international community is represented by an Office of the High Representative (OHR), who has sweeping powers -- which are now rarely used. The Office issues regular press releases at http://www.ohr.int/.

NATO forces led a stabilization force, or SFOR. It was originally called IFOR, or Intervention Force. NATO handed over its military role in Bosnia to the EU-led European Force (EUFOR) Althea in 2004.

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently involved in arms control, security sector reform, war crimes processing, the fight against trafficking in human beings, political and education reform, gender equality, programs to support good governance, media reform, and civil society and human rights initiatives. Career U.S. diplomat Fletcher Burton became Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2011.

The UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina focused on reforming the various police forces which had been organized on an ethnic war-time footing, into smaller professional multi-ethnic forces, each with human rights training, working in accountable structures, with modern police equipment. The Mission also coordinated the work of UN organizations in the country. The UN Mission’s mandate ended in 2002, and the EU Police Mission took on its police-monitoring role.
Fletcher Burton heads the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCE)

Dayton Accords
The Dayton Accords ended the war, but also established a structure of government with significant flaws:

- The stress given to the ethnic collectivities as electoral and political units weakens central government.
- Foreign rule and international economic support narrow people's horizons further, reducing incentive and opportunity to build political and business ties with other groups.
- Local officials and populations often obstruct the return of refugees and displaced persons.

OHR actions to try and "fix" problems, which have included the removal from politics of elected leaders categorized as extremists or as uncooperative, have often increased local feelings of disempowerment. Rather than building a common state, many have preferred to focus on their own ethnic enclave.
Politics since Dayton

Ethnic nationalist parties thrived after first post-Dayton elections in 1996, presenting victories to the SDS in the Republika Srpska, SDA among Bosniaks, and HDZ among Croats in the Federation. Social Democratic opposition parties were again fragmented in elections in 1998. Republika Srpska elected a hard-line nationalist, Nikola Poplašen, for president.

International efforts shape the political landscape

In 1999, with considerable international support, a single Social Democratic Party (SDP) was formed. In March, the High Representative fired Poplašen.

Political shift among Bosniaks temporary

In the municipal and general elections in 2000, the new SDP won around the same share of the vote as the SDA in the Federation. SDP leader Zlatko Lagumdžija became Foreign Minister, and in July, Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When SDA leader Izetbegović stepped down from the presidency in October 2000, international observers hoped Bosniaks would shift from nationalism to a multicultural vision. However, the 2002 general elections saw the SDA regain its leading position among Bosniak voters. Turnout was low, and the SDA capitalized on popular dissatisfaction with the incumbent SDP’s attempts at reform.

Nationalism among Bosnia’s Croats and Serbs

In the 2000 elections the SDS and HDZ returned to power. Among followers of both parties, opposition to Dayton ran high. The HDZ organized a referendum on Croat status in the Federation, despite UN warnings that this was illegal. In 2001, furthering the same policy, HDZ
leader Jelavic and member of Bosnia's tripartite presidency convened a Croat assembly in Mostar and declared regional autonomy. The High Representative immediately dismissed him from office.

2002 first locally-run elections
The SDS and HDZ defeated their non-nationalist rivals again in the 2002 general elections. These were the first post-Dayton elections not organized by the OSCE. Despite the persistent electoral power of divisive nationalism and low voter turnout, the election process was considered free, fair and successful.

2004 local elections
Nationalist sentiment in Bosnian politics remained strong in the 2004 local elections. Voters opted for one of the three main nationalist parties in 99 out of 122 municipalities.

2006 elections
The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) emerged as the most powerful political party in Republika Srpska, while the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SzBiH) emerged as the winner within the Federation. The main nationalist parties – the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Croat Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ), and the mostly Bosnian Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA) – saw their electoral support decline.

2008 local elections
The nationalist parties again won local elections in 2008. Low voter-turnout in the urban areas, considered more supportive of the multi-ethnic parties, contributed to this outcome.

2010 elections
The 2010 presidential and parliamentary were the second to be entirely administered by BiH authorities. The OSCE and the Council of Europe monitors assessed the elections in line with commitments and international standards for democratic elections, although certain areas required further action. The Presidium election resulted in wins for Željko Komšić (Croat) from the SDP, Bakir Izetbegović (Bosniak) from the SDA, and Nebojša Radmanović (Serb) from the SNDP. In the House of Representatives, the SDP emerged as the leading party in BiH. The SNSD emerged as the winner in the Republika Srpska.

The election produced a divided political landscape without a coalition of a parliamentary majority. An agreement was finally reached on 28 December 2011 between the six political parties: the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ), the Croatian Democratic Union 1990, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD). Vjekoslav Bevanda, a Bosnian Croat, became Prime Minister.
BiH joined the Council of Europe in 2002.

EU

BiH and the EU began talks on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2005. U.S.-hosted talks with Bosnian leaders in Washington in 2007 failed to achieve agreement on constitutional reform and unification of Bosnia’s police forces. The U.S. proposal for reduction of
regional powers gained Bosniak agreement, but Bosnian Serb leaders rejected any change in existing constitutional arrangements.

In April 2008, Bosnia’s Parliament adopted police reform legislation that satisfied watered-down EU conditions for signing the SAA. The EU accepted reforms involving more effectiveness, financing from a joint budget, and less political influence. BiH signed the SAA in June 2008. The SAA was ratified in 2010, but it is still not in force. EU trade relations with BiH are governed by the Interim Agreement.

**NATO**

BiH joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 2006.

The 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit welcomed BiH’s decision to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan and invited it to begin an intensified dialogue on the range of issues relating to membership.

In 2010, NATO invited BiH to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) with one important condition: the first Annual National Program under the MAP would only be accepted once immovable defense property was registered as BiH state property, for use by the country’s defense ministry.

**The 1992-95 Bosnian war and the search for justice**

**ICJ Ruling on BiH complaint of genocide**

The International Court of Justice ruled in 2007 that Serbia (as the successor to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) had not committed genocide during the Bosnia war, responding to charges first made by BiH in 1993. The ICJ found that Serbia did violate its obligation to prevent genocide at Srebrenica, and its obligation to transfer Mladić to the Hague Tribunal. The ICJ added that Serbia should transfer wanted individuals to the Tribunal. The Court stated that its findings constituted appropriate satisfaction, and did not provide for any compensation to BiH.

**Karadžić and Mladić arrested**

Former Bosnian Serb president Karadžić, wanted by the Hague Tribunal for genocide, was arrested by Serbian authorities in Belgrade in 2008 and quickly transferred to The Hague for trial. General Mladić, also wanted for genocide, was arrested in Serbia in 2011 and extradited to The Hague for trial.
Hague Court on Croat actions during the 1992-95 war
"Joint criminal enterprise" engaged in ethnic cleansing

The Hague Tribunal convicted six former Bosnian Croats for murder and other serious crimes during the 1992-95 Bosnian war, noting that the crimes were part of an ethnic cleansing campaign in Bosnia planned and coordinated by the neighboring state of Croatia. The Court's judgment said that then Croatian President Tudjman and defense Minister Susko, both now dead, had engaged in a joint criminal enterprise to force Muslims out of mixed areas of western Bosnia, and leave them populated by Croats.

**OSCE online war crimes case map**

The OSCE Mission in BiH has launched an [online case map](https://www.osce.org/biha/online-case-map) of war crimes verdicts in Bosnia at the state, entity and Brčko District levels. Since 2003, 140 war crimes cases have been completed, with another 1,200 to be processed.

*A screenshot of the interactive War Crimes Case Map, developed by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. (OSCE)*
Challenges and pressures

The Dayton Agreement established a rotating presidency elected by the country's Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. While the Accords created a power-sharing agreement among ethnic groups it is also an unstable structure with a new president every eight months. Critics of the arrangement have said that it was never meant to be permanent, but thus far any attempt for constitutional reform has ended in disagreement. Discussions have been ongoing since 2005, concerning a unified presidency, reduction of bureaucracy, and other critical points that are conditions for EU membership.

The Chairman of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers and the UK's Minister of Foreign Affairs set a June 2012 deadline for the BiH to comply with a 2009 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the case of Sejdic-Finci vs. BiH. The ECHR found the Bosnian Constitution in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, because the presidency and the upper chamber of parliament – the House of the People – were only open to Serbs from the Republika Srpska and Bosniaks and Croats from the Federation, thus excluding minorities (such as Roma or Jews) and members of the dominant nation from the ‘wrong’ entity. BiH had to adjust its constitution so that no individual is barred from standing for political office on the basis of national or ethnic origin. Although the Bosnian parliament appointed a commission in 2011 with a mandate to amend the constitution, the commission’s mandate ran out in March 2012 without any action being taken. Until Bosnia's three main ethnic groups are able to agree on a way to implement the ECHR ruling, there will be no way BiH will be able to apply to become a member of the EU.

BiH's need for Bosniaks and Serbs to work together not only impacts on the longer range goal of EU membership, but also Bosnia's short term interests. Once Croatia joins the EU in July 2013, for example, BiH will need to have an agreed authority to certify that its producers meet EU health and veterinary standards in order to continue to export to its EU neighbors. Bosniaks insist that the BiH state to do the job, while Serbs insist that authorities in the two entities have the responsibility. Unless they can find a solution, Bosnian farmers will soon lose this export market.

Sarajevo experienced its largest demonstration in years as protestors blockaded parliament on June 6, 2013 over the government's inability to amend laws needed to continue issuing identification numbers. For months, newborns had been unable to get the ID numbers necessary to receive health care, passports or other government services. Police finally cleared the area the next day and enabled those inside parliament to leave. Some Bosnian Serb leaders interpreted the blockade as aimed at them and warned they would have to reconsider participation in Sarajevo-based institutions (i.e., in a city which is overwhelmingly Bosniak).

Protests lead to civil unrest in 2014

Civil unrest stemming from factory closures, corrupt privatization and unemployment in Tuzla broke out in February 2014, spreading to over 20 cities and towns in the Federation. Protests emphasized the failure of the political system and its elites to respond to the needs of citizens. Government buildings were burned in Sarajevo (including the Presidency building) and elsewhere, and hundreds were injured in clashes between police and protestors. As a result, the governments of several cantons resigned and citizens' assemblies were formed in Sarajevo, Tuzla and Mostar.
EU Enlargement Commissioner Fule met with Bosnian leaders and a delegation of protestors, and urged Bosnian leaders to address the need for constitutional reform. Many of the protestors had focused on the need to change the complex, multi-layered system established by the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Protests in Zenica on 10 February 2014 (Wikimedia Commons)

**Violent crime and illicit business**

Crime and illicit business continue to threaten institution building. Smuggling networks created during the war continue to function, and their leaders and members are prepared to use extreme means to defend their livelihoods. One example was the car bomb assassination of HDZ member and Federation deputy minister Jozo Leutar in Sarajevo in March 1999. Six Bosnian Croats were acquitted of Leutar’s murder in 2002 due to lack of evidence.

**Politician profiteering, cronyism, and graft**

There remains a profound lack of trust, not only between people of different ethnic backgrounds, but between people and political elites. Politicians are widely believed to have amassed personal fortunes from profiteering, cronyism, and graft.

Republika Srpska Prime Minister Dodik and several other high-ranking RS officials were charged with fraud in 2009. In 2011, the RS special prosecutor’s office of dropped all corruption charges against them.

In 2012 Srdjan Ljubojevic, general manager of the public enterprise Republika Srpska Forests, was arrested for corruption. He was charged with taking a 5,000-euro bribe to ensure payment to an audit company for a 60,000-euro debt that his company owed. Police supplied marked bills for the bribe, which were found in Ljubojevic’s office.

In April 2013, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina President Zivko Budimir was arrested on charges of accepting bribes in exchange for granting pardons.

In May 2013, 57 persons were charged with involvement in organized crime and election fraud.
Media reported that these charges involved 2010 vote-buying for the People’s Party Working for Betterment. The most senior person charged was Jerko Ivanovic-Lijanovic, Federation vice president and entity minister of agriculture.

Refugee return and reintegration

In 2007, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that over a million refugees and internally displaced persons had returned to BiH, and of this number 466,000 minority refugees and internally displaced persons had returned to their places of origin.

International presence a source of income and resentment

The ongoing international presence in the country is both a source of income and resentment. The High Representative has the responsibility to ensure the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and peace in BiH. His “Bonn powers,” giving him the authority to interfere in the political process, on which laws are implemented and whether to remove elected officials from office if their views and policies contravene international expectations, are perceived by some as subverting the democratic process, and unintentionally giving local politicians the freedom to engage in irresponsible rhetoric. Conversely, those politicians that cooperate with the international community find themselves vulnerable to charges of treason or subjection.

The Office of the High Representative was to have been phased out in 2007, replaced with a less powerful EU Special Representative. But tensions in BiH and in the region led the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board to delay closing the OHR indefinitely until a set of positive benchmarks has been fulfilled.

Meanwhile, current EUFOR Althea military forces based in BiH total about 600.
From 30th August 2013, soldiers from the European Reserve Forces of Slovakia and Austria will be arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina to conduct integration training with the EUFOR Multi-national battalion and also practice Peace Support Operations with the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)

**Challenging role for High Representative**

Slovakian diplomat Miroslav Lajčak resigned as High Representative and EU Special Representative in 2009, unhappy at the lack of U.S. and EU support for the use of the High Representative’s powers to intervene in the running of the country.

Austrian diplomat Valentin Inzko was appointed High Representative in March 2009. He has had considerable experience working in the Balkans, including as Austrian Ambassador to Bosnia after the 1992-95 War.
CHAPTER 6

Serbia

Serbia is a former republic of Yugoslavia. This chapter contains the following sections:

- Historical background
- OSCE involvement
- Recent developments
# Key information

## Geography

<table>
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<th>Item</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Serbia proper: 21,600 square miles (Roughly equal to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia), and Vojvodina: 8,300 square miles</td>
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## People

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<td>Ethnic groups</td>
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## Government

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<td>Parliamentary republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of state</td>
<td>Tomislav Nikolić</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>The currency is the Dinar. The Euro is widely accepted, though not everywhere.</td>
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Introduction

Serbia was the largest single republic of the former Yugoslavia, and included the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The two provinces received autonomy in 1974, but self governance was limited in 1990. Yugoslavia split along ethnic lines in 1991. Throughout the 1990’s Serbia unsuccessfully waged war to bring ethnic Serb-populated territories under its control. Kosovo came under international administration after the 1999 war, and declared independence in 2008. Montenegro ended its loose union with Serbia in 2006.
Contemporary Serbia

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia established after WWII

A Federal Republic was established under Tito's communist rule in 1945. Macedonians and Montenegrins were recognized as distinct nations. While Serbs still constituted the largest single national group, they were divided between republics with around 2 million living in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Serbian nationalism was kept in check, as was nationalism in other Republics, by the communist authorities.

1974-1986

As regional autonomy became a fact of life in the Yugoslav system, especially after the 1974 constitution came into force, Serbian leaders and intellectuals developed two grievances.

• First, it appeared that Kosovo and Vojvodina were approaching de facto Republic status, thus threatening to "rob" Serbia of nearly 30% of its territory.

• Second, the move toward greater autonomy for the existing Republics put the rights of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia at risk.

Milošević

More than any other Republic, Serbia of the 1990s was defined by the actions of its leader. Slobodan Milošević was a nationalist, but his long political career was more characterized by opportunism. Moreover, Serb nationalist dreams to build a "Greater Serbia" for all Serbs and control the symbolic heartland of Kosovo were completely in tatters by the end of Milosovic's time in power. Additionally, the country's economy had been crippled, and its international status reduced to that of pariah.

Milošević addressing the Serb National Assembly. (Courtesy of
Milošević’s rise

When he became Serbian Communist Party head in 1987, other party leaders believed he would be easily controlled. Many consider his visit to the Kosovo Polje in 1989, a turning point. Milošević gave a speech recalling the six hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, which served to electrify Serbian national sentiment. His party won the first Serbian multi-party elections with less than 50% of the popular vote, but benefited from an electoral system which gave it 194 of 250 seats.

In the face of demonstrations in Belgrade in 1991 against state control of the media, Milošević called in the Yugoslav Army to suppress the protest. In elections in December 1992, his party received less than 30% of the vote, and only 101 seats. He retained power by forming an alliance with Vojislav Šešelj’s Serbian Radical Party (SRS). Capitalizing on the Serb perception that Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia were threatened, the party gained popularity by actively aiding Serb military campaigns in those Republics. Milošević himself became President of Serbia, a position he occupied until 1997.
Seselj speech during the 1990s (YouTube)
Domestic resistance and state oppression

Sanctions implemented and later lifted

Serbia and Montenegro were placed under sanctions by the international community for their involvement in the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia.

If in 1992-3 Western leaders wanted to oust Milošević, by 1994 they appeared invested in his survival. He was seen as the figure that could deliver peace by controlling local Serbian leaders and in 1995, at Dayton, he did just that. Sanctions against Serbia were ended in 1995.

Opposition parties

Milošević faced significant Serb opposition at home. The three opposition democratic parties organized a unity coalition called Zajedno prior to the 1996 municipal elections.

The opposition to Milosovic expressed itself through the news magazine Vreme, the radio station B92, the anti-war group Women in Black, and by widespread draft avoidance. While struggling against the powerful state apparatus, the opposition also had to overcome public apathy. They were also hampered by the boycott of the Serbian elections by Kosovo Albanians, which immediately yielded seats either to the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) or more extremist nationalist parties elected by Kosovo's Serbs.

Municipal elections in 1996

Opposition supporters in Belgrade and several large urban centers outvoted Milošević’s Socialist Party, and claimed victory in the local elections. Milošević blocked confirmation of the results, prompting three months of peaceful protest before he gave way, and opposition parties took control of fourteen cities. Zoran Đinđić, head of the Democratic Party, became mayor of Belgrade.
Presidential and parliamentary elections in 1997

Milošević, having served two terms as President of Serbia could not stand again, and so ran for the Presidency of Yugoslavia -- previously a position with little power. His selection resulted in increased Montenegrin nervousness over Serbian domination of the Yugoslav federation. Meanwhile, in the run up to the elections the opposition coalition fell apart. Rivalry between leading opposition figures over who would run for the Presidency as the coalition’s candidate resulted in a Democratic Party boycott of the elections.

Šešelj was defeated in the final round by the SPS’ Milan Milutinović’s. SPS formed a leftist coalition with Yugoslav Left (JUL), headed by Milosevic’s wife Mira Marković, which won 110 seats in the Assembly, while Seselj’s SRS won 82 seats, and Vuk Drašković’s Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) won 45. A government was formed when SPS formed a coalition with Šešelj’s SRS, which united the forces of socialism and nationalism.
CHAPTER 6

Serbia

Vuc Draskovic (courtesy of Mariusz Kubic)
Consequences of Kosovo

Electoral success of SRS due to Kosovo situation

Part of the electoral success of Seselji’s SRS can be linked to the violent struggle against Serb rule by the Kosovo Liberation Army, (KLA) in 1996. Fears of Albanian secession in Kosovo and stories of the victimization of Serbs were central to the first-wave of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s. In the 1990s after Dayton, it appeared to many Serbs, with access only to state-controlled media, that those fears were being realized.

Guerrillas in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). (AP/Wide World Photos)
The short-lived Kosovo Verification Mission

As the situation in Kosovo continued to deteriorate, the OSCE concluded an October 1998 agreement with Yugoslavia under which a Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) would be deployed, primarily to verify a ceasefire accepted by all parties. The KVM was slow to deploy and reached 1,500 international staff on the ground by February 1999, only part of its authorized strength. It was never able to carry out the full range of tasks allotted to it. Ceasefire violations continued and OSCE CiO/Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek withdrew the KVM in March 1999.

Milošević rejects deal at Rambouillet Conference

Meanwhile, talks to defuse the Kosovo conflict were held at the Rambouillet Conference in January 1999. Milošević refused to accept a NATO-drafted agreement, which would have placed NATO troops on the ground in Kosovo. The U.S., UK and Albanian delegations signed the agreement, the Yugoslav and Russian delegations refused to do so. Yugoslav state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo eventually prompted NATO to launch an air campaign against Serbia and Montenegro in March 1999.

1999 Kosovo War

NATO’s bombing campaign lasted from March to June 1999. Targets ranged from Serbia to Kosovo. Few attacks were made against targets in Montenegro, to avoid undercutting the position of its anti-Milosovic prime minister, Milo Đukanović.

NATO Secretary General Robertson estimated that about 500 civilians were killed in the
bombing. Serbian authorities claimed the total was higher. The bombings, including damage in
downtown Belgrade, left a residue of public animosity to NATO.

Yugoslavian Army General Headquarters building in Belgrade
damaged during NATO bombing. Photo taken in August,
2005. (Tadija)
Regime repression intensifies

The Milošević régime intensified pressure against its domestic enemies, which contributed to the increasing criminalization of the state and public life. The harassment and attempts to control radio stations and media outlets like B92 increased. In April 1999, prominent opposition journalist and publisher Slavko Ćuruvija was murdered and an attempt was made on Vuk Drašković's life in October. Former allies of the regime were also killed, including the general secretary of JUL and the paramilitary leader Arkan in January 2000. Some of the killings served to eliminate potential witnesses to Milošević’s past actions.

(The Serbian government initiated a journalist-governmental mixed commission in 2013 to assess the progress of investigations into the killings of Serbian journalists during the Milošević period. Two former state security officials long suspected to have been involved in Ćuruvija's murder were arrested for the crime in Belgrade in January 2014.)

After the war

The Kosovo war ended with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and paramilitaries from the province. Over two hundred thousand Serbian civilians also left their homes.

Serbia's pariah status continued while Milošević remained in power. International financial support for free media and the political opposition reached Serbia, along with promises of further aid for reconstruction on the condition that a democratic government would be elected.

October 2000 election for Federal Presidency

In the meantime, mafia-type killings and assassinations became almost commonplace. A new opposition coalition was formed, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, which this time was able to agree on a single candidate for the Federal Presidency. Milošević was seeking the same position for a second term.

Koštunica wins

Milošević’s opponent was Vojislav Koštunica, a nationalist seen as free of corruption. Drawing on support from the coalition and OTPOR, an anti-Milošević student-led organization, Koštunica took a first round win in the October 2000 election. Milošević disputed the results, but opposition protests were well organized and widespread, and the security forces did not resort to force to quell them. Milošević conceded defeat.
Democratic Opposition of Serbia wins parliamentary elections

In Serbian parliamentary elections in December 2000 the DOS won 176 out of 250 seats, and Đinđić became Prime Minister of Serbia. The Socialist Party of Serbia kept 37 seats, Šešelj’s SRS 23, and Arkan’s old party, the Party of Serbian Unity, 14.

Milošević extradited to The Hague

On 28 June 2001, the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Milošević was extradited to the Hague Tribunal to face trial. Immediately afterwards, an international donor’s conference pledged over a billion dollars to Serbian reconstruction, and Yugoslavia was readmitted to international organizations. Subsequently, Serbian police filed charges against Milošević for involvement in the murder of his former mentor, Ivan Stambolić, in 2000. (Milošević died in The Hague in March 2006 during his drawn-out war crimes trial.)
Anti-Milošević coalition splinters
The decision to send Milošević to The Hague divided the Serbian public - and the government coalition. Infighting between Koštunica’s and Đindić’s parties worsened. In June 2002, Koštunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) withdrew from the Serbian government and parliament after the Đindić-led Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) replaced 21 DSS members for boycotting assembly meetings.

Koštunica’s position was further weakened when Serbia-Montenegro’s new constitution eliminated his position. He sought election as President of Serbia in October 2002. Although he won a majority of the votes cast, a low turnout resulted in the election being declared invalid. The same non-result was reached in December 2002, and in March 2003 Koštunica stepped down from office and became a private citizen.

Zoran Đinđić assassinated
That same month Đindić was assassinated in Belgrade by a group led by Milorad “Legija” Ulemek the head of Serbian Security Service’s Special Operations Unit. Ulemek was captured in 2004 and convicted of the murders of former President Stambolic, activists from Vuk Drašković’s party, and the murder of Đindić. A state of emergency was declared and security forces conducted widespread arrests of organized crime gang members, who were believed to have been involved in the assassination. Đindić’s successor Zoran Živković vowed to continue his predecessor’s policy of pursuing integration with Europe.

After Đindić’s death, the Serbian government faced additional problems. Miroljub Labus, who had contested presidential elections against Koštunica and his G17 Plus party, left the DOS coalition in July 2003, accusing the government of playing politics in its removal of the G17 Plus Vice President Mladjan Dinkić from his post of Governor of the National Bank.

The funeral of Prime Minister Zoran Đindić (Serbian government website)
**Struggle for Serbia’s political direction**

Serbian presidential elections held in November 2003 again failed to attract the necessary minimum 50% of registered voters to the polls. The 39% who did go to the polls gave the SRS’ **Tomislav Nikolić** 46.9% of the vote, while 36% went to **Dragoljub Mićunović** from the fragmenting DOS coalition.

Parliamentary elections scheduled for 2004 were brought forward to December 2003. In a low turnout, **Vojislav Šešelj**’s SRS won 82 seats, **Vojislav Koštunica’s** DSS 53 seats, G17 plus 34 seats, the Democratic Party (DS) 37 seats, and Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM)/New Serbia(NS) 22 seats. The reform-oriented parties could have formed a coalition and achieved a majority in the 250-seat house, if not for the breakup of DOS, personal rivalries, and the DS’s own divided leadership.

Koštunica eventually formed a minority coalition without the participation of DS or SRS, but including G17 plus, SRM-New Serbia, and Milosevic’s Socialist Party.

In the 2004 Presidential elections, the DS’ **Boris Tadić** defeated the SRS’ **Tomislav Nikolić**. Tadić took 54% of the vote to Nikolić’s 45% in the second round. Nikolić had come in first in the initial vote, when a number of reformist candidates stood: in the second round, all transferred their support to Tadić, as did Koštunica, thus temporarily suspending the infighting between DSS and DS.

The 2004 local elections were marked by low turnout (35%) and struggles between Tadić’s DS and Nikolić’s SRS. The elections confirmed the decline of Koštunica’s DSS, and the short-lived rise of **Bogoljub Karić**. A businessman and former Milošević associate, Karić had been a presidential candidate in 2004 and head of the Serbian Strength Movement, a potential third force in Serbian politics. He fled to Russia in 2006 after being charged with embezzling Serbian state funds.
Tomislav Nikolić (Serbian presidential website)

Šešelj campaign poster (Courtesy of Micki)
2006 constitutional referendum
Low voter turnout (54% of voters) for the 2006 Constitutional referendum confirmed public disillusionment with politics. The constitution was supported by 52.3% of registered voters. The new constitution asserted Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo and was intended to prevent any future recognition of an independent Kosovo.

2007 parliamentary elections
Nikolić’s SRS came in first with 28.32% of the vote, Tadić’s DS in second place with 22.67%, and Koštunica’s DSS in coalition with New Serbia won third place with 16.38%. Other parties passing the 5% threshold were G17 Plus with 6.79%, the Socialist Party with 5.64%. Liberal Democrats coalition with 5.33% led by former Democratic Party leader and Deputy Prime Minister Cedomir Jovanović, and several small ethnic parties. Voter turnout was 60%, somewhat greater than recent elections. Neither Draskovic’s Serbian Renewal Movement nor Karić’s Serbian Strength Movement passed the threshold. The OSCE termed the elections free and fair, and in line with OSCE commitments and Council of Europe standards.
Democratic bloc government short-lived

DS, DSS-NS and G17 formed a government with a compromise coalition agreement stating that: Kosovo is Serbia, Serbia with Kosovo as one will enter the EU, continuing cooperation with The Hague Tribunal, and fighting against organized crime and corruption.

كوشنيچا remained as prime minister and compromised his control over the security apparatus. President Tadić headed a national security council with a mandate to coordinate the security agencies. DSS retained the Interior ministry, and DS and DSS agreed to joint administration of the State Security Agency (BIA). DS held a majority of portfolios in the government, including a vice president for European integration, foreign affairs, and defense. DSS gained a new ministry for Kosovo and Metohija.

2008 presidential elections

The SRS’ Nikolić and the DS’ incumbent President Tadić again faced each other. Nikolić and Tadić won 39.99% and 35.39 % of the vote respectively in a first round in January, but neither won the necessary absolute majority. Tadić won the run-off held in February with 51.61 % of the vote. كوشنيچا’s DSS supported New Serbia leader Velimir Ilić who came in third with 7.43 % of the vote. DSS’ failure to support Tadić further damaged their ability to work together.
DS forms coalition with the Socialists

After first negotiating with the Radicals (SRS) and Democratic Party (Serbia) (DSS)-New Serbia (NS) on a nationalist-right wing coalition, the Socialists joined a Democratic Party of Serbia (DS)-led coalition. The DS’ Mirko Cvetković became prime minister, the DS took the foreign affairs and security portfolios, including the ministry of Kosovo and Metohija, and the Socialists took the deputy prime minister, interior, infrastructure and energy portfolios. The LDP agreed to support the government from outside the coalition.

Although the SRS and DSS-NS had been pushed into the opposition, the new government did not shift from the old government’s action plan opposing Kosovo independence.

Meanwhile, the SRS split into extreme nationalist and pragmatist parties. Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić headed the more pragmatic Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which adopted a European-orientation and focused on socio-economic issues and corruption.
Democratic bloc coalition collapses

By March 2008, following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the tension between Serbia’s Kosovo policy and movement towards EU integration was the last straw for the coalition. The DSS wanted to condition movement toward European integration on EU acceptance of Kosovo as part of Serbia, while DS and G17 insisted on keeping the issues of Kosovo and EU integration separate. G17 leader and Minister of Economy Dinkić’s proposal to stop paying Kosovo’s debt and Koštunica’s opposition also could not be resolved. The governing parties could no longer finesse their differences. They agreed to hold parliamentary elections together with provincial and local elections.

Tadic’s DS coalition first in 2008 parliamentary elections
The DS-led coalition came in first in the May parliamentary elections with 102 seats, followed by Nikolic’s SRS with 78 seats. Koštunica’s DSS/NS coalition with 30 seats, the Socialist–led coalition with 20 seats, and the LDP with 13 seats. Hungarian, Bosniak and Albanian ethnic minority coalitions won the remaining seven seats.

Neither Tadić’s Democrats nor the Radicals won enough seats to form a parliamentary majority without a coalition. The SPS, the party once led by Milošević but now seeking to define itself as a modern European socialist party, become the kingmaker.

The International Election Observation Mission fielded by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reported that these elections were in line with commitments for democratic elections, despite negative campaigning (threats made to senior officials and posters that could be interpreted as suggesting assassination). The elections were administered professionally and in an atmosphere of confidence.
Nikolic wins 2012 presidential election

In May, incumbent President Tadić again faced off against Nikolić in a presidential election. This time, however, Nikolić won 51.12% against Tadić’s 48.88%.

Parliamentary elections were also held. The SNS-led Get Serbia Moving coalition won 24% of the vote, closely followed by the DS-led coalition Choice for a Better Life, which received 22% of the vote.

OSCE/ODIHR fielded a limited election observation mission. Its report is available here.

Tomislav Nikolic, President of Serbia (Serbian presidential website)

Early parliamentary elections in 2014

Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and its partners were the big winners in the March 16 vote. The SNS won a landslide of 48.4% of votes cast and an absolute majority of 158 seats in parliament. Dačić’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and its partners repeated their previous performance winning 13.5% of the vote and 44 seats; the Democratic Party and its partners, now led by Dragan Đilas, won 6.04% and 19 seats; and Tadić, who had formed the New Democratic Party-Greens after losing DS internal leadership elections to Đilas, won 5.71% and 18 seats.

Jovanović ‘s Liberal Democratic Party and Koštunica’s nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) failed to pass the electoral threshold.

The campaign focused almost entirely on the economy. Vučić advocated a more liberal, market-oriented model, while Dačić called for more state intervention. Koštunica later resigned as DSS president after the failure of his Euroskeptik message.

The IEOM’s report stated that the elections offered voters a genuine choice, were conducted on a sound legal basis, and fundamental freedoms were respected throughout the campaign. Voters and representatives of political parties, alike, expressed a high degree of trust in the electoral process. Election commissions at all levels performed their duties efficiently and professionally and met legal deadlines, and the Republic Election Commission adopted decisions in sessions that were open to the media and accredited observers. The IEOM also highlighted the need for further legal reform and increased media pluralism.
A voter casting his ballot at a polling station in the city of Topola during Serbia’s parliamentary elections, 16 March 2014. (OSCE/Thomas Rymer)
Serbia's identity and its vision for the future

Montenegro opts for independence in 2006
Montenegro voters decided on Montenegro’s independence and separation from Serbia in a referendum in May 2006.

Kosovo declares independence in 2008
Although public opinion polls show Kosovo low on the list of Serbian priorities, Kosovo continues to be a key issue for Serbia’s politics. The Liberal Democrats are the only major party that publicly accepts Kosovo’s independence from Serbia.

Serbs protested Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of Independence; rioters burned part of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade.

U.S. Embassy in Belgrade attacked. (U.S. Department of State)

European integration
A majority of Serbia’s population supports EU accession. Serbia’s failure to apprehend Ratko Mladić led to suspension of Stabilization and Association (SAA) talks with the EU in 2006. Negotiations resumed a year later, one day after the arrest and delivery to the Hague Tribunal of wanted wartime Bosnian Serb General Zdravko Tolimir.

The EU signed the SAA in April 2008 as a signal that it wanted closer relations with Serbia. President Tadić, Deputy Prime Minister Delić and Foreign Minister Jeremić, all members of the Democratic Party (DS) represented Serbia at the signing. They noted that the outgoing government had initialed the agreement and had authorized Delić to sign it. Coming at the height of the parliamentary election campaign, then Prime Minister Koštunica and DSS/NS, opposed the signing, and claimed that it essentially recognized Kosovo’s independence.

The European Council stated that implementation of the SAA would occur as soon as it decided
that Serbia was fully cooperating with the Hague Tribunal. Some EU members, especially the Netherlands, insisted on this linkage.


The EU granted candidate status to Serbia in March 2012.

**EU Accession and Kosovo normalization linkage**

The EU made concrete progress on normalization between Serbia and Kosovo a main condition for Belgrade’s progress toward EU membership.

The Belgrade-Pristina dialogue started in 2011, rising in level to meetings between prime ministers and presidents.

The meetings between Prime Ministers Dacic and Thaci in April 2013, mediated by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Ashton, confronted Belgrade with an unavoidable decision on an EU package proposal to regularize the Kosovo-Serbia relationship, including powers and competencies to be granted to Kosovo’s Serbs. Belgrade's response to the EU proposal would determine Ashton's and the EU Commission's recommendation to the EU Summit meeting in June on starting accession talks with Serbia.

Dacic and Thaci initialed a 15-point First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations (text in English follows text in Albanian, from Pristina Express) on April 19, 2013. Key elements of the agreement had Belgrade giving up its parallel institutions in Kosovo, especially in the north, in return for receiving protections for the Serbs proposed in the Ahtisaari proposals. In addition, Belgrade agreed not to block Pristina's progress toward EU (and international) acceptance.

Ashton has continued to meet with Dacic and Thaci in Brussels to discuss implementation of the agreement.

The European Commission recommended to the Council of Ministers on April 22 that negotiations on EU membership begin with Serbia.
Kosovo Liaison Officer in Belgrade

Kosovo’s Liaison Officer in Belgrade, Lulzim Peci, arrive in June in accordance with the April 19 Agreement.
Lulzim Peci (Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Rapprochement with Croatia
Relations between Belgrade and Zagreb have improved in recent years. Still, Croatia has an outstanding complaint against Serbia for genocide during the 1991-95 war, filed at the International Court of Justice in 1999. Serbia filed a counter-complaint in 2010, and insists on mutual withdrawal.

NATO
NATO invited Serbia to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 2006. Serbia joined these NATO frameworks, which was accepted by Serbian public opinion. A NATO Military Liaison Office was set up in the Ministry of Defense in Belgrade. Serbia joined the PfP Planning and Review Process in 2007. NATO also completed a PfP trust fund project that removed 1.41 million anti-personnel mines from Serbian territory.
NATO was willing to offer an individual Partnership Action Plan to Serbia, but differences within the Serbian government limited further engagement with the alliance at that point. Kostunica and other DSS leaders took a public line that the West’s Kosovo policy is to detach it from Serbia and to turn it into a “NATO state.”

Serbia’s relations with NATO improved under the Tadic government in 2008, and the Serbian Army Chief of Staff visited NATO Headquarters.

In 2011, NATO’s Secretary General Rasmussen remarked that Serbia has made good progress in developing a sound basis for partnership and cooperation and it is for Serbia to decide on future cooperation with NATO. In 2012, incoming President Nikolić asserted that Serbia would never become a member of NATO.

Russia

Kosovo’s independence has tightened the relationship between Serbia and Russia, which has been its most steadfast supporter on this issue.

Underlining the deepening of ties, Serbia and Russia signed a major energy deal in January 2008. Russia’s GAZPROM received a 51% holding in the Serbian Oil Industry (NIS), in return for 400 million Euros and a commitment to invest a further 500 million Euros by 2012. In addition, the South Stream pipeline is to be built in Serbia to convey a minimum of 10 billion cubic meters of GAZPROM gas per year.

OSCE

The OSCE reestablished a mission in Belgrade in 2001, renamed the OSCE Mission to Serbia in 2006, with a focus on democratization, protection of human rights and minorities, media and development.
South Serbia

Ethnic Albanians make up a majority of the 120,000 residents of the three municipalities of Presovo, Bujanovac and Medvedja in south Serbia. Albanians launched an armed insurgency from November 2000 to May 2001 when a ceasefire was reached. The government established a Coordination Body for South Serbia to coordinate the work of the central government and local self-governing bodies.

South Serbia is challenged by lack of economic opportunities, while ethnic Albanians and Roma continue to complain of discrimination and lack of inclusion in state institutions. The increase in Serbian rhetoric over Kosovo has impacted on Albanian sensitivities in south Serbia. After a three-year absence, Albanians from southern Serbia signed an agreement in March 2009 and returned to the Coordination Body.

Numerous international organizations and NGOs, as well as embassies accredited to Belgrade, have been active in playing a helpful mediating role as well as providing development and other assistance in the area.

OSCE has a South Serbia Program Coordinator in its Mission to Serbia, resident in Bujanovac.
Serbia as international peacekeeper

Demonstrating its wish to play a positive role in international peace and security, Serbia has about 75 soldiers participating in UN peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, Congo, Cyprus, Liberia and Ivory Coast, as well as in the EU training mission in Uganda and EU anti-piracy naval mission off Somalia.
Montenegro

Montenegro is a former republic of Yugoslavia. This chapter contains the following:

• Key information
• Contemporary Montenegro
• Politics in Montenegro
• Other issues
Key information

Geography

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<tr>
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<td>Orthodox 70%, Muslim 15%</td>
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Government

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<td>Filip Vujanovic</td>
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Culture

Montenegrin society was historically organized in clans and relied on a pastoral economy. Blood feuds were commonplace, as in Northern Albania. This is one of the reasons for the commonly held view in the Balkans that Montenegrin men are prone to violence. Montenegro was the birthplace of one of Tito’s most famous aides, Milovan Dilas, who became a dissident. He describes his Montenegrin childhood and family history in Land without Justice, and wrote a classic critique of communism in The New Class.
Contemporary Montenegro

World War II and after

Montenegrins played a major role in the Partisans, and were later prominent among Yugoslavia's élite. Montenegro was recognized as a republic, and Montenegrins as one of the constituent peoples in the Yugoslav federation.

Underdeveloped before the war, Montenegro received major investment during the communist period. For the most part, like inhabitants of the other poorer, smaller republics, Montenegrins supported the Yugoslav ideal.
Politics in Montenegro

Multiplicity elections of 1990

In the 1990 multiparty elections the League of Communists won a two-thirds majority in the Republic's parliament, and its head, Momir Bulatović, won 76% of the vote for President. Milo Đukanović became Prime Minister. The League was renamed the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) in June 1991.

After Croatia and Slovenia seceded followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, Montenegrins voted to join the new Federal Yugoslavia with Serbia.

Montenegro aligned with Serbia during 1991-95 wars

Incumbent President and DPS head Bulatović defeated Nikola Kostić, the former Montenegro representative on the Yugoslav eight-member presidency in the 1992 presidential elections. DPS also won 46 seats in the national assembly, and Đukanović returned as prime minister. DPS was
closely aligned with the Milošević regime during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Montenegrin forces took part in the war in Croatia, participating in attacks on the southern Dalmatian coast, including Dubrovnik. Montenegro also served as a refuge for Serbian refugees from Croatia.

Milo Đukanović

As Serbia became an international pariah in the mid-1990s, Đukanović distanced Montenegro (and himself) from Milošević. Among other gestures towards the West, he floated the idea of allowing international use of the Montenegrin ports for support of operations in Bosnia. In 1997 he ousted Bulatović as DPS party head, and became its candidate for president. He narrowly defeated Bulatović running as an independent by 51% to 49%.

DPS agenda greater autonomy from Serbia

In 1998, Bulatović created the Socialist People’s Party (SNP). In Parliamentary elections, Đukanović’s DPS won 30 seats, while Bulatović’s SNP won 29. Subsequently, Bulatović became prime minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, reaffirming his commitment to the close Serbia-Montenegro relationship.

In late 1999, Đukanović took bold steps and introduced the German Mark as legal tender alongside the Yugoslav Dinar to combat inflation, and announced Montenegrin control over the airports.

Pathway to independence not clear

In the 2001 parliamentary elections, the DPS-led coalition "Victory for Montenegro" won 36 seats, while the SNP-led opposition "United for Yugoslavia" won 33 seats. The Liberal Party got six seats and two Albanian parties got one seat each in the 77-seat parliament.

2002 municipal and parliamentary elections

The DPS and its coalition partners made gains in the 2002 municipal elections, seen as supportive of President Đukanović.

The OSCE termed the elections as generally in line with OSCE standards.

The parliamentary elections gave the DPS and its Social Democratic Party partner an outright majority. Đukanović stepped down as President to become Prime Minister, becoming a vocal advocate for independence. Filip Vujanović, a Đukanović supporter, was elected President.
"Serbia and Montenegro" Agreement
In 2003, the Yugoslav Federal Parliament adopted the Constitutional Charter for the new State of Serbia and Montenegro, delaying a referendum for three years. Vujanović and Đukanović pushed for independence.

Montenegro chooses independence in 2006
In the 2006 referendum 55.6% of Montenegrins voted for independence. There was an 86.5% voter turnout. The pro-independence campaign barely crossed the 55 percent threshold. The OSCE stated that the referendum was conducted in accordance with international standards.
Đukanović steps down as prime minister in 2006 and returns in 2008
Towards the end of 2006, Đukanović left government, but remained as DPS leader. Zeljko Sturanović succeeded him as prime minister. Đukanović returned as prime minister in 2008 after Sturanović resigned due to illness.

2008 presidential elections
Incumbent President Vujanović of the DPS won reelection in the first round with 51.4% of the vote. Runners-up Andrija Mandić of the Serb List won 20.4%, Nebojsa Medojević of the Movement for Changes won 15.7%, and Srđan Milić of the Socialist People’s Party won 12.8%.

The OSCE assessed that nearly all aspects of Montenegro’s first post-independence presidential election were in line with international standards. Areas for improvement were the continued blurring of state and party structures, and financial transparency.

Early 2009 parliamentary elections
Parliament voted to hold early elections. The government insisted early elections were necessary due to the timeframe in which to complete tasks under the EU Association Agreement. The opposition asserted, however, that the government wanted to gain a mandate before the global economic crisis hit Montenegro.

Prime Minister Đukanović’s DPS-led “For a European Montenegro” coalition won 49 of parliament’s 81 seats. The other seats went to the opposition SNP (15), the New Serbian Democracy Party (8), and the Movement for Change (5). The four Albanian ethnic parties each took one seat.

The OSCE International Election Observation Mission reported that the parliamentary elections met almost all international commitments and standards, but the process again underscored the need for further democratic development. The observers evaluated the voting and counting process as being highly positive, with very few incidents reported. The observers noted, however, that lack of public confidence remained a key challenge, as frequent allegations of electoral fraud and the blurring of state and party structures created a negative atmosphere among many voters. Other challenges include the need to harmonize and reform the electoral framework, lack of adequate legal redress, and insufficient critical reporting by most broadcast media.

2013 presidential election
Incumbent Vujanovic wins close race
Vujanovic was declared winner of the April 7 presidential election by the State Election Commission, with 51.21% of the vote, compared to independent candidate (supported by most opposition parties) Miodrag Lekic with 48.76% of the vote. Turnout was almost 64%. Lekic first disputed the outcome and filed a complaint with the Election Commission, but finally went along with the results.

The OSCE-led International Election Observation Mission’s statement of preliminary findings termed that the election professionally and efficiently administered, but allegations of misuse of state resources and blurring of the line between state activities and candidate campaigning were
at odds with OSCE commitments and Council of Europe standards.

**OSCE**

The OSCE established a [Mission to Montenegro](https://osce.org) in 2006. The mission operates under a general mandate to promote the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments in cooperation with the government and local NGOs and institutions.
EU, COE, NATO

Montenegro signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU and joined the Council of Europe in 2007. Montenegro submitted its application for EU candidate status in 2008. Montenegro’s EU application stalled in 2009, as EU members split over whether to continue enlargement during the current economic situation. Montenegro secured its candidate status in 2010.

The 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit welcomed Montenegro’s decision to develop an Individual Partnership Action Plan and invited the country to begin an intensified dialogue for membership. In 2009, Montenegro was granted a Membership Action Plan, the final step in an application for membership in the organization. Montenegro has deployed a small contingent to Afghanistan since 2010, and participates in UN peacekeeping missions.
Other issues

Unresolved issues from the 1991-95 War

BiH brought a lawsuit at the International Court of Justice in 1993 against the now defunct Yugoslavia (and then Serbia-Montenegro) for aggression and genocide in the Bosnian war.

A Bosnian war crimes court in Sarajevo sentenced Montenegrin Veselin Vlahovic to a maximum of 45 years imprisonment in April 2013 for crimes he committed as a member of the paramilitary White Angels, allied to the Bosnian Serb Army during the Bosnian war.

Feelings also run high in Croatia concerning Montenegrin involvement in hostilities against Croatia, especially the shelling of Dubrovnik in 1991. Montenegro and Croatia agreed in 2008 to have the International Court of Justice arbitrate the status of the Prevlaka Peninsula.

Corruption and crime

There is widespread suspicion that major political figures have amassed personal fortunes through criminal activities or corruption. Among others, former President and Prime Minister Đukanović have been accused of ties to mafia groups involved in tobacco smuggling. Warrants for his arrest were issued in Italy. In 2008, Đukanović made a low profile visit to the prosecutor’s office in Bari, Italy to address the accusations against him. All charges against him were dropped in 2009.

On 2004, a prominent journalist, Dusko Jovanović, was murdered. An editor of the opposition newspaper Dan and a deputy in parliament for the opposition Socialist People’s Party, he took a stand against Montenegrin independence, and wrote investigative reports on smuggling in the Republic. There have been allegations that senior political figures were implicated in the crime, although this was never proven. In 2006, a Podgorica Court cleared the only suspect in the case following a lengthy trial. The murder remains unsolved, underlining the concern of many that violence and fear are continuing components of Montenegrin politics.
Terrorism

Eighteen Albanians from the Malesija area, a predominantly Albanian region near Podgorica, were arrested in 2006 and charged with setting up a group to launch an armed separatist rebellion. Police stated that they found weapons and explosives hidden near the town of Tuzi, in Malesija. The plot allegedly was launched with help from groups in Kosovo and the U.S. Six percent of Macedonians are ethnic Albanians.
CHAPTER 8

Kosovo

Kosovo is a former autonomous region of Yugoslavia. This chapter contains the following:

• Key information
• Historical background
• OSCE involvement
• Recent developments
### Key information

#### Geography

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#### People

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#### Government

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Historical background of Kosovo

An anomaly in the Yugoslav system

Kosovo (or, in Albanian, Kosova) and its majority Albanian population always constituted an anomaly in the Yugoslav system. More numerous than Macedonians, Montenegrins and Slovenians, Albanians were categorized as a nationality or narodnost. The rationale was that unlike the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, Albanians constituted the majority in a neighboring nation-state, Albania. Thus they already "had" their own state. Instead of being grouped into a single Republic, Yugoslavia's Albanian population was divided between three Republics (Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia) and constituted a linguistic and cultural minority in all three. The largest number lived in Kosovo, where they constituted a majority, and where Albanian cultural and political activism was concentrated.

1974 Constitution gave Kosovo status close to that of a Republic

Tito's government gave federal funding to aid development in Kosovo, especially in the 1960s and 1970. Much of the funding was spent on public buildings and housing in Pristina, the capital. The city's University was opened in 1970 and attracted Albanian students and intellectuals from all over Yugoslavia. The 1974 constitution granted Kosovo status close to that of a Republic, with a government, constitution, control of legal and educational systems, and representation in the presidency of Yugoslavia.

Kosovo did not have right to secede

As an "autonomous province" of Serbia, Kosovo resembled republics in every respect save one: it did not have the constitutional right to secede. Additionally, Albanians were not recognized as a "narod" or constituent people of Yugoslavia. Gaining Republic status remained part of the agenda of Kosovo's Albanian leaders.

Tensions between Serbs and Albanians

Police repression continued throughout the 1980s against Albanians. At the same time, Serbian emigration from the province increased, as did Serbian media assertions of atrocities committed by Albanians against Serbs. Tensions between Serbs and Albanians continued to rise and came to a head after Milošević’s accession to power in Serbia in 1987.

Milošević stripped Kosovo of its autonomy, staging a vote by the province's parliament, effectively to dissolve itself. Protests over specific grievances, including a hunger strike by Albanian miners at the Trepa lead and zinc mines, evolved into massive demonstrations, prompting violent reprisals by police as had occurred in 1981.
Organized non-violence

Kosovo Albanian’s set up parallel administration

Milošević’s regime set about eliminating Albanian employees from state institutions, including schools, hospitals, factories, and public administration. Kosovo’s Albanian political leaders resisted. In 1989, Ibrahim Rugova founded the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), and in 1990, with wide support declared Kosovo a republic. This established a "parallel administration" in Kosovo.

In September 1991, Rugova’s parallel administration organized an underground referendum which received overwhelming support for independence. In the elections that followed, LDK dominated the new parliament, and Rugova became president. The "shadow state" offered employment and services to Kosovo’s Albanians who had lost their jobs and who were increasingly treated as second-class citizens by the Serbian authorities.

Kosovo’s Albanian population reacted with non-violence

Under Rugova’s leadership, Kosovo’s Albanian population preached and practiced non-violence. As Yugoslavia moved to a break-up, the two sectors of Kosovo -- a Serb-dominated official administration, and a rival Albanian society and parallel administration -- rarely clashed and little violence occurred.
Bush Administration warning to Milosovic
A clear message from the first Bush Administration to Milošević also served to temporarily curb potential Serbian repression by making clear that such actions would be met by U.S. intervention.
After Dayton

Uneasy impasse

The uneasy impasse in Kosovo was brought to an end after the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. The U.S.-brokered peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not address the situation in Kosovo, and Serbian military resources shifted in anticipation of action in Kosovo.

Kosovo Liberation Army

In the meantime, a new force had appeared in Kosovo, calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA (in Albanian, UÇK) and targeting the Serbian presence in the province.

The KLA’s spokesman, Adem Demaçi, advocated unification with Albania. At the same time a younger generation of militant leaders emerged, the most prominent being Hashim Thaçi.

By early 1998, violent clashes between the KLA and Serbian police were widespread, and Rugova’s leadership of Kosovo’s Albanians increasingly came into question. Rugova was re-elected as president by Kosovo Albanians, but responding to demands from his electorate called for independence. The U.S. tried to persuade both sides to moderate their positions. But violence continued to escalate as Serbian forces sought to destroy the KLA and regain control of the province.
Violence, KVM, peace conference, and more violence

The stepped-up fighting displaced over half a million people, which culminated in major successes for Serbian security forces in September 1998. The threat of NATO air strikes in October finally forced Milosevic to cease all-out offensives, withdraw some forces, and permit international observers.

The OSCE sent approximately 2,000 international civilian personnel as part of a Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), which had a verification. The mandate called for the KVM to verify the agreement brokered by U.S. Ambassador Holbrooke in October 1998. However, since the OSCE did not have an existing recruitment roster of potential candidates for deployment, the mission was slow to be filled. The KVM reached about 1,400 persons when the decision was made to withdraw its personnel from Kosovo as violence continued to escalate.

Military activity continued on both sides. In mid-January 1999, international observers reported that Serbian security forces killed over 40 Albanian civilians in the village of Račak. The threat of airstrikes forced the Belgrade government to attend a peace conference in Rambouillet in February and March. The Albanian delegation included Rugova and Thaçi, but not Demaçi. Albanian delegates signed an agreement (together with the U.S. and UK) that called for almost 30,000 NATO soldiers to enter Kosovo to ensure compliance: the Serb (and Russian) delegation refused, and the Serbian parliament confirmed its decision.
Ethnic cleansing

Evidence of mass killings

In the face of ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians by Serbian security forces, and amid international determination not to permit mass murder of civilians as had occurred in Bosnia, a NATO air campaign was launched against Yugoslavia in March 1999 and continued for almost three months.

After the air campaign began, the scale of Yugoslav military operations against the Albanian civilian population increased, and Serbian paramilitaries also began to operate in the province. Widespread occurrences of rape and mass killings of at least 2,000 Kosovo Albanians occurred, and hundreds of thousands of people were forced from their homes. Fearing for their own safety from government forces and the paramilitaries, over half of Kosovo's Albanian population sought refuge outside Yugoslavia, either in Albania or Macedonia. Family or friends sheltered a majority of the refugees privately; others were housed in camps. The KLA, meanwhile, continued to fight against Yugoslav forces.
Kosovo refugees fleeing their homeland, Biace area (FYROM)1
March 1999. (UNHCR/RLeMoyne)
UNMIK established

NATO military and UN civilian presence take over in Kosovo

In the face of NATO’s air campaign, Milošević agreed to the withdrawal of Serbian military and paramilitary forces from Kosovo. Kosovo Albanian refugees began to return, and Serbs and others began to leave. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 authorized a military NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and civilian UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). NGOs also mushroomed in Pristina and elsewhere, to provide services and assist in the rebuilding of civil society.


KFOR Deploys. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 was adopted on 10 June 1999 and on 12 June, the first elements of the NATO-led Kosovo Force, or KFOR, entered Kosovo. By 20 June, the withdrawal of Serbian forces was
Postwar instability

There was an initial spurt of "revenge" killings of Serbs and perceived collaborators, which further hastened the departure of those who considered themselves targets.

Different international bodies took responsibility for different aspects of UNMIK’s operations: Pillar 1 humanitarian assistance was led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (phased out by 2000), Pillar 2 Civil Administration was led by the UN, Pillar 3 Democratization and Institution Building was led by the OSCE, and Pillar 4 Reconstruction and Economic Development was led by the EU. UNMIK worked to reestablish law and order; international civilian police were deployed. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo organized the training of local police, in addition to its wider role in institution building, organization of elections, human rights monitoring and support for a democratic media.

The KLA was demilitarized and members formed or joined various political parties. In addition, several thousand KLA members became the nucleus of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), having an emergency disaster response mission. Some KLA members, however, retained arms and continue to use them for political and private purposes.

Deadly violence was used in political struggles among Albanians. The 2000 municipal elections were preceded and followed by assassinations of political leaders. One of Rugova’s closest aides was killed within days of the LDK victory, and this was followed by the violent deaths of several former KLA leaders.

The mayor of Suhareka, Uke Bytyqi, was shot to death in 2002. In 2003, former Kosovo military leader Tahir Zemaj was killed in broad daylight in Peja/Pec, together with his son and nephew. Zemaj was one of several witnesses killed after testifying in the war crimes trial that convicted a group of ex- KLA members (including Ramush Haradinaj’s brother Daut Haradinaj). In 2005 a bomb unsuccessfully targeted President Rugova’s motorcade in Pristina. The following month Ramush Haradinaj’s brother Enver was ambushed and killed.

Serbs continue to be targets in Kosovo. Major violence broke out in March 2004, after an incident in which three Albanian boys were drowned after claims (later shown to be false) that Serbs chased them with a dog. In widespread anti-Serb rioting and organized attacks by Kosovo Albanians, 28 people died and over 500 houses were destroyed before order was restored. UN personnel and vehicles were also targets for attack. By June 2004, 270 people had been arrested for their part in the riots.
Self-government

Municipal elections in 2000 and Assembly elections in 2001 established the basis for democratic self-government in Kosovo. A government with limited powers under the authority of UNMIK was formed in 2002. Rugova’s LDK had 47 seats, Hashim Thaçi’s PDK 26 seats, and the Serbian Povratak (representing only 11% of the popular vote) 22 seats in the Kosovo Assembly. The Assembly elected Rugova President of Kosovo.

The 2004 Assembly elections resulted in the LDK maintaining its leadership of Kosovo politics, winning 45% of the vote, compared to the PDK’s 28%, and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo’s (AAK) 8%. Kosovo Serbs boycotted the elections and followed the hard-line position of Serbian Prime Minister Kostunića’s government and the Serbian Orthodox Church. The LDK and AAK formed a government, with AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj as prime minister. Haradinaj resigned after his indictment for war crimes. (He would be acquitted by The Hague Court in 2008, but ordered to face a partial retrial in 2010). Bajram Kosumi became prime minister in 2005. Agim Ceku replaced Kosumi as prime minister in 2006.
CHAPTER 8

Kosovo

Ramush Haradinaj (Courtesy of the ICTY)

Bajram Kosumi (Kosovo Assembly website)
Death of Rugova

President Rugova died in 2006. The Assembly elected LDK Secretary General Fatmir Sejdiu as President.

LDK leaders competed to replace Rugova, leading to splits in the party and a sharp drop in public support. This benefited the former political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Hashim Thaçi, whose PDK has been the leading party since then. The other party that emerged from the KLA leadership, Ramush Haradinaj’s AAK, has been damaged by having leaders faced with war crimes and corruption charges. Moreover, these parties are regionally-based, rather than class or ideology-based. This makes it hard for any of them to build a broad base of public support.

2007 Assembly elections

Thaçi’s PDK became the largest party with 34.3% of the vote in the Assembly elections, followed by the LDK with 22.6%, the New Kosovo Alliance with 12.3%, the Democratic League of Dardania-Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo with 10%, and the AAK with 9.6%. The Reformist
ORA with 4.1% failed to cross the 5% threshold to win a seat. Kosovo Serbs again boycotted the elections at the urging of the Serbian Government. Thaçi became prime minister in 2008, leading a PDK, LDK and New Kosovo Alliance coalition.
Kosovo achieves independence

Kosovo under 1244
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 adopted in 1999 dictated the withdrawal of Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces and authorized the establishment of KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo, but did not define the province's final status.

“Standards before status”
UNMIK announced a “standards before status” policy in 2002, followed by a Standards Implementation Plan a year later that was endorsed by the UN Security Council. The plan specified the standards to be achieved for a multi-ethnic, stable and democratic Kosovo.

Ahtisaari proposal
In 2005, Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide was named UN Special Envoy for Kosovo to review progress achieved on standards with the goal of preparing Kosovo for final status discussions. Later that year, former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari took on the role of UN Special Envoy to broker discussions on final status.

The Ahtisaari proposal presented to Belgrade and Pristina in 2007 addressed Kosovo’s future constitutional arrangements, ways to protect its communities and their rights, decentralization, the role of an international civilian and military presence, protection of religious and cultural heritage, and economic and property issues. A timetable was proposed for implementation once the settlement came into force.

The proposal specified that Kosovo would have its own national symbols, the right to conclude international agreements, and the right to seek membership in international organizations. A new Kosovo Security Force would also be established, as well as a domestic intelligence agency.

Belgrade and Pristina officials held several rounds of fruitless talks in Vienna. Ahtisaari delivered his final report and comprehensive proposal on Kosovo’s status to the UN Secretary General, who sent them to the members of the Security Council in March 2007.
Mr. Ahtisaari presents his proposal to President Tadic of Serbia in Belgrade 2 February 2007. (UNSEK)

**Action shifts to contact group**

The UN Security Council's initial efforts to reach agreement on Kosovo's status stalled when Russia insisted that any decision had to be accepted by Belgrade and Pristina. Russia also backed Belgrade's rejection of independence for Kosovo, including the Ahtissari proposal for supervised independence. Meanwhile, Pristina rejected any outcome that did not involve independence.

The UN Secretary General shifted action to the Contact Group in August 2007, asking a U.S.-EU-Russia troika to undertake "active engagement" with Serbia and the Kosovo Albanian authorities to reach an agreement on status by the end of the year.

Serbian and Albanian positions proved irreconcilable. The Security Council was unable to reach any conclusions when it met to discuss Kosovo status. Russia called for continued negotiations, while the U.S. and EU argued that the potential for negotiations had been exhausted and more talks would not make any difference.

**New international actors**

As Russia split with the other Contact Group members over Kosovo, the U.S. and key European states formed an **International Steering Group (ISG) for Kosovo** in February 2008 to help guide its democratic development. These states saw formation of the ISG as envisioned in the Ahtisaari proposal and consistent with the objectives of Security Council resolution 1244. The ISG focused on good governance, multi-ethnicity and the rule of law.

The ISG approved Dutch diplomat Pieter Feith as the International Civilian Representative (ICO) for Kosovo. The EU also designated Feith as the EU Special Representative for Kosovo, and established an **EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX)** to deploy in Kosovo.

**Independence**

The Kosovo Assembly adopted a **declaration of independence** in February 2008. The declaration accepted the Ahtisaari proposal, an international civilian presence to supervise its implementation, the EU-led rule of law mission, and NATO's continuing security role. Serbia, backed by Russia, termed the declaration illegal.

As of September 2013, 106 UN member states had recognized Kosovo’s independence. This included the U.S. and 22 EU member states (UK, Germany, France, and Italy among them). Kosovo had also joined the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Council of Europe Development Bank.

In the first weeks after the declaration, Serbs burned border posts in north Kosovo and Kosovo Serbs pulled out of the Kosovo Police Service and Kosovo institutions at the instigation of Belgrade. Serbs occupied the UNMIK courthouse in Kosovska Mitrovica, which led to a violent confrontation with UNMIK and KFOR, leading to the death of an UNMIK policeman.
Meanwhile, Serbian authorities sought ways to extend their governance to areas of Kosovo inhabited primarily by Serbs. Serbia sponsored local elections and parliamentary elections in majority ethnic Serb areas of Kosovo.

**Kosovo’s new constitution**, verified by International Civilian Representative Feith, took effect June 15.

The “NEWBORN” obelisk unveiled at the celebration of the 2008 Kosovo declaration of independence proclaimed earlier that day, 17 February 2008, in the capital, Pristina. (Courtesy of Cradel)

The border crossing at Jarinje between Kosovo and Serbia is set ablaze on July 27. (UNHCR)

**After Independence**

The EU Rule of Law Mission Kosovo (EULEX) deployed with international and national staff in December 2008. Serbia agreed to EULEX’s deployment after working out a six-point agreement with the UN that would provide greater autonomy to Kosovo Serbs. Pristina rejected the points. Nonetheless, the Security Council approved these arrangements in the UN Secretary General’s “reconfiguration” of UNMIK. EULEX slowly extended its role to the Serb majority municipalities in
north Kosovo. UNMIK was sharply reduced in 2010 but, at Belgrade’s insistence, continues to exist. KFOR continues to maintain security with about 5,000 troops as of 2014.

In 2009, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was launched. The KSF did not replace the Kosovo Protection Corps which was disbanded several months later. KFOR was charged with mentoring the KSF and bringing the force to full operational capability. NATO established a NATO Advisory Team to mentor and advise the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force on force operations. Kosovo authorities have also been implementing the provisions of the Ahtisaari proposal.

Kosovo authorities announced in March 2014 plans to start a 10-year process to establish an army, with 5,000 soldiers and 3,000 reservists.

On Wednesday the 16th of February 2011, General Enrico Spagnoli, Commanding General for the formation of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) attended the KSF final fire fighting exercise at KFOR HQ fire fighting station. General Enrico Spagnoli from KFOR welcomed Brigadier General Imri Ilazi and Colonel Skender Hoxha from KSF. This fire fighting basic training course started on 31st of January 2011 with 13 candidates from the Civilian Protection Regiment of KSF. During the graduation ceremony the fire fighting certificates were presented to all the successful KSF candidates. (NATO/ACO/PAO)

2010 Assembly elections - first after independence

The resignation of President Sejdiu over a constitutional issue led to a breakup of the governing coalition, and a vote of no-confidence that prompted the holding of Assembly elections in 2010.

PDK again came in first with 32.11% of the vote, followed by LDK with 24.69%, the Self-Determination Movement (Vetevendosje) running for the first time with 12.69%, Alliance for the Future (AAK) with 11.04%, and New Kosovo Alliance with 7.29%.

A European parliament observer team reported that serious allegations of fraud had been brought to its attention. The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations said that the
elections had been orderly, but there had been breaches of procedure and irregularities. American Ambassador Dell was quoted as saying that he had personally observed ballot stuffing.

December 20, 2010. An election official walks along stacks of ballot boxes at the Count and Results Center in Pristina following the December 12 parliamentary elections in Kosovo. (IFES/Maia Lyons)

2011 presidential election

Pacolli’s has short-lived presidency

The Assembly elected Bahgjet Pacolli president in February. He resigned five weeks later after the Constitutional Court declared the election to be unconstitutional due to the absence of a quorum. No fault was found in his actions. (Pacolli became first deputy prime minister in Thachi’s government.)

President, 22 February - 30 March 2011. (Kosovo presidential website)

Jahgaga elected president

Atifeta Jahjaga was elected as a consensus candidate in April 2011. She was the first woman, first non-partisan, and youngest candidate ever to be elected president. Jahjaga was previously Deputy Commander of the Kosovo Police Service.
Thaci accused of war crimes

Former Swiss prosecutor and politician Dick Marty prepared a report for the Council of Europe in 2011 claiming that Prime Minister Thaçi had led a mafia network involved in the drug trade, and was linked to the 1999 kidnappings of Kosovo Serbs and others who were killed in Albania for their organs.

The COE adopted the report and called on Kosovo and Albania to investigate. Former chief prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Carla Ponti first made the organ trafficking charges in a 2008 book. Thaçi rejected the charges.

EULEX organized a Special Investigative Task Force (SITF) to investigate the accusations. The SITF recommended that a special court be set up to address the issue. In April 2014 Kosovo's parliament approved establishment of a special court under Kosovo law with international staff that would meet outside the country to handle such sensitive cases. The SITF issued a status report on July 29, 2014.

Belgrade-Pristina dialogue sponsored by EU

Serbia and Kosovo have engaged in bilateral talks sponsored by the EU since 2011, most recently at the level of prime minister. Serbian President Nikolić and Kosovo President Jahjaga also met in the EU-facilitated dialogue in Brussels in February 2013. Initial agreements were achieved on:

- Freedom of movement across the administrative border for persons and cars.
- Belgrade giving Pristina copies of land registries and documents on births, deaths and marriages in Kosovo
- Mutual Recognition of university degrees.
- Belgrade acceptance of Kosovo Custom stamps saying "Customs of Kosovo"
- End of trade embargo, allowing trade between Serbia and Kosovo
- Integrated operations at crossing points in north Kosovo
- Representation of Pristina at regional organizations
- Liaison officers exchanged between Belgrade and Pristina stationed in EU missions

At the tenth round hosted by EU Foreign Affairs and Security High Representative Ashton, Prime Ministers Dacic and Thaci initialed a 15-point First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations (text in English follows text in Albanian, from Pristina Express) on April 19, 2013. Belgrade agreed to give up its parallel institutions in Kosovo, especially in the north, in return for receiving protections for the Serbs proposed in the Ahtisaari proposals. In addition, Belgrade agreed not to block Pristina’s progress toward EU (and international) acceptance. An implementation committee with EU participation was established. Ashton has been meeting periodically with Dacic and Thaci to resolve outstanding implementation issues.

**Serbia’s Liaison Officer in Pristina**

Serbia’s Liaison Officer in Pristina, Dejan Pavicevic, arrived in Pristina in June 2013. He has described his job as talking to everyone, including international community representatives, Albanians, representatives of NGOs, and solving specific everyday problems and implementing the Brussels agreement.

![Dejan Pavicevic (International Radio Serbia)](image)

**2013 local elections take place throughout Kosovo**

Problems in Serb-majority north Kosovo in first round

Mayors were elected in 10 municipalities in Kosovo in the November 2013 first round of voting, and run-offs were to be held December in a second round for 25 more.

There were significant irregularities marring the elections in the Serb-majority municipalities in north Kosovo, complicating this important aspect of the April 19 Agreement. Extremists attacked and destroyed the ballot boxes at three polling centers. OSCE staff facilitating the elections had
to leave for their safety. The elections took place normally in Serb communities elsewhere in Kosovo. (A re-run of the voting in the three polling centers took place peacefully on Nov. 17, facilitated by OSCE, with security provided by Kosovo Police, EULEX and KFOR.)

2013 local elections proceed smoothly during second round

The second round of local elections was peaceful and orderly. Incumbents lost heavily, showing that voters wanted change. Over two-thirds of municipalities changed hands. PDK took 10 cities, including Prizren. LDK took 9, including Peja, Gjilan and Ferizaj. AAK won only in 3. Paccoli’s AKR won 2 for the first time. PDK splinter IQM, led by Fatmir Limaj, won in Malisheva. The Serbian List, backed by Belgrade, took 9 municipalities. The SLS, the first Serb party to accept the Ahtisaari package in 2008, won in only one municipality.

Shpend Ahmeti, a former civil society leader running on the Vetevendosja ticket won in Pristina, becoming the first non-LDK mayor in the capital city. He won more than three times his own party's votes, suggesting more a personal than a party win. His party will not control the municipal assembly, and will have to work with the mainstream parties it has long attacked.

In another first, Mimoza Kusari became the first woman mayor in Kosovo, winning election in Gjakova.
PDK remains leading party in 2014 Assembly elections

Prime Minister Thaci’s PDK remained the largest party with 30.71% of the vote (winning 36 seats), followed by Mustafa’s LDK with 25.74% (31 seats), Kurti’s Self-Determination with 13.52% (16 seats), Haradinaj’s AAK with 9.62% (11 seats), and Limaj’s Civic Initiative for Kosovo with 5.24% (6 seats). Paccoli’s New Kosovo Alliance with 4.66% of the vote failed to reach the entry threshold. The remaining 20 seats in the 100-member Assembly were allocated to national minorities (Serb, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Bosniak, Turkish, and Gorani.) Voter turnout dropped from 47% in the previous Assembly election to 41%. Serbia for the first time urged Kosovo Serbs to vote, but their turnout was low.

The election process was marred by the murder following the election of a candidate from the PDK, Elvis Pista, in the town of Orahovac.

Although the OSCE Mission in Kosovo no longer has an executive role in Kosovo’s elections, it did play technical and advisory support roles for the process in the north.

The EU Election Observation Mission reported that these elections were transparent and well-organised, and consolidated progress made in the 2013 municipal elections.

Mitrovica flashpoint

June 2014 clash at bridge over the Ibar

Ethnic Albanians in south Mitrovica trying to break through police lines clashed with Kosovo police and EULEX officers at the Ibar bridge on June 22, 2014, in one of the worst incidents of civil unrest since Kosovo’s independence. Police had to ask for assistance from KFOR, who positioned armored vehicles to block access to the bridge. Protest organizers were responding to north Mitrovica Serbs placing what they called a peace park of concrete pots and eath in place of a barricade removed from the bridge the week before.
CHAPTER 8

Kosovo

*Bridge over the Ibar (Wikipedia Commons)*
Kosovo realities

Ancestral home to Serbs and homeland to Albanians

The very name of the province reveals its double character, seen as ancestral home by Serbs and homeland by Albanians. Serbs call it Kosovo, and Albanians Kosova.

Memorial at Gazimestan, dedicated to the Serbian knights killed at the 1389 battle at the Field of Blackbirds, outside Pristina. (USIP/Ted Feifer)

International presence

The NATO-led military presence KFOR (Kosovo Force) has been in Kosovo since 1999. KFOR has dropped from an initial high of 50,000 to about 5,000 troops today. Italy, the U.S., Germany, Turkey and France (in descending order) are the largest troop contributors, together with 25 other NATO and non-NATO states. At the insistence of the international community, Kosovo has accepted a continued international presence.

UNMIK, which provided international administration following the 1999 War, transferred most of its
responsibilities to the International Civilian Office/EU KFOR Special Representative and EU Rule of Law Mission EULEX. The EU has extended EULEX’s mandate to 2014, restructuring it and reducing the mission to 2,250 staff. Most of its regional offices will be closed, and mobile teams will operate out of Pristina. UNMIK was sharply reduced in 2010, retaining a limited reporting and political observation function.

VETËVENDOSJE!, (Movement for Self- Determination), now the third largest party in the Assembly, has actively criticized the limitations on Kosovo sovereignty before and since independence.
CHAPTER 8  Kosovo

OSCE Mission in Kosovo
The [OSCE Mission in Kosovo](#) is the largest OSCE field operation. It formally continues to be a component of UNMIK, and is mandated with building democratic institutions, and promoting human rights and the rule of law. Ambassador Jean-Claude Schlumberger took office as the Head of OSCE Mission in Kosovo in 2012.
UNMIK

Farid Zarif, an Afghan diplomat, has been the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative and head of a much-reduced UNMIK since 2011. UNMIK continues to exist at the insistence of Serbia.

Infrastructure problems

Infrastructure shortcomings still pose major constraints: electricity and heat supply problems continue, especially in the winter. In 2012, the Kosovo government sold the Electricity Distribution Company (KEDS) to the highest bidder, a Turkish consortium Limak Yatirim Enerji and Calik Enerji Sanayi for 26.3 million Euros. The Institute for Development Policy in Pristina, has publically voiced concern that the KEDS privatization lacked transparency. There is also fear the Turkish consortium will have a monopoly. Soon after the KEDS privatization, Kosovo’s Energy Regulatory Office raised electricity bills by 8.9% in a country where 16% of citizens live on $1 per day, and face an unemployment rate between 40% and 45%.

Shut-offs of electricity by the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK) over reported non-payment of
bills, especially to Serb villages, continues to cause controversy. In January 2013, for example, KEK disconnected 220 commercial sites in the Prizren area from power, stating that these consumers have never paid their bills, totaling 20 million Euros.

Implementation of investment and maintenance consistent with the electricity transmission development plan 2010-2019 seeks to make Kosovo’s transmission system more reliable. Nevertheless, Kosovo’s system operator still does not participate in regional mechanisms to plan and remunerate electricity transit, due to differences over the country’s status. The resulting lack of control threatens the stability of Kosovo’s power system and causes Kosovo to lose out on transit revenue.

As of 2010, 74% of Kosovo’s population subscribed to mobile phone services. Fixed phone penetration is among the lowest in Europe.

Demarcating borders

Kosovo and Macedonia began border demarcation talks in 2008, mediated by the Office of the International Civilian Representative. A border agreement was concluded in 2009.

Violence

Statistics for crime in Kosovo dropped following the war but sporadic violence continues against Serbs and Roma by some of the Albanian majority, and between Albanian political factions. Extremist Serbs in the divided city of Mitrovica also have resorted to violence. In 2012 Kosovo Serbs in north Kosovo barricaded the main roads after the authorities in Pristina installed customs officers at the Jarinje and Brnjak border crossings with Serbia. Three Serbs and one KFOR soldier were injured in clashes when KFOR attempted to remove the barricades.

Two EULEX vehicles carrying six customs component staff on regular rotation to Gate 1, near Zvecan in north Kosovo, came under fire from unknown attackers on September 18, 2013. One Lithuanian EULEX member was killed and three wounded. The wife of Kosovo Mitrovica mayoral candidate Oliver Ivanovic was attacked by Serb extremists in their home in early September 2013. Ivanovic, who is the secretary of the Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija in the Serbian government, has urged Kosovo Serbs to participate in the November 3 local elections resulting
from the April Agreement, and not boycott them as advocated by Serb extremists. Attacks have continued on the homes of Serb candidates running in the Mitrovica elections. In January 2014, Dimitrije Janicijevic, a Serb from the Liberal Party, defeated in the race for mayor but elected to the municipal council of Mitrovica North, was murdered by Serb extremists.

Hidden arms are a reality. The UN Development Program estimated in 2003 that there were 330,000-460,000 small arms held by civilians in Kosovo. Illegal weapons caches are periodically seized by KFOR.

Lack of Prospects
Kosovo has an unemployment rate of 45%, the highest in the Balkans. It also has the youngest population (70% younger than 35), and the highest youth unemployment rate (40% of those unemployed).

Many of Kosovo's large young population, as elsewhere in the Balkans, see their best employment hopes abroad, due to the lack of opportunities and the depressed economic situation.
CHAPTER 9

Albania

This chapter contains the following sections:

• Historical background
• OSCE involvement
• Recent developments
Key information

Geography

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Ohrid

The Ohrid region, shared between Macedonia and Albania, has been listed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for its cultural and natural sites.

People

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<td>Religions</td>
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### Albania

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### Government

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Historical background of Albania

The gradual end of communist rule

The end of the Cold War was not marked by revolution in Albania. President Ramiz Alia, who was Hoxha’s anointed successor was under popular pressure and pushed through gradualist reform. In 1990, religious expression that had been banned since 1967 was permitted once again, and soon after the first opposition party formed.

In 1991 elections, the Socialist Party won 67% of the vote, and reformer Fatos Nano became prime minister, only to be replaced when the opposition Democratic Party joined a government of national salvation.

A law permitting private ownership was passed in 1991, which included land. In December, the Democratic Party withdrew from government, forcing new elections in 1992. The Democratic Party swept to victory, and Alia resigned as President, replaced by Sali Berisha.

Ramiz Alia, left, with his predecessor Enver Hoxha, center, on May 1, 1983. Hoxha ruled Albania from 1944 until his death in 1985. (c) ATA
Facing foreign and domestic issues

The new government faced considerable foreign and domestic challenges. As Yugoslavia broke up, Albania denounced Serbian aggression against Kosovo Albanians. Tensions also rose with Greece over the Greek minority in Albania, and the large numbers of illegal labor migrants from Albania in Greece.

At home, unemployment continued to rise. The new government expended considerable energy in prosecuting former leaders, among them Hoxha's widow, and former President Alia, for crimes against the state and the Albanian people committed during socialist rule. Many were jailed, including Fatos Nano, for corruption.

The activities of Berisha's government at this time fueled impressions of a north-south, (Geg-Tosk) linguistic divide. Berisha's power base was in the North, while Nano’s was in the South. On Kosovo in particular, where a majority of Albanians are Geg speakers, Berisha had been more strident in asserting Albania's interests than his rivals.
Pyramid schemes collapse

Berisha's Democratic Party won again in 1996, despite international concerns over voting procedures. The party oversaw the rapid introduction of a free-market economy. Pyramid investment schemes, which promised large and swift returns on capital investment, were numerous.

In early 1997, a number of these schemes collapsed, having enriched some at the expense of many smaller investors, who reportedly lost over a billion dollars. This prompted a virtual insurrection against the state in the Tosk-dominated south of the country, which spread later to Tirana and the north. Huge quantities of weapons were looted from barracks and armories. Berisha’s government lost control of the southern third of the country, and Berisha himself was the target of an assassination attempt.

It is estimated that over 2,000 people were killed in the course of the unrest.

Many blamed Berisha's Democratic Party (DP). Unable to campaign in southern Albania, the DP was soundly defeated by the Socialist Party and its allies, who won 117 seats out of the 155-seat assembly in the June and July 1997 internationally-supervised election.

OSCE Presence in Albania

Responding to the breakdown of law and order, the OSCE Permanent Council deployed an OSCE “Presence” in Albania in April 1997. The OSCE Presence worked with a multinational protection force (established under UN Security Council Resolution 1101) and other international organizations and NGOs to help stabilize the country.

The OSCE Presence continues to focus on democratization, promotion of human rights, and election reform.
Hostility between political parties escalates

The Socialist Party’s Rexhep Mejdani was elected Albania’s President in 1997. Fatos Nano returned as prime minister. Democratic Party members continued to protest the election process. Hostility between the rival parties escalated after DP MP Azem Hajdari was shot and killed in Tirana in September 1998. In response, DP supporters stormed government offices. A coup was attempted by radical DP followers after Hajdari’s funeral with the goal of seizing power and murdering Nano. To avoid the mob, Nano fled and resigned as prime minister.
Referendum to change the Constitution
In late 1998, a referendum to change the country’s Constitution provoked further political conflict. Cracks had by now developed within the two main parties as well as between them. Nonetheless, the referendum was held with 98% voting in favor of the new draft Constitution.

Kosovo Albanian refugees enter Albania
The Kosovo crisis overshadowed Albania’s domestic problems when half a million Kosovo Albanians crossed the border to find refuge in 1999. Two-thirds of the refugees stayed with host families, 20% in tent camps and 13% in collective centers. During this time, the OSCE Presence monitored the border and responded to the refugee crisis. Humanitarian aid alleviated Albania’s
stretched resources. The NATO intervention in Kosovo allowed most Kosovo Albanians to return home by the end of the year.

*Food distribution to refugees on the border between Kosovo and Albania, May 1999. (OSCE/Lubomir Kotek)*
Domestic politics

2001 parliamentary elections
Meta’s Socialist Party wins

The old alignments proved decisive. The Socialist Party won 73 seats in the 140-member legislature, and Ilir Meta was made Prime Minister for another term, fighting off a challenger backed by Nano. The Union for Victory (UFV) coalition, led by the Democratic Party, won 46 seats. They denied the legality of the process, but Meta’s government retained international support, largely due to its policy of preserving or restoring good neighborly relations, and urging Kosovo and Macedonian Albanians to use dialogue rather than violence to achieve political aims.

Prime Minister Ilir Meta visiting NATO Headquarters, May 7, 2001. (NATO)

2002 presidential election
Moisiu elected

Parliament elected ex-general Alfred Moisiu President in 2002, replacing Rexhep Meidani. The 72-year old Moisiu was acceptable to the major political parties and had good contacts with the West. His election was a hopeful sign of cooperation between rivals Nano and Berisha, who cooperated for the first time in a decade. Moisiu selected Nano as Prime Minister - his third time holding that office.

In 2003 Meta quit the government after calling on Nano to speed reform and stamp out corruption. Subsequently, Meta’s faction blocked the appointment of a foreign minister. The rift between Meta and Nano weakened the Socialist Party, pitting a younger generation of reformists against more experienced political actors, and also serving to strengthen Berisha’s position.

In 2004, Berisha orchestrated large-scale street demonstrations against Nano in Tirana. International support remained behind Nano, who after Meta’s resignation negotiated with smaller parties to keep the government functioning. Although Nano appeared vulnerable to accusations
of corruption and insider dealing (his wife was a leading businesswoman), Albanians also resented Berisha’s attempts to stir up disorder.

2005 parliamentary elections
Berisha’s Democrats win, as Socialists split
Berisha’s Democratic Party bested Nano’s Socialist Party in the 2005 parliamentary elections, with another 10 parties also taking seats thanks to proportional representation. The Socialist Party split prior to the election, with Meta forming his own Socialist Movement for Integration.

The OSCE International Election Observation Mission said the elections complied only partially with international standards for democratic elections. While the elections were competitive and the media provided a diversity of electoral information, there were numerous technical and administrative problems with the potential for electoral abuse.
People look for their names on the voter list during parliamentary elections in Albania, 3 July 2005 (OSCE)

Rama replaces Nano as head of Socialist Party
Nano resigned his leadership of the Socialist Party after it lost its majority in the 2005 parliamentary elections. He was succeeded by Tirana Mayor Edi Rama.

Nano also failed to win the support of his party or the opposition in the 2007 presidential election. He subsequently formed a new party, the Movement for Solidarity.

Edi Rama (Facebook)

2007 local elections
Disagreement over voting procedures delayed elections by one month. Minister Berisha and Socialist Party leader Rama finally agreed on voting lists and types of voter identification voters would need.

The Socialists were the decisive victors in the elections, winning the majority of offices contested in 384 urban and rural communities, including almost all the major cities.
The International Election Observation Mission noted that while the elections provided for a competitive contest, an opportunity was missed to conduct elections fully in accordance with international standards. Although, overall the election day was calm, voting was marred by procedural shortcomings and local tensions.

Ink is applied to the hand of a voter in the Albanian local elections, 18 February 2007. The International Election Observation Mission report noted that the ink was controversial, with opposition parties claiming it could be easily removed. (OSCE/Urdur Gunnarsdottir)

**Topi elected in 2007 presidential election**

The Assembly held several rounds of indirect elections over June and July 2007. An opposition boycott first prevented any candidate from winning the necessary three-fifths. Finally, Bamir Topi of the Democratic Party won with 85 out of 100 votes, thanks to five opposition members who voted for him.
2009 parliamentary elections

Berisha edges out Rama

A coalition led by Berisha’s Democrats won 46.9% of the June vote (70 seats), edging out Rama’s Socialist-led coalition with 45.34% of the vote (66 seats). The Socialist Alliance for Integration led by former Prime Minister Ilir Meta won 5.56% of the vote (4 seats). Berisha’s coalition took the north of the country, while Rama’s coalition rook the south.

According to the International Election Observation Mission’s final report, while these elections met most OSCE commitments, they did not fully realize Albania’s potential to adhere to the highest standards for democratic elections. The report also implicitly criticized the insufficient commitment of Albanian political parties to respect the letter and the purpose of the law and carry out their electoral duties in a responsible manner in order to preserve the integrity of the process.
Parallel Vote Count monitors observe ballot counting to report results of Albania’s June 2009 parliamentary elections (USAID/Paul Cohn)

As a precaution against fraud, each voter’s finger was marked with ink during Albania’s 2009 parliamentary elections, Elbasan, 28 June 2009. (OSCE/Roberto Berna)

2012 presidential election
The ruling Democratic Party put forward Xhezair Zaganjoni, a member of the Constitutional Court, as a proposed consensus candidate. The opposition Socialists, however, rejected Zaganjoni, claiming that the Democrats had failed to consult them prior to his candidacy. After three failed rounds, Zaganjoni withdrew from the race. Finally, Interior Minister Bujar Nishani was elected president.
2013 parliamentary elections

Rama's Socialist coalition wins decisively
Rama's Socialist-led coalition took 57.7% of the vote (and 84 seats) compared to Berisha's Democrat-led coalition with 39.4% of the vote. Some 62 parties and 2 independents contested the elections, with most joining coalitions lead by the Democrats or Socialists. Berisha took responsibility for the loss and resigned as party leader.

The preliminary report of the International Election Observation Mission noted that the elections were competitive with active citizen participation, with genuine respect for fundamental freedoms, but that the atmosphere of mistrust between the two political forces tainted the electoral environment and challenged administration of the whole process. Instances of blurring between state institutions and party interests were noted. Technical preparations for the elections were termed adequate. One shooting incident marred election day.
A man scanning the voters list for his name outside a polling station in Elbasan during the Albanian presidential elections, 23 June 2013. (OSCE/Thomas Rymer)
Prospects

Little enthusiasm for Greater Albania
The concept of Greater Albania -- uniting ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania in one state -- has not featured largely in domestic politics, other than strong support for Kosovo's Albanians. It appears that there is little enthusiasm for ethnic union among Albania's younger elites.

Euro-Atlantic Integration
Albania is eager to join Western Institutions like the EU and NATO.

Albania signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in 2006, and a Visa Facilitation Agreement in 2008. The European Commission informed Albania, however, that it needed to implement further reforms before it would be ready for EU candidate status. In 2009 the European Commission submitted the Questionnaire on accession preparation to the Albanian government. Albania submitted its answers to the EU in 2010, but was not accepted due to the slow implementation of reforms by squabbling political parties. In 2012, the European Commission determined that Albania still needed to comply with 8 of 12 key priorities before it would be able to receive candidate status and start accession negotiations.

Albania was invited to join NATO in March 2008. The country became a full member in 2009.

Impact of the global economic crisis
The United Nations Development Program has estimated that forty percent of Albania’s work force is working outside the country. Sixty percent of migrant workers are between the ages of 18 and 29 when they move away. Remittances, once estimated to be $1.5 billion a year or 15% of Albania's GDP, have steadily declined due to the ongoing global economic crisis and are now a little over $1 billion. The amount of money migrant workers remit, which has dropped drastically, is in turn affecting domestic consumption.

Albania is also directly affected by Greek and Italian economic problems, due to the fact that these two countries are Albania’s main trading partners. Despite these negative trends, it is expected that GDP growth in Albania will help the country weather the current economic crisis.
Albanian Culture

Urban and rural contrasts

Tirana's active cafe and restaurant-filled "Block," the enclave of the former communist ruling elite, can make one forget the under-development of rural Albania.

The legacy of Albania's communist isolation is still visible in the bunkers that dot the countryside.
Kanun: traditional code of honor

The traditional code of honor in Albania's northern mountains was based on a code of law called the Kanun. Among the key concepts on which it rests is Besa, which can be translated as honor, pledge, or alliance -- somewhat similar to the idea that one's word is one's bond. These ideas are now being reinvigorated all across the country: old feuds, which arise when Besa is violated, are said to lie behind much of contemporary politics. Kanun drives sharp distinctions between men and women, and tends to exclude women from public life.

Religion

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the government generally respects individual beliefs. Islam and Christianity are both practiced in Albania, with Muslims (Sunni and Bektashi Sufis) approximately 70% of believers, Orthodox Christians 20%, and Roman Catholics 10%. A 2010 Gallup Global Reports survey showed that only 39% of Albanians say that religion plays a role in their lives. This is not surprising, given that religious practice was precluded during most of the communist period.

Transportation

Since 2000 the government has upgraded many of the major transport arteries, and several new major highways have been built. The completion of the excellent highway between Kukes and the center has sharply reduced travel time from the scenic mountainous north of the country (and Kosovo) to Tirana and the coast at Durres. Still, many of the roads outside the capital are in poor repair. In 2010, the Albanian government received 50 million Euros from the EBRD for reconstruction of rural roads.

Public transportation remains difficult, but there are now plenty of private taxis for hire by visitors. As vehicles more than doubled in recent years, traffic fatalities have increased.
Tunnel at Thirre in northern Albania on the road from Kukes to the south (Wikipedia Commons)
CHAPTER 10

Challenges Facing Southeastern Europe
Minorities across the Balkans

The Roma

The origins of the Romany people, often referred to as Roma or Gypsies, remain a subject of speculation. There is a general consensus that these people, who practice various religions, have ties to a migrant movement from India to Europe during the Middle Ages. Their numbers are disputed, as they have been historically subjected to persecution by European states. Hitler’s Nazi regime killed over half a million Gypsies between 1941 and 1945: since the end of the Cold War, they have been targets of racist attacks and discrimination in many places in Europe, notably in Romania and Hungary, where they are the most numerous and visible minority.

A memorial to the Sinti and Roma murdered by the Nazis opened in Berlin in 2012. (Voice of America)

Roma economically and politically marginalized

Official statistics put the total number of Roma in the Balkans at around 200,000, 70% of which are in Serbia. Advocacy NGOs claim a more realistic figure is around 800,000, with around 50% in Serbia, 30% in Macedonia, 10% in Albania, and smaller numbers in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

What is generally agreed is that they have been economically and politically marginalized. In Serbia and Macedonia, where they are most numerous, they have formed political parties, and appear to enjoy better relations with the Slavic majority than with the large Albanian minorities. Most of the Roma from Kosovo left in the wake of the war; Roma were alleged by Albanians to have colluded with Serbs during the conflict.

Humanitarian organizations are working to improve educational and health services, but Roma nonetheless continue to face significant challenges. An example of programs designed to assist Roma integration and access to public services is the Best Practices for Roma Integration Project, funded by the European Commission and implemented by OSCE field missions and ODIHR in the western Balkans.
More than half of the Roma communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina still live in informal settlements. (OSCE)

Ambassador Janez Lenarčič (r), the Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, talking with a Brnješ/Bërnjesh (Kosovo) resident during a visit to the Roma settlement to inspect the new waste-water collector built there with the aid of a grant from the Best Practices for Roma Integration project, 5 September 2013. (OSCE/Tomislav Georgiev)
Conflicting interpretations of the past

Impacts on contemporary politics

In Southeastern Europe, conflicting interpretations of the past and its influence on the present play an important role in contemporary politics. Challenges to accepted historical truth continue to divide large national groups.

It is common for politicians and others to insist that those living today have a direct connection with, and bear responsibility for, evils committed in the past. Current political debates often center on the linked issues of blame, responsibility and justice. When trying to assess rival arguments there is often noticeable difference in time-scales that different sides invoke, and the intensity of perceptions of injustice.

Another concern is the tendency to claim extended and continuous national and, where feasible, state roots in current or expanded territories.

Bosnia

Serbian accounts highlight the Ottoman Turks conquest of the Balkans from outside the region.

During the Bosnian war and in post-Dayton Bosnia, extreme Serbian nationalists to assert that Bosniaks are the descendants either of invaders of the region, or of natives who betrayed their "true" faith by adopting Islam under Ottoman occupation.

Both arguments turn Bosniaks into “foreigners” in their home republic, and justify Bosnian Serb attempts to reclaim territory for themselves.

Kosovo

In Kosovo, site of the Ottoman victory of 1389, Serbian association of predominantly Muslim Albanians with the Ottoman Turks again serves as justification for a view that they are not the true owners of the land. The complex fact that Albanians fought alongside Serbs in the battle, and also that some Serbs fought on the Turkish side is discounted in favor of a simplistic version of the past, populated only with aggressors and victims.

Croatia

In Croatia, at least under the leadership of Tudjman, nationalist enthusiasm highlighted the autonomous state of Croatia between 1941 and 1944. The fact that the ruling regime of that time, the Ustaša, was a fascist movement, influenced and funded by Mussolini’s Italy in the 1930s for his own political purposes, was ignored—as was the regime’s participation in the murder of Jews, Romany and Serbs in collaboration with Nazis. The use of symbols from the Ustaša period in Tudjman’s Croatia sent a frightening signal to Croatia’s Serbs. This has diminished in the post-Tudjman period.

Historical assignment of blame, responsibility and justice

These different ways of viewing the past clearly have an impact on people’s interpretations of the recent conflicts in the region. When challenged over the justice of their actions, or the actions of their compatriots, some people immediately seek refuge in historical parallels. Current aggression
is presented as legitimate revenge to past victimization.

Recently, a number of scholarly initiatives have sought to reconcile different versions of the past. These include projects at the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in South-Eastern Europe, at http://www.cdsee.org/, and the Scholars Initiative at http://www.cla.purdue.edu/history/facstaff/Ingrao/si/scholars.htm.
Regional issues

Reduced international interest
Albania and all the countries of the former Yugoslavia save Slovenia, face daunting economic challenges. Humanitarian and development assistance reached high levels in the late 1990s, but international attention has moved away from the region. Accession to the EU remains a goal for all these countries, but it remains unclear how long this process will take, especially for the states with weak economies and unresolved political challenges.

Criminal economies
As long as many states in the region continue to be institutionally weak, grey and black economies continue to flourish. The OSCE recognizes this regional problem and has called for regional cooperation among police and customs bodies.

The Balkan states face a tough challenge in dealing with transnational organized crime, which has long and deep roots in the region, and was further bolstered by the wars and instability of the 1990s.

The area continues to remain vulnerable to instability due to enduring links between business, politics and organized crime, according to the report on Crime and its Impact on the Balkans released by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in 2008.